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by 
Kittiwat Chunchaemsai 
 
Abstract 
The conflict of laws relating to the assignment of receivables raises characterisation 
difficulties. Based on the property-contract approach currently employed in legal 
systems, the characterisation of legal issues as contractual and proprietary results in 
complications. No general solution can be reached regarding the proprietary aspects of 
assignment, especially third parties’ effectiveness and priority issues. This thesis 
establishes that the core cause of the difficulty resides in the property-contract approach 
itself. It therefore attempts to provide a new approach to the conflict of laws for 
assignment, namely, a rights-based approach. It argues against the property-contract 
approach on the ground that assignment is not a hybrid of contract and property. Rather, 
it proves that the true legal nature of assignment is not the transfer of items of property, 
but a contractual method for transferring contractual rights to payment in receivables. 
The assignment of receivables not only creates triangular relationships between 
assignor, assignee and debtor, but also has external effects on third parties. In the rights-
based approach, there is no need to differentiate between the contractual and proprietary 
aspects of assignment. The conflict of laws for assignment is established based on the 
relationships of rights between relevant persons, i.e. the relationship of rights between 
assignor and assignee, that between assignee and debtor, and the relationship of rights 
as it affects third parties including priority issues. These are proposed as being governed 
by the law of assignment and of assigned receivables. The rights-based approach 
eliminates the need to refer to property law and resolves characterisation difficulties. 
Consequentially, it grants an opportunity to modernise and harmonise the law of 
assignment based on contract law. In this way, positive outcomes vis-à-vis the financial 
practice concerning the assignment of receivables are the end result of this approach.   
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1 
 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
This research focuses on conflict of laws relating to international voluntary assignments 
of receivables.1 As an overview, there are three main legal subjects that are studied as 
these constitute the core substance of the thesis. The first subject is receivables, which 
are the object of assignment. The second subject is assignment, which is the method of 
transfer. While these two are substantive laws for the assignment of receivables, the 
third subject is conflict-of-law rules for an international assignment of receivables. 
On the substantive aspect, this research questions the legal nature of the assignment of 
receivables. It argues against the notion that assignment has a hybrid legal nature 
involving contract and property. It intends to advance the notion that receivables are 
intangible and contractual rights. Assignment is a contractual method for transferring 
receivables. The true substantive nature of an assignment is a contractual matter. The 
legal treatment of assignment differs substantially from the traditional concept of 
property law which has been developed on the basis of tangible things.  
From a conflict-of-laws perspective, this thesis doubts that the property-contract 
approach is the best solution to assignment in international scenarios. It will propose a 
rights-based approach to deal with assignment. In contrast to the property-contract 
approach, conflict-of-law rules under the rights-based approach are based on the true 
                                                             
1
 Voluntary assignments are assignments that parties voluntarily choose or intend to make and effect. 
Involuntary assignments, by contrast, are assignments that occur by operation of law, such as 
subrogration of surety or insurance contracts and succession; see M Smith, Law of assignment: the 
creation and transfer of choses in action (OUP 2007) ch 16; the scope of this thesis is also limited to 
assignments by way of contract. Other forms of activities which can be viewed as assignments, such as 
by way of trust, are beyond the scope of this research. See OR Marshall, The assignment of choses in 
action (Pitman 1950) 80–99. 
     For the term receivables, it can be used to cover receivables either created by or originated from 
contracts and other legal actions. An example of the latter is a tort claim. However, it is not within the 
scope of this thesis. It is only contractual receivables that are the subject of the thesis. This matter is 
explained further in Chapter 2.   
2 
 
legal nature of assignment, i.e. an international transfer of contractual rights. Rather 
than characterising the legal issues arising out of assignment into contractual and 
proprietary, the rights-based approach treats them all together. Characterisation 
difficulties resulting from the mixing of contract and property will thus be resolved. The 
central claim in the thesis is that an international assignment of receivables should be 
regarded as a purely contractual matter. With everything considered, the current law 
which is based on the property-contract approach is inappropriate for the assignment. 
The rights-based approach is the methodology that ought to be adopted into a legal 
system the rules of which relate to the assignment, specifically conflict-of-law rules. 
To introduce this thesis in more detail, the content of this chapter is structured as 
follows: firstly, the background to and development of this topic are illustrated in the 
first section. Next, the research question this thesis intends to address is presented in the 
second section. The research methodology this thesis utilises to develop its content is 
stated in the third section. Then, in the fourth section, the originality in research and 
significant contribution to knowledge are brought out. Finally, the whole structure of 
the thesis is described in the fifth section.   
 
1.1 Research background 
It is not surprising that some leading legal scholars when referring to conflict of laws 
declare in their textbooks and articles that conflict-of-law rules for intangible things, 
e.g. receivables, are especially difficult to state with certainty.2 This subject is also one 
                                                             
2
 AV Dicey, L Collins, JHC Morris, Dicey, Morris and Collins on the conflict of laws (15th edn, Sweet & 
Maxwell 2012) 1355; JJ Fawcett, JM Carruthers and PM North, Cheshire, North & Fawcett: private 
international law (14th edn, OUP 2008) ch 30; M Bridge, ‘The proprietary aspects of assignment and 
choice of law’ (2009) 125 LQR 671; R Fentiman, ‘Assignment and Rome I: towards a principled solution’ 
(2010) 4 LFMR 405; TC Hartley, ‘Choice of law regarding the voluntary assignment of contractual 
obligations under the Rome I Regulation’ (2011) 60 ICLQ 29; H Beale, M Bridge, L Gullifer and E 
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of the most intractable areas of private international law.3 Its complexity stems from 
various difficulties which are linked to the nature of receivables themselves, as well as 
their appearance in different governing legal systems involving international financing 
and secured transactions in cross-border activities.4 Because of their nature, i.e. they 
only exist as legal rights or claims, the traditional approach of property law is unsuitable 
to regulate transfers of receivables. Traditional conflict-of-law rules for property which 
focus on the law of the place where things are located cannot be easily specified. Such 
an approach is likely to create complexity and confusion, in both theory and practice, 
regarding dynamic diversification in the trade and transfer of inherent rights in such 
intangible things.5 Given the vast amount of international trade and many transfers of 
receivables in international financial markets, which are subject to different legal 
systems, comprehensive proposals from practitioners and academics to modernise and 
harmonise this area of law are required in order to facilitate financing activities linked to 
receivables.6 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
Lomnicka, The Law of Security and Title-Based Financing (2nd edn, OUP 2012) 677; P Rogerson, Collier's 
conflict of laws (4th edn, CUP 2013) 396. 
3
 JM Carruthers, The transfer of property in the conflict of laws: choice of law rules concerning Inter Vivos 
transfers of property (OUP 2005) 145; M Moshinsky, ‘The assignment of debts in the conflict of laws’ 
(1992) 108 LQR 591. 
4
 Problems regarding conflict of laws are present in many aspects of international financing and secured 
transactions, for either tangible or intangible things. But, as stated at the beginning, this thesis only 
deals with international assignments involving receivables. See, for example, Beale, et al. (n 2) ch 22; A 
McKnight, The Law of International Finance (OUP 2008) ch 4.  
5
 Intangibles rights cover a wide range of things. There are, for instance, (a) those which are pure 
intangibles or rights in actions which are contractual in nature such as a receivable from a loan or a sale 
contract; (b) those which are negotiable instruments and shares; and (c) those which are intellectual 
property such as copyright and trademarks. See Carruthers (n 3) 144–145; Dicey, et al. (n 2) 1155–1356; 
Fawcett, Carruthers and North (n 2) 1225; Rogerson (n 2) 396. 
6
 See, for example, NB Cohen, ‘Harmonizing the Law Governing Secured Credit: The Next Frontier’ 
(1998) 33 Tex Int'l LJ 173; Buxbaum HL, ‘Unification of the Law Governing Secured Transactions: 
Progress and Prospects for Reform’ (2003) 8 ULR 321; Goode R, ‘Harmonised Modernisation of the Law 
Governing Secured Transactions: General-Sectorial, Global-Regional – An Overview’ (2003) 8 ULR 341; 
NO Akseli, ‘International harmonisation of credit and security laws: the way forward’ in M Andenas and 
CB Andersen, The theory and practice of harmonisation (Edward Elgar 2012) 551–571; also HC Sigman 
and EM Kieninger, Cross-Border Security over Receivables (Sellier 2009); NO Akseli, International secured 
transactions law: facilitation of credit and international conventions and instruments (Routledge 2011) 
ch 8; BIICL, ‘Study on the question of effectiveness of an assignment or subrogation of a claim against 
third parties and the priority of the assigned or subrogated claim over a right of another person’ 
4 
 
An assignment of receivables has been regarded as a hybrid legal institution of contract 
and property.7 A receivable, such as a loan or a sale price, comes from a contract, e.g. a 
contract for a loan and a contract for a sale. But it is also treated as a kind of property. 
When a receivable is transferred by way of assignment, it is seen as not only a 
contractual right that is assigned, but also a property. The assignment of receivables can 
be done by way of either sale or security. By sale, receivables are transferred outright 
from an assignor to an assignee. By security, receivables are used as security or 
collateral, e.g. to secure a loan. In terms of legal effects, while the former is a transfer of 
proprietary rights, the latter creates a security interest in the receivables.8 Turning to an 
international assignment where a foreign element is involved and the laws of several 
jurisdictions may be linked as a governing law, conflict-of-law rules are thus needed to 
decide what law(s) shall be an appropriate applicable law. A suitable connecting factor 
must be found to establish an appropriate link between assignment and jurisdiction. 
Law(s) must be chosen from among the various jurisdictions.9 A central role of conflict-
of-law rules is to identify substantive rules that shall regulate a cross-border 
assignment.10 Without conflict-of-law rules, persons who are involved in the assignment 
will not know with certainty what are their rights and obligations that flow from the 
assignment. Without knowing what the applicable law is, their legal positions cannot be 
determined. From the concept that an assignment is a hybrid of contract and property, 
conflict of laws relating to both contract and property is brought into the picture in order 
to deal with an assignment in an international context. As has been stated, this is a legal 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
<http://ec.europa.eu/justice /civil/files/report_assignment_en.pdf> accessed 9 October 2015; European 
Commission, ‘Action Plan on Building a Capital Markets Union’ (COM (2015) 468 final) 23. 
7
 A Flessner and H Verhagen, Assignment in European private international law: claims as property and 
the European Commission's" Rome I Proposal" (Sellier 2006) 2–4; Bridge (n 2) 677–678; Dicey, et al. (n 2) 
1356–1357.  
8
 Beale, et al. (n 2) 286; this matter is considered in Chapter 3. 
9
 See Rogerson (n 2) ch 9; TC Hartley, International commercial litigation: text, cases and materials on 
private international law (OUP 2009) ch 22. 
10
 See A Dickinson, ‘European private international law: embracing new horizons or mourning the past’ 
(2005) 1 JPIL 197. 
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area where the ‘autonomous law of contract collides with [the] non-autonomous law of 
property’.11  
An explicit example of a conflicting approach between contract and property occurs in 
the Raiffeisen case.12 In this case, it was argued by a third party that the assignment 
between assignor and assignee of the claim under the insurance contract was not valid 
since it did not satisfy the requirement of notifying the debtor in the appropriate way, as 
required by French law. The assignment was not perfected, i.e. it was not made effective 
against third parties. This is typically regarded as a proprietary matter. The Rome 
Convention 1980,13 Article 12, was the law applicable at the time of the case. According 
to an authoritative report, Article 12 of the Rome Convention was not intended to apply 
to proprietary matters of an assignment.14 Rather, it was suggested that such a matter, 
which is about the method for passing a property, should be governed by the lex situs of 
the assigned receivables.  
Despite that, Mance LJ in the English Court of Appeal characterised the question as 
contractual and not proprietary.15 The issue was viewed as what steps were necessary 
for an assignment to take place between an assignee and a debtor. It concerned the 
relationship between assignee and debtor. And this did not involve any property rights, 
it was simply a contractual matter. The judgment was that the effect of the assignment 
in question was determined by reference to the law of the assigned claim, according to 
Article 12(2) of the Rome Convention. That was English law while the law of lex situs 
of the receivable would be French law.16 Today, this problem would be decided under 
                                                             
11
 Bridge (n 2) 677. 
12
 Raiffeisen Zentralbank Österreich AG v Five Star General Trading LLC [2001] EWCA Civ 68. 
13
 The 1980 Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (‘Rome Convention’). 
14
 M Giuliano and P Lagarde, ‘Report on the Convention on the law applicable to contractual obligations. 
Official Journal C 282, 31 October 1980’ (1980) 10. 
15
 Raiffeisen Zentralbank Österreich AG v Five Star General Trading LLC [2001] EWCA Civ 68, para 34. 
16
 ibid paras 43, 81 and 83. 
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Article 14 of the Rome I Regulation17 which is the descendant of the Rome Convention. 
Based on the approach developed by this case, it would give the same result.  
The development of principles and practice for conflict-of-law rules dealing with an 
international voluntary assignment of receivables occurs not only in Europe and the 
United Kingdom but also in the United States. In Europe, to find the most suitable law 
governing the assignment of receivables, especially for proprietary matters, several 
solutions have been proposed. The law of the domicile of the owner, the law where the 
receivable is located, the proper law of the assigned receivables, and recently, according 
to the Rome I Regulation, the law which applies to the contract of assignment, have 
been developed and applied.18 Furthermore, the law of the assignor’s habitual residence 
was proposed when revising the rules.19 This choice of law is also a rule that has been 
imposed by the United Nations Convention on the Assignment of Receivables in 
International Trade (‘Receivables Convention’).20 In the United States, the laws which 
govern various aspects of legal issues arising from assignment, for either absolute 
transfer or security purposes, are contained in Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial 
Code (‘UCC’). It is the law of the assignor’s location that has been advanced as a 
conflict rule to govern proprietary matters of assignment.21 Besides, the British Institute 
of International and Comparative Law (‘BIICL’) has published a detailed comparative 
study on the conflict of laws for assignment.22 This study is an attempt to identify the 
advantages and disadvantages of contractual and proprietary approaches that are 
applicable in various countries. Its purpose is to see which conflict-of-law rules would 
                                                             
17
 EC Regulation 593/2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (‘Rome I Regulation’). 
18
 See art 14, recital 38 and art 27(2) 
19
 Commission of the European Communities, Proposal for a Regulation on the Law Applicable to 
Contractual Obligation (Rome I) (COM (2005) 650 Final) 19. 
20
 Art 30. 
21
 S 9-301(1).  
22
 BIICL (n 6).  
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be more suitable for assignment. However, in its conclusion, a comment is made that 
‘no general solution is perfect’.23 
 
1.2 Research questions 
When considering the hybrid legal nature of contract and property, legal issues arising 
from the assignment of receivables are divided into contractual and proprietary. It is the 
‘property-contract approach’ to assignment which is currently employed, not only in 
substantive aspects of law but also in conflict-of-law rules. Characterisation between 
contract and property is a preliminary matter that must be addressed. Depending on the 
category that a legal issue is classified under, it will be subject to either conflict-of-law 
rules for contracts or conflict-of-law rules for property. The property-contract approach, 
then, points to various possible choices of law rules. They are lex situs of receivables, 
the law of receivables, the law of assignment, the law of the assignor’s location, or even 
a combination of these rules. Although there are many debates and arguments regarding 
all these choices,24 none of them appear to be universally accepted. No choice is perfect. 
No consensus can be achieved. Choice-of-law rules for assignment remain a mystery 
subject. This thesis will therefore attempt to provide a solution to this problem.  
A core hypothesis of this research is that the property-contract approach does not treat 
an assignment of receivables according to its true legal nature. The hybrid approach of 
                                                             
23
 ibid 402.  
24
 See Dicey, et al. (n 2) 1357–1358; Fawcett, Carruthers and North (n 2) 1226–1240; Carruthers (n 3) ch 
6; Akseli, International secured transactions law: facilitation of credit and international conventions and 
instruments (n 6) ch 8; Rogerson (n 2) 398–400; also Sigman and Kieninger (n 6); Flessner and Verhagen 
(n 7); Rogerson, ‘The Situs of Debts in the Conflict of Laws: Illogical, Unnecessary and Misleading’ (1990) 
49 CLJ 441; Moshinsky (n 3); THD Struycken, ‘The proprietary aspects of international assignment of 
debts and the Rome Convention, Article 12’ (1998) 3 LMCLQ 345; EM Kieninger and HC Sigman, ‘The 
Rome-I proposed Regulation and the assignment of receivables’ (2006) 1 ELF 1; Bridge (n 2); Fentiman  
(n 2); J Perkins, ‘Proprietary issues arising from the assignment of debts: a new rule?’ (2010) 6 JIBFL 333; 
HLE Verhagen and SV Dongen, ‘Cross-border assignments under Rome I’ (2010) JPIL 1; P Kiesselbach, 
‘The assignment of debts: which law applies to the question who has the better proprietary right to an 
assigned debt?’ (2011) 26 BJIBFL 544; Hartley, ‘Choice of law regarding the voluntary assignment of 
contractual obligations under the Rome I Regulation’ (n 2); BIICL (n 6)  
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contract and property is not really the right way to proceed. As explained in the 
previous section, it cannot produce a harmonised solution. By itself, it raises further 
complications and only confuses the issue. The main research questions posed by this 
thesis are as follows: firstly, on the object of assignment, what is the true legal nature of 
receivables? Are they contractual rights or property? And why in the development of 
legal practice have they been treated as a kind of (intangible) property? Is it necessary 
for a receivable to be considered as property for it to be transferable? Secondly, on the 
method of transfer, what is the true legal substance of an assignment? How is it made? 
What is its effect? Is it really a hybrid of contract and property institutions? Thirdly, and 
lastly, regarding the conflict-of-law rules regulating an international assignment of 
receivables, is the property-contract approach suitable for the assignment and those 
rules? If not, what is a more appropriate approach to this subject matter? Is it a rights-
based approach advanced in this thesis?  
 
1.3 Research methodology 
To address all the research questions sketched out above, the principal methodology that 
is used throughout the thesis is comparative doctrinal legal research. A doctrinal enquiry 
will be conducted into legal concepts, categories and the criteria of law for an 
assignment of receivables, including conflict of laws in an international scenario.25 This 
is to investigate the logic and reasoning of legal rules and the property-contract 
approach in the current legal system. Their relationships will be analysed. And their 
areas of difficulty will be revealed.26 The aim of this doctrinal analysis is to argue that 
                                                             
25
 PC Westerman, ‘Open or Autonomous? The Debate on Legal Methodology as a Reflection of the 
Debate on Law’ in M van Hoecke, Methodologies of legal research: which kind of method for what kind 
of discipline? (Hart 2011) 94.  
26
 See I Dobinson and F John, ‘Qualitative Legal Research’ in M McConville and WH Chui, Research 
methods for law (EUP 2007); C McCrudden, ‘Legal research and the social sciences’ (2006) LQR 632. 
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the property-contract approach does not work properly. It cannot provide answers to all 
the legal problems emanating from assignment. 
Comparative law and conflict of laws may be ‘distinct but they interact’. 27  Their 
methods and functions rely on each other. Various mainstream systems of law affecting 
the assignment will be examined. These systems are English common law, the law of 
the European Union, American law, and the laws introduced by relevant international 
instruments. Using English law as a basic comparator, similarities and differences 
within it compared to other systems shall be analysed. The task of this comparative 
analysis is to attempt to identify patterns of legal backgrounds and understandings of 
those laws. Ideal relations among them will be established.28 Presumably, they are all, 
more or less, based on the controversial property-contract approach. The difficulties that 
these legal systems have in common will be disclosed, as well as way to seek future 
improvement and harmonisation.   
Finally, this thesis will propose a new way of thinking about an assignment of 
receivables. That new way is a ‘rights-based approach’. It will contest the current 
property-contract one. Generally, the term ‘rights-based approach’ to law or ‘rights-
based analysis’ of law is described as a form of analysis that seeks to ‘develop an 
understanding of private law obligations which is driven, primarily or exclusively, by 
the recognition of rights we have against each other, rather than by other influences on 
private law, such as the pursuit of community welfare goals’.29 This thesis seeks to 
                                                             
27
 K Zweigert and H Kötz, Introduction to comparative law (T Weir tr, 3rd rev edn, Clarendon Press 1998) 
6; M Reimann, ‘Comparative Law and Private International Law’ in M Reimann and R Zimmermann (eds), 
The Oxford handbook of comparative law (OUP 2008).  
28
 See G Wilson, ‘Comparative Legal Scholarship’ in M McConville and WH Chui, Research methods for 
law (EUP 2007); Zweigert and Kötz (n 27) chs 1–3; G Dannemann, ‘Comparative Law: Study of 
Similarities or Differences?’ in M Reimann and R Zimmermann (eds), The Oxford handbook of 
comparative law (OUP 2008); G Samuel, ‘Does One Need an Understanding of Methodology in Law 
Before One can Understand Methodology in Comparative Law?’ in M van Hoecke, Methodologies of 
legal research: which kind of method for what kind of discipline? (Hart 2011); see details of the 
comparative methodology in Chapter 4. 
29
 A Robertson and D Nolan, Rights and Private Law (Bloomsbury Publishing 2011) 1; see also R Stevens, 
‘The Conflict of Rights’ in A Robertson and HW Tang, The goals of private law (Hart 2009). 
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advance an understanding of assignment based primarily on the relationship of rights 
among persons. Those persons are assignor, assignee, debtor and third parties. Its aim is 
to make clear the foundational structure and operation of substantive laws of assignment 
and to re-establish legal principles and the understanding of conflict of laws regulating 
assignment in an international context. As shall be demonstrated in the thesis, the true 
legal nature of assignment of receivables is a transfer of contractual rights to payment. 
The rights-based approach proposes to treat assignment in this way. It covers both 
contractual rights inter parties and rights against third parties resulting from an 
assignment. This is the approach that matches the real substance of assignment. This 
doctrinal methodology will also be applied in an evaluative way in order to compare 
whether the present and proposed rules can work effectively in practice. Financing 
against receivables by way of assignment which is done via market practices, such as 
factoring,30 will also be taken into consideration. The potential effects, whether positive 
or negative, if any, resulting from the new rights-based approach and its conflict-of-law 
rules will be examined. This will, as a consequence, shape the rights-based approach to 
the real practice surrounding assignment. 
 
1.4 Contribution to research 
As the thesis foundation, the central claim and argument developed herein seek to 
provide a more accurate understanding of the existing law based on the property-
contract approach and then to establish and advocate a new reform of that understanding 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
     Among different areas of private law, this kind of analysis is mostly used to analyse tort laws. See 
Robertson and Nolan (n 29); also R Stevens, Torts and rights (OUP 2009); A Beever, Rediscovering the 
law of negligence (Hart 2007); for rights-based analyses of contract and property, see SA Smith, Contract 
theory (OUP 2004); B McFarlane, The structure of property law (Hart 2008); on rights-based theories of 
law in general see EJ Weinrib, The idea of private law (HUP 1995); R Dworkin, Taking rights seriously 
(Duckworth 1977); WN Hohfeld, ‘Some fundamental legal conceptions as applied in judicial reasoning’ 
(1913) 23 Yale LJ 16. 
30
 R Goode and E McKendrick, Goode on commercial law (4th edn, Lexis Nexis 2009) 787–791; Akseli, 
International secured transactions law: facilitation of credit and international conventions and 
instruments (n 6) 28–31; F Oditah, Legal aspects of receivables financing (Sweet & Maxwell 1991) 32–35.  
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on the basis of the rights-based approach. On the theoretical side, there is as yet neither 
a clear approach nor rule regarding the international assignment of receivables in 
conflict of laws. A great deal of previous research has been conducted on the property-
contract approach to the conflict of laws for assignment. The advantages and 
disadvantages of each conflict-of-law rule have been studied, but no general solution 
has been found.31 This thesis does not approach it on that basis but rather with regard to 
the true legal nature of assignment. This research suggests that the main reason is 
because of the property-contract approach itself. As it is inconsistent with the true legal 
nature of assignment, the research identifies and specifies fundamental problems arising 
from such an approach, in terms of both substantive law and conflict of laws. By 
arguing against the property-contract approach, the thesis proposes a new way of 
thinking about and understanding this subject matter, namely, a rights-based approach. 
It intends to prove and establish that the true legal nature of assignment is a transfer of 
contractual rights and not a mixture of contract and property. An original theoretical 
analysis involves making a comparison of the rights-based approach and the property-
contract approach. Its aim is to reveal problematic difficulties caused by the latter in 
characterising the contractual and proprietary issues of assignment. Also, a new set of 
conflict-of-law rules based on the proposed rights-based approach is drawn up, so that 
to offer a general solution to this legal problem.  
On the practical side, the rights-based approach seeks to shed fresh light on a way to 
modernise and harmonise the law of assignment, hence supporting and facilitating 
international financing against receivables. It is an alternative to the traditional property-
contract one. Receivables are one of the important financial assets.32 They are utilised 
by businesses to enhance their credit and raise finance through selling or using them as 
                                                             
31
 See, for instance, BIICL (n 6); Sigman and EM Kieninger (n 6); Flessner and Verhagen (n 7).    
32
 Zweigert and Kötz (n 27) 33; Beal, et al. (n 2) 286; EP Ellinger, E Lomnicka and CVM Hare, Ellinger's 
modern banking law (5th edn, OUP 2011) 868; this matter is explained in Chapter 2. 
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security. Divergences in the law of assignment among national systems and unsettling 
debates on characterisation and choice-of-law rules based on the property-contract 
approach result in legal uncertainty. Through not knowing with certainty what law 
governs the international assignment of receivables, parties are not sure what rights and 
obligations they have. With the inability to find a general solution to the proprietary 
aspect of assignment, the diversity of national laws remains problematic. Harmonisation 
of the laws regulating receivables financing seems remote. This, in turn, creates legal 
risks; hence, there is an increase in transaction costs since the parties need to research 
and comply with many potentially governing laws.33  It is work that is not easy to 
complete without investing a lot of time, effort and resources. The property-contract 
approach has been proven to be an obstacle to harmonising transnational secured 
transaction law. The rights-based approach, by contrast, advances a set of conflict-of-
law rules to govern both the contractual and proprietary aspects of assignment. No 
characterisation of these two aspects needs to be done. No traditional proprietary 
concept of law or its difficulties needs to be referred to. The biggest obstacle to the 
harmonisation, residing in the proprietary aspect of assignment, can be overcome. The 
legal risk is minimised and legal uncertainty is avoided, hence reducing the cost of 
transaction and making credit more readily available to businesses. As such, the rights-
based approach is shown to serve the notion of harmonised modernisation of the laws 
governing the international assignment of receivables, the end result of which is to 
support and facilitate cross-border financing against receivables on a global scale.34      
 
                                                             
33
 Buxbaum (n 6); Cohen (n 6); Akseli, ‘International harmonisation of credit and security laws: the way 
forward’ (n 6) 554–557. 
34
 Burman HS, ‘Commercial Challenge in Modernizing Secured Transactions Law, The’ (2003) 8 ULR 347; 
Goode (n 6); Buxbaum (n 6).   
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1.5 Structure of the thesis 
As there are three main legal areas concerned in this thesis – receivables, assignment 
and conflict-of-law rules – its main content is categorised accordingly. To study them 
thoroughly, the thesis is structured as seven chapters. This first chapter introduces the 
international assignment of receivables in conflict of laws. Its aim is to set up core 
research problems, main research methodologies, contributions to research and also the 
thesis’s structure. 
In Chapter 2, receivables which are the object of assignment are studied. Their legal 
status, as either contract or property, is investigated through conceptual developments of 
legal classification. This chapter focuses on examining and establishing the true legal 
nature of receivables. The answer to this question will lead to further advances of the 
research in subsequent stages. Although, a receivable has been categorised as an 
intangible property, the thesis challenges this debatable issue by way of doctrinal 
research methodology. The chapter also attempts to establish a new acceptable view of 
the nature of a receivable by arguing against the current property notion. Subsequently, 
its true legal nature is proposed. Ideally, a transnational receivable should be treated as a 
contractual right, especially in terms of conflict of laws. 
Chapter 3 deals with assignment, a method of transferring receivables. The combination 
characteristics of contract and property are the main subject of research. In terms of 
historical developments, the assignment of a contractual right – or a chose in action in 
English legal terms – was formerly seen as a mere exception to the privity of contract 
doctrine. This subject fell under the law of contract and obligation. Later, it was 
classified as the transfer of an assignable property right. Assignment then takes on the 
hybrid nature of a law of contract and of property. Contractual-based and property-
based rules of the law of assignment are clarified in this chapter. Developing from the 
14 
 
supposition in Chapter 2 that receivables are contractual rights, this thesis intends to 
clarify the true legal nature of assignment. It will question and answer why the 
assignment of receivables should be straightforwardly treated as the assignment of 
contractual rights, rather than as a hybrid of contract and property.  
Chapter 4 turns to the conflict of laws regulating the international assignment of 
receivables. Conflict-of-law rules under English law and American law, including those 
of the European Union and those contained in international instruments, are considered. 
In Europe, it is the Rome I Regulation, which succeeds the Rome Convention, that 
covers this topic. International instruments significantly related to the subject are the 
UNIDROIT Convention on International Factoring 1988 (‘Factoring Convention’), the 
United Nations Convention on the Assignment of Receivables in International Trade 
2001 (‘Receivables Convention’), the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Secured 
Transactions 2007 (‘Guide’) and the UNIDROIT Principles of International 
Commercial Contracts 2010 (‘Principles’). The purpose of this chapter is to examine the 
principles and underlying policies currently applicable and to consider current global 
trends in legal reforms. Similarities, differences, advantages and flaws of these 
contemporary rules will be pointed out.  
Chapter 5 analyses the legal approaches adopted in the present conflict of laws 
concerning the international assignment of receivables. It characterises the development 
of legal approaches involving the conflict of laws for assignment to proprietary, 
contractual and mixed approaches. The analysis of those approaches links back to 
substantive laws that have been developed from the legal principles of the nature of 
assignment and conflict-of-law rules, as discussed in Chapters 2 to 4. In Chapter 5, the 
current property-contract approach is first critically analysed. Subsequently, the 
alternative rights-based approach is advanced by way of comparing to the property-
contract approach. Hypothetical cases involving the assignment of receivables will be 
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asked and answered. These cases are based on major legal disputes and problems that 
might arise in international commercial litigation. The aim is to investigate the 
application of a rule based on the rights-based approach. Using a specific situation as a 
case study will make it easier to engage in deep discussion. Moreover, this problem-
solving analysis aims to clarify one of the research questions, i.e. the extent to which the 
conflict of laws can regulate and facilitate assignment in international scenarios. 
In Chapter 6, the proposed rights-based approach to the conflict of laws vis-à-vis 
assignment is analysed. Emphasis is put on legal effects, in terms of both principal and 
practical perspectives, that might result from this new approach. By seeing assignment 
as a method of transferring receivables which are intangible marketable assets, this 
thesis does not limit its theme to legal theories and the literature. It also pays close 
attention to the practical effects, whether positive or negative, that might result from the 
application of conflict-of-law rules. The role of conflict-of-law rules for assignment in 
financial contexts is examined. The aim is to evaluate the advantages and disadvantages 
of these rules if they are applied in international financial practice. 
Finally, Chapter 7 will summarise the thesis, its research content and findings. Future 
developments to the rights-based approach and the conflict of laws for international 
assignment of receivables will also be emphasised.  
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CHAPTER 2: RECEIVABLES 
 
To study the conflict of laws for an assignment of receivables, the first legal subject 
matter of this thesis is receivables. As the object of assignment, receivables are the 
things that are transferred from an assignor to an assignee. They are the sources of rights 
and obligations between relevant persons, i.e. assignor, assignee, debtor and perhaps 
third parties. They form the core of this chapter.   
Originating from a contract, receivables are also counted as items of property.1 This 
fundamental characteristic of receivables affects the approaches that a legal system uses 
to treat an assignment of receivables. The proprietary nature of receivables raises 
specific problems in international contexts since there is no clear rule for it nor 
understanding of it. This can be seen as a problem not only in substantive law but also 
in conflict of laws. When receivables are classified as property, transferring them in an 
international scenario will be governed by conflict-of-law rules for property. By 
contrast, the governing rules shall be those for a contract if receivables are classified as 
a contract.  
As described in the previous chapter, the research questions studied in this chapter are: 
what is the true nature of receivables? Are they contractual rights or property? And why 
in the development of legal practice have they been treated as a kind of property? 
Although receivables have been categorised as property,2 this thesis challenges such a 
categorisation. It will propose that receivables should be treated as contractual rights, 
particularly in terms of international assignment and the conflict of laws. The 
methodologies adopted in this chapter are doctrinal and theoretical research.  
                                                             
1
 As described in Chapter 1, the scope of this research is limited to contractual receivables.   
2
 This matter is discussed in Section 2.2.2. 
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In developing arguments about the true nature of receivables, this chapter is divided into 
four sections. Firstly, conceptual developments of law concerned with fundamental 
ideas of things and rights will be explored. In Section Two, receivables as the object of 
assignment will be studied. Their legal character will be analysed. Subsequently, by 
arguing that receivables should not be treated in the same way as property, this chapter 
will advance in Section Three that the true nature of receivables is that of a contract and 
so they should be treated as contractual rights. Finally, in Section Four, some interim 
remarks on receivables will be made before moving on to the law of assignment in the 
next chapter.  
 
2.1 Conceptual developments 
Knowledge and reasoning in relation to law have at times been developed based on the 
inconstant beliefs, critical ideas and thoughts of a society. Legal theories and doctrines 
help us to understand laws but, in another dimension, they influence our thinking about 
the legal rules already developed and also those being developed. The classification of 
things is a fundamental concept established in a legal system. Its purpose is to 
categorise things and to deal with subsequent legal matters within a logical separated 
branch of law.3     
In this section, the legal categorisation of things is first illustrated in order to clarify the 
current legal standpoint of receivables in a legal system. Next, two of the most 
important, though controversial, subjects – i.e. intangible things and choses in action – 
will be discussed. Lastly, an attempt will be made to identify the differences between 
contractual rights and property rights. The aim of these sections is to conduct a critical 
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 See R Pound, ‘Classification of law’ (1924) 37 Harv L Rev 933; JE Penner, ‘Basic Obligations’ in P Birks, 
The classification of obligations (Clarendon Press 1997) 81. 
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analysis of the prominent legal concept of receivables. It will serve as a basis for further 
arguments.   
 
2.1.1 Legal classification of things 
The legal classification of things affects the way a legal system considers a thing, and 
the way a thing is treated in a legal context. It is as such important to know where a 
‘thing’ stands from a legal viewpoint if one is to understand and argue about governing 
rules. In this thesis, the research is on receivables, which are ‘intangible things’.   
(1) Meaning of things 
The word ‘things’ is legal language that is both elastic and elusive. 4  It is also 
problematic when an attempt is made to clarify a phrase such as an ‘interest in things’. 
The meanings of these words are hard to define with certainty. However, several 
theoretical approaches have been formulated to draw conclusive definitions. One of the 
broadest definitions that has been proposed on the basis of human perception is that ‘[a] 
thing is, in law, some possible matter of rights and duties conceived as a whole and 
apart from all others, just as, in the world of common experience, whatever can be 
separately perceived is a thing’.5   
Where economics or business is concerned, a clear definition of either a thing or 
property is not a vital issue. That is because this approach is likely to determine that 
everything valuable should be also regarded as a thing in law.6 Still, the word ‘things’ in 
property law differs somewhat from the same subject-matter as ‘things’ in the sense of 
                                                             
4
 CK Allen, ‘Things’ (1940) 28 Cal L Rev 421, 421. 
5
 F Pollock, ‘What is a Thing’ (1894) 10 LQR 318, 318. 
6
 See JW Harris, Property and justice (Clarendon Press 1996) 145–149; RA Posner, Economic analysis of 
law (6th edn, Aspen Publishers 2003) 29–33, where property rights are defined as the right to the 
exclusive use of valuable resources; JE Penner, The idea of property in law (OUP 1997) 63–64, where it is 
stated that ‘not all valuable rights are regarded by the law as property rights’. 
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wealth. Being considered as wealth, things are treated as an external form of value and 
in those terms an opportunity cost.7 The result of this is that no member of a class of 
things enjoys any special status.8 In contrast, in terms of legal treatment, legal systems 
have laid down patterns of vocabulary which tend to control perception;9 and there are 
many different aspects, either major or minor, in the legal doctrines and rules dealing 
with each class of things.  
With regard to the terms ‘interest in things’ or ‘right in things’, it has been observed that 
there exists a different aspect in the legal meaning of this phrase in comparison with the 
word ‘things’.10 The interest in a thing might not be identical to that thing in itself. For 
example, it differs if one owns a thing, such as a horse, outright or one owns a half share 
in that horse with another. 11  Nevertheless, sometimes these two words are used 
interchangeably. The scope of the conception of things has been extended to include the 
realisation of interests in those things.12 Therefore, speaking of a thing by itself might 
also refer to the legal interest in such a thing, e.g. ownership and possession.13  
(2) Classification of things 
Things are broadly classified according to their physical and material nature. Two main 
categories are tangible or corporeal things, and intangible or incorporeal things. This is 
the division of property generally used in the Roman and civil-law system.14 Tangibles 
are subdivided into immovable things such as land, and movable things such as goods. 
In the case of intangibles, it can simply be said that they are things that have no physical 
                                                             
7
 B Rudden, ‘Things as Thing and Things as Wealth’ (1994) 14 OJLS 81, 86–87. 
8
 ibid. 
9
 ibid.  
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 F Lawson and B Rudden, The law of property (3rd rev edn, OUP 2002) 19. 
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 ibid. 
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 Allen (n 4) 440. 
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 Rudden (n 7) 83. 
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 WW Buckland and P Stein, A text-book of Roman law from Augustus to Justinian (3rd edn, CUP 1963) 
185–185, where it is stated that ‘Physical objects are given illustrations of res coporales. Res 
incorporales were abstract conceptions, notional things, and, as res meant assets, res incorporales were 
rights’; see also JHM van Erp and B Akkermans, Cases, materials and text on national, supranational and 
international property law (Hart 2012) 31–36 and 365–368.      
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or material object. Intangibles combine a wide range of various things, e.g. debts, 
receivables, negotiable instruments, shares, bonds and intellectual property.15  
Terminology in a common-law system, however, is different. English property law, in 
particular, has not followed the Roman or civil-law tradition for the classification of 
things.16 Rather, it has its own approach to this matter. First, there are two major groups 
of property: real property or realty such as land, and personal property or personalty.17 
Personal property is separated into choses in possession related to physical items like 
chattels or goods, and choses in action like receivables. It has a wider scope than realty, 
so one might simply say that ‘it comprises all property other than realty’.18 
The non-matching legal classification of things across civil law and common law results 
from different approaches to historical developments regarding those things. Such 
dissimilarity leads to difficulties in dealing with the law of assignment for receivables. 
This topic will be discussed in the following two sections.  
 
2.1.2 Intangible things  
(1) Property aspect of intangible things 
Nowadays, a significant part of the wealth of the world exists not only in tangibles but 
also in intangibles.19 Fortunately, ‘[a] thing is no less a thing in law merely because it is 
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 Lawson and Rudden (n 10) 29–49. 
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Press 2000) 7–21. 
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intangible’.20 Although intangible things already comprise a large diversity of things, a 
new type like financial derivatives has still to come into existence. It is therefore 
difficult to describe all the different kinds of intangibles with a generic term.21 But in 
terms of a common reason for why various classes of intangible things have become 
property in a legal system, perhaps the most probable explanation is this: ‘[the] reason 
why [English property law] treats intangible interests as objects, as things, is because 
people are willing to buy them; and any thing which is the object of commerce may be 
treated as an asset, just as much if it is an abstraction like share in a company as if it is a 
physical object like a house or a car.’22  Along the same lines, the theory of value 
suggests that, in a capitalist economic system, ‘value creating means property 
creating’.23  
(2) Classification of rights in relation to intangible things 
A legal system usually makes a distinction between property rights and personal 
rights.24 In principle, a property right or right in rem is a right in a property that can be 
asserted against a public. A personal right or right in personam is, by contrast, a right in 
a relationship between persons and against those persons only. Dealing with tangible 
property, i.e. immovable and movable, it seems easy enough to make a clear distinction; 
but where intangible property comes into the picture, drawing such a line is much 
harder and, as a result, becomes blurred. This is basically because in the case of 
tangibles there is a material property for a right in rem to reside in, whereas in the event 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
  It has also been recorded that the volume of household liquid financial assets such as bank deposits, 
equities, bonds and shares in the United States has exceeded 25 trillion US dollars since 2010. See 
SIFMA, ‘2012 Year In Review’ <www.sifma.org/year-in-review2012> accessed 9 October 2015; Lawson 
and Rudden (n 10) 29.   
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of pure intangibles such as receivables this is not the case. An example can be seen in 
the ownership right of a thing. Ownership is legal language that connotes a legal right to 
a thing, or res. A legal principle is able clearly to distinguish property rights from mere 
personal rights to delivery or the transfer of an asset.25 It is, anyway, doubtful whether 
anyone can have ownership of an intangible thing such as a claim or receivable. To put 
it another way, can an intangible thing be an object of ownership? To respond to this 
question, different approaches have been used in different jurisdictions. There appears 
to be no consensus.26 This problem also leads to such fundamental questions as: ‘[is] the 
distinction between corporeal and incorporeal about rights or things? Is the distinction 
between movable and immovable about rights or about things?’27 
In addition to the classification of ‘things’, the classification of ‘rights’ is another 
important subject which should be mentioned here. The classification of rights benefits 
lawyers in understanding various aspects of intangible things and, of course, in 
advancing arguments in this thesis. Dissimilar approaches to the classification adopted 
by a legal system can, however, create further difficulties when grouping different 
categories of classified rights. 
On the traditional classification of right in rem and right in personam, these two 
different kinds of rights are, respectively, described as: a right that clearly has an object 
to which a person is entitled, such as a property right in respect of a corporeal thing; and 
a right where an object is not so apparent, such as a right arising from an obligation.28 
Focusing on their substance, rights can be classified as absolute and relative. A right 
will be relative if it has limited use whereas an absolute right refers to a right that is not 
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 R Goode (n 24) 433. 
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limited by the rights of others. In this terminology, it is then explained that ‘an absolute 
right is potentially directed against everybody’. 29  A relative right, in contrast, ‘is 
directed against a certain debtor only’.30 Moreover, English law, as an example of a 
common-law system, divides rights into four categories: real rights (rights in rem); 
rights ad rem (rights in personam ad rem) referring to rights to have goods delivered or 
transferred; purely personal rights (rights in personam); and equities which denote 
personal power over the rights of another.31  
Considering this classification, an individual legal set of rules should then be formed in 
order properly to handle each categorisation of rights. 32  In principle, whereas in 
personam rights are subject to the law of contract, in rem rights come under the law of 
property. Even though it is presently admitted that intangibles are one of the subject 
matters in today’s property laws,33  legal problems relating to intangible things and 
associated with intangible rights still arise, specifically those involving receivables 
which are the main class of intangibles studied in this research. Such problems 
primarily originate from the relationship between and interactions of property law and 
contract law. This raises further issues which will be discussed later in this chapter. 
 
2.1.3 Choses in action  
(1) Definition and scope of choses in action 
In common-law terms regarding personal property, there is a ‘thing in action’ or a 
‘chose in action’ which points to a thing or a right that can only be asserted by legal 
action. This phrase is used in parallel with ‘choses in possession’. According to a 
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statement by Fry LJ in Colonial Bank v Whinney, ‘all personal things are either in 
possession or in action. The law knows no tertium quid between the two.’ 34  By 
definition, a chose in possession is mainly concerned with a physical thing of which one 
can take possession, whereas a chose in action is not.   
A chose in action is incorporeal in its nature. It is simply a legally recognised right to 
action. Historically, much attention was paid by legal scholars to the question of ‘what 
is a chose in action?’ What sorts of things could be regarded as being included within 
the scope of this legal phrase?35 A definition of a ‘chose in action’, which is generally 
accepted as correct,36 was given by Channel J in Torkington v Magee: a chose in action 
is ‘a known legal expression used to describe all personal rights of property which can 
only be claimed or enforced by action, and not by taking physical possession’. 37 
However, a variety of things has been included under the heading of ‘choses in action’. 
Choses in action cover a wide range of personal property. It includes, but is not limited 
to, contractual rights, debts, receivables, negotiable instruments, stock, shares, 
intellectual property, and even rights to damages founded on tort actions.38 It could be 
said that things covered by ‘choses in action’ overlap with the phrase ‘intangible 
properties’ employed in civil law. To be more specific, that overlap also includes 
receivables. 
As a result, the various kinds of choses in actions are not usually treated under one 
particular area of law, but under separate branches of the laws to which they more 
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properly belong.39 For example, shares are valuable units established by company law, 
while negotiable instruments and intellectual property have their own special sets of 
law. Thus the phrase ‘choses in action’ is neither a sign of nor a sole answer for the 
governing legal area of each type of them. Although receivables are grouped as choses 
in action, that does not automatically mean that they shall be governed by the same 
substantive laws as those for shares, negotiable instruments and intellectual property. 
Instead, a law should be adopted to deal with receivables on the basis of their real 
nature, i.e. a contractual claim enforceable by legal action.     
(2) Property law and choses in action 
A chose in action is a right enforceable by legal action. It is a personal right of the 
rightholder against the person subjected to it. Initially, it is not a property right. As a 
personal right between identified persons, originally it cannot be assigned. 40 
Inalienability and non-assignability have been the main characteristics of the nature of 
this kind of right.41 
In the past, it was settled that a chose in action was inalienable. A chose in action was 
described as a right to bring a personal action, and the cause of action might concern a 
contract, property or tort.42 It was a right arising from and to be asserted by a personal 
action. It did, to a large extent, depend on the law of procedure.43 A right of action for 
the recovery of a thing including a receivable was regarded as ‘a specific res’. 44 
However, this does not mean that a right of action is a thing. It is not a thing or res in 
itself but a claim or a mere right to action. It, in itself, comprises a cause of action 
giving rise to a right to legal action; hence it was not an alienable right. As a 
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consequence, ‘where one has a mere right against another, there is nothing that is 
capable of transfer’.45 Furthermore, the substance of a chose in action only contains a 
personal obligation between the rightholder and the person subject to it. Historically, 
‘assignment of such a right in action by the act of two parties was unthinkable.’46 The 
non-assignability of choses in action was then ‘a necessary and logical deduction from 
the nature of [them]’.47 Another reason from legal history is that the assignment of a 
chose in action was against the policy of law known as the objection of maintenance. It 
was believed that permitting such assignment ‘might lead to the oppression of debtors 
by assignees more powerful than the assignor’.48 
After modifications surrounded by controversies, today, a chose in action has been 
extended from a mere right to bring a legal action against a person to be regarded as an 
item of property. 49  In the past, rights to action for a contractual obligation were 
absolutely prohibited for assignment.50 Now it is a settled law that a contractual right 
can be assigned by an act of a party to the contract itself. Taking into account the 
broadest sense of the word ‘property’ it means valuable things – things that can be 
evaluated by, or transformed into, money. Rights, when admitted as valuable, are then 
included in the word ‘property’.51 Another reason why intangible rights or choses in 
action are counted as property is because they are assignable; and only objects of 
property can be legitimately assigned.52 In spite of its origin, a chose in action has been 
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categorised as a class of property, to be more precise ‘intangible property’. A lawsuit 
thus becomes a property, i.e. a private property derived from the right to sue.53   
Considering the reasons for value and assignability, this research argues that they are 
only assumptive rationalities that actually follow the features of intangible things. 
Neither of them should be a decisive factor for intangible things to be classified as 
property. An argument which can be found in legal history is that ‘the term chose in 
action was an established law term long before property came to be used in the wide 
sense of valuable things’.54 As such, it seems unlikely to be accurate to require a right of 
action to be included under property as a condition precedent for it to be a chose in 
action or assignable. The question of whether a right is an assignable chose in action or 
not is different from the question of whether it is a property or not. Rights, including 
those which are contractual in nature, might be termed property in a common sense. 
This is generally because there are measurable values stored in them. However, their 
criteria are not like property in the same legal sense as land and tangible objects. In the 
case of receivables, they are monies payable under contracts, which is one of the classes 
of choses in action.55  They are contractual claims against persons who are debtors 
subject to those receivables. Value and assignability are important features of intangible 
things, but it is not necessary to assume that intangible things, especially receivables, 
should be counted as items of property in a legal sense. 
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2.1.4 Contract vs property notions of law 
Contract and property are connected, but different, branches of law.56  The greatest 
difficulty in a legal system is always knowing what the difference is between the two, 
and to be able to distinguish between them and draw a line in the middle of their 
linkages with minimal confusion or disguise. At this stage, the fundamental concepts of 
contract and property are examined alongside their core doctrines of contractual rights 
and property rights. This will serve as a fundamental basis to determine whether 
receivables are contract or property.    
Property law ‘primarily concerns a person’s relation in, to, or over, a thing’. 57  It 
involves the fundamental question of what things can be counted as property in the eyes 
of the law. What is the nature of interests, particularly proprietary interests, contained in 
a piece of property? How, and to what extent, can a rightholder derive or gain benefit 
from them? The principle of ownership rights over a property might be the most vital 
legal concept there has ever been, but property law has broader concerns than that.58 In 
particular, it is not limited to physical objects. It does, by contrast, cover so-called 
proprietary rights or interests in intangible things. Turning to contract law, it basically 
deals with legal relationships created by an agreement between persons. Although there 
is no formal definition of contract in English law, 59  its basic principles can be 
summarised as per the following statement. ‘A contract is an agreement giving rise to 
obligations which are enforced or recognised by law. The factor which distinguishes 
contractual from other legal obligations is that they are based on the agreement of the 
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contracting parties.’60 The law of contract is also known, specifically among civil-law 
systems, as a subject of the law of obligation.61 The scope of the law of obligation is, 
however, wider than the law of contract. It is typically admitted that the law of 
obligation basically concerns ‘a person’s relation with another person’. 62  It is not 
limited to voluntary obligations, such as contracts, but also includes involuntary 
obligations, such as torts.  
To distinguish between the spheres of property law and contract law, it is typically ruled 
that there is a limited number of proprietary rights that are accepted by property law. 
This doctrine is mostly known as the principle of numerus clausus.63 According to this 
principle, the law of property is a mandatory rule limiting the number and content of 
property rights. Property rights created by law form a closed list. Individuals or parties 
by themselves are unable to create a proprietary right outside that list.64 In contrast, the 
law of contract is about the principle of private freedom. Based on the freedom of 
contract doctrine, parties by themselves can create and modify rights and obligations 
enforceable among themselves, as long as they are not contrary to a fundamental public 
policy.  
Once, it was claimed that property and proprietary rights listed in conformity with the 
numerus clausus principle were not exclusive. The idea was that any right could be 
categorised as proprietary if it was ‘definable, identifiable by third parties, capable in its 
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nature of assumption by third parties, and have some degree of permanence stability’.65 
Nevertheless, it was later pointed out that ‘this approach has never been used to admit a 
right [as proprietary], and there are many rights which have been rejected even though 
they satisfy the criteria’.66 An example is the contractual license to occupy land which 
was held not to be a property right.67    
Still, the numerus clausus principle has been the subject of controversies, on the one 
side, in terms of finding its underlying objectives as laid down in the property law. On 
the other side, it can continue to function as an indication of the scope of property law 
in comparison with contract law. For example, it has recently been illustrated that 
information costs and standardisation are two important reasons for numerus clausus 
which can be used to explain the fundamental differences between property rights and 
contract rights.68 Since in personam rights involve an identified group of parties to a 
contract, the legal rules of contract then ‘permit a high degree of customisation of rights 
and duties, and emphasise the importance of disclosing information particular to the 
parties to the in personam agreement’.69 In rem rights, in contrast, affect an indefinite 
numbers of persons. ‘[The] legal rules associated with in rem rights are standardised 
and immutable, and focus on gross proxies like boundaries that are easy to observe and 
grasp by a large and heterogeneous population of duty-holders’.70  
‘Both civil-law and common-law jurisdictions have long recognised that certain legal 
rights are good “against the world” while others apply only against named persons or 
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entities.’71 The former have been called in rem or property rights, and the latter in 
personam or, more specifically, contract rights. Being the two great pillars of the legal-
rights concept, several detailed theoretical approaches have been proposed to clarify 
them. Apart from numerus clausus, there appear to be two contrasting theoretical 
approaches which should be considered here.  
In trying to clarify the distinction between personal rights and property rights, the first 
theory which should be mentioned is that of Hohfeld.72 While defining the word ‘right’ 
in the narrowest sense as a synonym of ‘claim’ and a correlative of duty, he explains a 
right in personam as ‘a unique right residing in a person (or group of persons) and 
availing against a single person (or single group of persons); or else it is one of the few 
fundamentally similar, yet separate, rights availing respectively against a few definite 
persons’.73 A right in rem is explained as ‘one of a large class of fundamentally similar 
yet separate rights, actual and potential, residing in a single person (or single group of 
persons) but availing respectively against persons constituting a very large and 
indefinite class of people’.74  The result is that, in one of the Hohfeld’s conclusive 
opinions based on jural relations, ‘[a] right in rem is not a right “against a thing”’75 but 
one ‘against persons’.76 All rights are thus rights against persons. Subsequently, this 
view has been attached to a well-known phrase, the ‘bundle of rights’. It is an idea 
intending to establish that property rights are merely a bundle of personal rights. A 
similar theory has been established by Kelsen, who declared that ‘every right to a thing 
is also a right against a person’.77 ‘It is the relation between individuals which is of 
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primary importance … [the] relation to the thing is of secondary importance, because it 
merely serves to clarify the definition of the first relation.’78   
By strongly criticising the ‘bundle of rights’ concept, another theoretical approach has 
been advanced by Penner. He has argued that the ‘bundle of rights’ omits a fundamental 
aspect of in rem rights; that is to say, rights and duties in rem do not refer to any 
particular persons but to everyone in a relationship, through a property, with the 
owner.79 He, in contrast to Hohfeld’s theory, has emphasised that ‘property is a right to 
thing’,80 and ‘[a] necessary criterion of treating something as property is that it is only 
contingently ours’.81 It has also been pointed out that ‘[what] distinguishes property 
rights is not just that they are only contingently ours, but that they could just as well be 
someone else’s’.82 Therefore, from Penner’s viewpoint, contractual rights, choses in 
action and receivables are undoubtedly property.83 On top of this, the law of property 
can be defined as law that concerns ‘the legal relations between persons with respect to 
things’.84  
After all, one might find it bewildering and ask a simple question. What precisely are 
the differences between these two classes of rights, contract and property? Specifically, 
for this research’s purposes, when an intangible contractual right, or what could be 
called a chose in action, is being questioned, should the answer be that a contract can 
generate property, while a contractual right should be described as the object of a 
property right?85 Or, a better approach might be, as someone has remarked, that ‘[there] 
is no “chose” or thing or res. There is [only] a right (or claim) against some person.’86 
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Together with this, ‘[there] can be no such thing as a legal relation between a person 
and a thing’.87   
Nevertheless, it is true when one states that ‘[at] one level, property and contract are the 
same: proprietary and personal rights can both be conceived of as constituting assets’.88 
This statement is based on an economic perspective, but it might not be quite correct 
from a legal perspective. As shall be considered in the following sections, many 
debatable legal points have been advanced regarding the contractual and proprietary 
nature of receivables. While some lawyers try hard to draw a dividing line between 
property and contract, others tend to blend them together.   
 
2.2 Characteristics of receivables 
Considering receivables as the object of assignment, this section concentrates on the 
principal features of receivables and their legal nature. Receivables are contractual ab 
initio. However, for some aspects, as shall be seen, they have been regarded as property 
and brought within the realm of property law. Subsequently, this notion has led to the 
application of property law to the contractual relations of receivables.  
To argue against the property notion of receivables, the features of receivables are 
explored. This is to set the fundamental scene for the following questions. Where does a 
receivable come from, how does it occur and what are the legal relationship arising 
from it? Next, the research will discuss the property notion of receivables in order to 
determine why such a belief and concept have been developed. It will also examine 
whether a receivable can match with the legal nature of property as constituted in 
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property law or, to put it in another way, whether the legal principle of property, usually 
applied to tangible things, can be properly applied to intangible things like receivables.  
 
2.2.1 Basic features of receivables  
A ‘receivable’89 is a bond intentionally formulated by the parties to a contract. It is a 
consequence of a contractual relationship between the contracting parties, that is 
recognisable and enforceable by law. It is, in other words, a debt but the emphasis is on 
the perspective of the creditor, not the debtor.90 A receivable is a right to payment for a 
creditor, but a debt is an obligation of a debtor. For a receivable to be formulated, there 
must be a party taking up a promise, according to the terms of a contract, to make a 
monetary payment to another party. On this side of the contract, such as a borrower 
taking out a loan, or the buyer in a sale contract, it creates a monetary obligation. The 
party who is under an obligation is the ‘debtor’, and the other who holds a right to 
payment is the ‘creditor’. Upon performing in accordance with the terms of the contract, 
the debtor is thereby discharged from his debt or the receivable.  
Another key aspect of a contract as a binding agreement, or as the source of a binding 
obligation, is the question of legal enforceability.91 When a debtor, on whatever grounds 
or none, fails to perform his contractual obligations, subsequent matters in contract law 
will point to a breach of contract. As a result of this breach, it gives rise to the creditor 
having a right to enforce the contract against the debtor and/or claim damages in respect 
of losses originating from it. Whether this involves collecting unpaid receivables or 
enforcing contractual rights, it must however be done through a legal process, by 
bringing a legal action against the debtor before a court. This is an action in personam 
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based on the creditor’s contractual right to sue, which is part of the underlying logic laid 
down in the phrase ‘chose in action’. It could therefore be stated that by the term 
receivables is meant a right to the payment of a sum of money. Receivables are 
therefore contract and should be ruled by contract law.   
From practical developments, receivables are one of the most important ways to raise 
finance, not only in domestic but also in international markets.92  Abbreviated from 
accounts receivable, the term ‘receivables’ is traditionally a business term usually 
referring to amounts due to (‘receivable’ by) a business.93 In the widest sense, it covers 
‘all monetary obligations owed to a business underpinning its cash flow’.94 
Accounts receivable financing is a continuing arrangement whereby funds 
are made available to a business concern by a financing agency that 
purchases the concern’s invoices or accounts receivable over a period of 
time or makes that concern advances or loans, taking one or a series of 
assignments of the accounts as primary collateral security.95  
Originating in American jurisdiction, receivables or accounts receivable have been 
regarded as the object of a financial asset and a method of raising finance. It was first a 
basis for short-term financing in the textile trade, 96  and subsequently a basis for 
financial formulation and development in business activities. 97  Before such a 
formulation, at a time when things incorporeal were not acknowledged as financial 
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assets or a source of wealth, receivables were virtually unused in financing strategy.98 
As the credit economy has developed, an account – e.g. owed by a purchaser to a seller 
– has been regarded as a storage value representing a claim for money.99  Such an 
account can be formed as a financial asset. Being able to be sold or attached as a 
security,100 receivables help businesses to raise funds and support monetary systems. In 
effect, receivables have an important part to play in circulating credit through markets. 
It is admitted that receivables financing is created by, and results from, the driving force 
of financial demand.101 According to its vital role in international financial markets, 
there exists a need for suitable regulation over receivables. At present, the word 
receivables is an official term written into several rules of law. Take, for instance, the 
definition of a receivable as described in the Receivables Convention, i.e. a ‘contractual 
right to payment of a monetary sum’.102 Along the same lines, the Guide defines the 
meaning of a receivable as ‘a right to payment of a monetary obligation’.103 Receivables 
is, nowadays, not only a business expression but also a vital subject matter of law. 
Along with receivables, there is another phrase that should be examined, i.e. ‘book 
debts’. In principle, both receivables and book debts are regarded under the English law 
as choses in action, i.e. rights enforceable by court action.104 Still, the term receivables 
is nowhere defined in English law.105 Instead, the term ‘book debts’ is advanced by 
English courts. Its meaning is narrowly described as debts arising in the ordinary course 
of business and due or becoming due to the proprietor of that business in that such debts 
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should or could be entered in well-kept books relating to that business, whether they are 
in fact entered in the books of the business or not.106 Under English law, ‘book debts’ is 
a term with a specific meaning and a specific scope of application.107 It comprises a 
special type of transaction that must be registered. According to English law, therefore, 
not all receivables are book debts.108 Receivables are a broader term than book debts.109 
It includes, but is not limited to, book debts. Nevertheless, comparing ‘receivables’ and 
‘book debts’, it has been noted that ‘modern commerce, influenced by American 
terminology, tends to use the wider term “receivables” to refer to all debts owed to a 
business’.110 This also avoids confusion with book debts.111  
Receivables have typically been separated into two types. The first one, which is a 
primary concern of this research, is ‘pure receivables’, i.e. rights to payment which are 
not embodied in a document.112 The second type is ‘documentary receivables’, such as a 
bill of exchange, a promissory note, or other negotiable instruments where there are 
documents which, by and in themselves, represent the receivables.113 Considering pure 
receivables, what thing can be categorised as a receivable, and where does a right in a 
receivable come from? Receivables have been defined as rights to payment of a sum of 
money. Generally, they can originate from various kinds of obligations, e.g. the price of 
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goods sold on credit, rentals due under a hire-purchase agreement, and amounts due 
from clients for services rendered.114 These are also examples of book debts. Other 
examples that have not been treated as book debts since they do not arise in the core 
course of business are bank accounts and bank balances. They are simply money 
deposited in a bank.115   
Furthermore, taking into consideration the definition of a receivable laid down in 
Article 2 of the Receivables Convention, it is a contractual right to payment of a 
monetary sum. From this definition, it has been explained that a non-monetary 
performance right such as a right to performance or a right to request delivery is 
excluded. 116  The exclusion also includes non-contractual receivables ‘arising by 
operation of law, such as tort receivables, receivables arising in the context of unjust 
enrichment, tax receivables or receivables determined in court judgments or arbitral 
awards, unless they are confirmed in a settlement agreement’. 117  In principle, 
‘[receivables] arising from any type of contract are intended to be covered’. 118 
Examples of receivables that have been given are as follows: 
A broad variety of receivables are included, such as receivables from the 
supply of goods, construction and services, irrespective of whether the 
contracts are commercial or consumer contracts. Also included are toll road 
receipts, royalties, damages for breach of contract, interest, non-monetary 
claims convertible to money and returned goods (at least, in the relationship 
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between the assignor and the assignee, provided that they take the place of 
the assigned receivables).119  
It is apparent from the definition and scope of receivables that they are in themselves 
based on and consist of contractual obligations. Their fundamental characteristics are 
contractual. A conclusion which can be drawn here is receivables result legally from the 
contractual relations creating them. They are rights to payment stemming from 
contractual agreements between contracting parties.   
In practice, receivables can comprise not only many, but also a variety of, debts or 
rights to payment of monetary sums; and they are often traded in bulk.120 Speaking of 
receivables does not mean a right to payment in the singular, but rather a bulk of rights 
to payment. Bulk assignments of receivables are handled in financial practice. This can 
involve not only single, large-value receivables but also large volume of low-value 
receivables. 121  Evidence of this can be found in the Receivables Convention. For 
instance, Article 8 prohibits the ineffectiveness of an assignment of receivables on the 
ground that it is an assignment of more than one receivable. Article 9(3), though it is not 
directly meant to describe receivables, also indicates various possible origins of 
receivables.122 Dealing with an assignment of receivables is not like a situation where a 
single right to payment against an individual debtor has been transferred. The bulk may 
be composed of many rights to payments arising from different contracts and against 
different debtors. When assigned in bulk, it means that the assignee might acquire rights 
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to payment based on various contracts and against various debtors. A bulk of 
receivables is not one piece of property but an intangible that is composed of many 
individual rights to monetary payment. Each one of them has its own characteristics 
which depend on the contractual relationship creating them. The substance of 
receivables in this circumstance is a bundle comprising a number of individual and 
separable contractual relationships between creditors and debtors.123 Such a situation 
makes things far more complex than when dealing with a receivable generated by a 
single contract. When the treatment of bulk receivables is being considered, it is 
common to distinguish this matter from an assignment of a single receivable.124    
By assuming that receivables are an item of property, this approach has been seen as 
making them easier to handle. A group of various kinds of contractual rights to payment 
has been brought into the picture of an item of property to respond to their value and 
assignability. Affirming the right to assign, the property approach diminishes some 
problems based on contract law, such as the privity of contract, the non-assignability of 
contractual rights, and some concerns about the obligations of relevant debtors. These 
contractual problems can basically be regarded as an obstacle to the transferability of 
receivables. It is then unsurprising why treating receivables as an object of property is 
more than welcomed in a legal system. It arises as well in financial practice where it is 
common to use proprietary language in saying that receivables can be owned and sold.  
Another issue that should be mentioned here is proprietary effects of receivables. After 
being transferred, an assignment of receivables has not only contractual but also 
proprietary effects. 125  A significant proprietary effect of an assignment is that it 
transfers the proprietary rights over assigned receivables from an assignor to an 
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assignee. As a result, the assignee is able to assert this right against third parties, such as 
other creditors and insolvency representatives of the assignor. In general, to speak of a 
right which can be asserted against a third party is to speak of a property right. This is 
because only property rights can have an in rem effect which can be asserted against the 
whole world. This issue is another reason leading to the classification of receivables as 
property. 
Despite their principal features as contracts, the proprietary picture of receivables in 
practice puts them into the position of mixed subject matter between contract and 
property. This, in turn, makes receivables much more complex and much harder to 
handle in a legal sense. By arguing against such a proprietary notion, this research calls 
for a further discussion of the property view of receivables. It then proceeds to 
investigate the property aspect of receivables under subsequent headings. 
 
2.2.2 Receivables from a property aspect 
Despite having their roots in contract law, receivables have many issues mentioned in 
property law. It begins with the belief that receivables should be counted as property. 
According to the legal classification, property law is another set of rules governing the 
legal matters of receivables. However, this might not be straightforward or conclusive 
to manage when the nature of receivables and the content of property law are 
scrutinised.     
(1) Receivables and notions of property   
There are at least three primary causes regarding the question of why receivables have 
been regarded as items of property. The first two causes come from theoretical 
deductions, while the third seems to relate more to practical usage.   
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Firstly, receivables seem to be widely acknowledged as property when the word 
‘property’ is used instead of the word ‘things’. Having been investigated previously, 
‘[the] word “things” catches the idea that, whatever it is, it is an asset; it has value, it 
can be inherited and traded, and can be reached by its holder’s creditors’. 126  By 
containing valuable monetary payments, receivables which have fallen within the scope 
of the ‘things’ are thus treated as a type of personal property, in the category of 
intangible property. Receivables are subcategorised as pure intangibles, referring to ‘a 
right which is not in law considered to be represented by a document’.127 In contrast 
with documentary intangibles, such as negotiable instruments, there is no need for any 
material object to embody a receivable for it to be seen or recognised as a valuable. 
The second cause relates to transferability, which is an important feature of a 
proprietary right in a property. 128  Once a receivable has been recognised as a 
transferable or assignable thing it is, on the one hand, commonly acknowledged that a 
receivable is property because it is transferable. On the other hand, it has been stated in 
reverse that because a receivable is assignable, it is property.129 This is also the same 
logic as that of a chose in action as property.130 Now, from such circular reasoning of 
property and assignability no one can be sure of what the real cause is, or what the 
consequences are.  
Thirdly, despite their immateriality, receivables are imagined in practice as if they are a 
real object. The language and jargon used in financial markets are in line with the 
receivable-as-property notion. 131  Using such sentences as ‘the lender owns the 
receivables’, ‘the creditor can sell his receivables’ or ‘the financier is buying some 
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other’s receivables’ makes an intangible receivable look like tangible property. This 
causes further complications, and perhaps more confusion, about the true nature of 
receivables. Nevertheless, businesses can use any fanciful word they like in any way 
they want to describe the matter of receivables. It is not their duty, but that of lawyers, 
to classify receivables under a legal methodology, and to solve a legal problem arising 
from them correctly and properly.   
(2) Receivables and substance of property rights 
On the general notion of receivables as a form of property, it has been illustrated that a 
receivable is property for reasons of value and assignability. Take the following 
statement as an example: ‘[a receivable] is a monetary obligation owed by one person to 
another which is an item of value because it can be transferred to a third party by way of 
sale or security for a loan’. 132  Even though it is a debatable question whether a 
receivable should be treated as an object of property, how far it can be appropriately 
governed by property law? The answer to this question is not clear. In fact it varies 
amongst countries.133 To investigate further into these controversial matters, relevant 
legal substance of property rights as prescribed in property law must be examined 
closely.  
(2.1) The negative aspect of property rights 
First of all, although a property has been regarded as containing a right in rem which is 
against the whole world – i.e. against an indefinite class of persons – assertion of this 
right seems to be less positive than that of a right in personam. Property rights, in 
theory, grant the owner rights to access and control. On the one hand, the rightholder 
obtains a monopoly right over the use of his property. On the other, it has been admitted 
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that a property right is a negative or defensive right in its nature.134 This is in the sense 
that it excludes others from accessing it. The substance of this negative aspect prevents 
other persons from using or performing certain acts over the property. 135  It also 
prohibits interference with respect to a property under that right.136 Such features might 
be labelled a ‘negative duty of abstention’137 or a ‘right of exclusion’.138  
A result of this negative right is there is no useful point to consider whether a 
rightholder can assert his property rights against unidentified people in daily life. An in 
rem right will turn out to be a positive right only where it is violated. At the time of 
such violation, it is reasonable for the rightholder to exercise his property rights. 
However, this is a right that can only be asserted against a specific person who is the 
violator. A right in rem will therefore be transformed into an in personam right for the 
ground of sanctioning.139 Thus, a property right like ownership might be referred to as 
‘absolute’; but in term of exercising this right, it comes under the heading of 
‘relative’.140 
A receivable has a contradictory scenario. It is always a right in personam by its very 
nature. Having a receivable, the rightholder has the right to bring an action before a 
court against the debtor, and against the debtor only. Bringing such an action is also a 
way to enforce and obtain the benefits of that receivable. This is regarded as a positive 
way of exercising this kind of personal right. Furthermore, in contrast with obligations 
in rem, ‘[in] personam obligations can be either duties of performance or abstention’.141 
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Both of them can be formed by contracts. A duty to perform actively might involve, for 
instance in the case of a sale contract, delivering the goods sold or making a payment 
for the cost of the goods. As for the in personam duties of abstention, an example is a 
covenant not to compete.142 
(2.2) The concept of ownership and possession 
The second legal substance concerns two of the most important legal principles laid 
down in property law. Those are the concepts of ownership and possession. 
‘Ownership’ is a legal institution denoted to ‘the greatest possible interest in a thing 
which a mature system of law recognises’.143 It is meant to describe ‘the right which 
gives its holder the highest degree of access and control’,144 or ‘the ultimate right to use 
the object or right in question’.145  Having ownership over a thing means the thing 
belongs to the owner, and the owner holds a bundle of rights in respect of that thing.146 
He is able to assert his ownership rights in that specific thing against any persons.     
Alongside ownership, another proprietary concept which should be considered is 
possession. Since common-law countries have little concern with ownership, instead, 
the proprietary rights of the holder primarily emphasise possession. ‘Possession’ in 
English law is a word from a piece of legal shorthand referring to a set of rules 
applicable to particular facts.147 Those facts are about ‘a person’s title to land, goods or 
any other type of subject-matter over which it is possible to have property rights’.148 As 
a matter of fact, there exist two central elements of possession. The first element is ‘the 
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exercise of factual control’.149 The second one is ‘the concomitant intention to exclude 
others from the exercise of control’.150    
Although their legal concepts are not exactly the same, 151  ownership as well as 
possession is a right connecting to a specific object. Their structures and substance are 
based on incidents of the greatest interest of the rightholder in relation to a thing. 
Additionally, their underlying principle is for the purpose of protecting the property 
rights of the holder.  
Originally, the concept of either ownership or possession had no role to play in a 
receivable. This was because of its character as a personal contractual relation based on 
a contract. Receivables have no material object. Even today, when the words 
‘ownership’ and ‘possession’ are used on some occasion with intangible things, 
including receivables, their legal meaning and understanding are not the same as when 
applied to tangible properties.152  This is simply because intangibles can neither be 
owned, nor possessed, nor delivered nor transferred in a similar manner to land or goods 
and chattels. Moreover, by their nature, receivables have an advantage over tangibles, 
since ‘[they] are not susceptible to physical loss, damage or deterioration’.153  
A creditor – or, to use ownership language, an owner – of a receivable might be able to 
perform acts which would bring about extinguishment of the receivable,154  such as 
executing it, assigning it, novating it, setting it off with another receivable, or even 
releasing it. Rules on extinguishing a receivable do not work in the same way for 
extinguishing property rights as those structured by property law. They are developed in 
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the area of contract law, not property law. As oppose to an intangible property like a 
receivable, a tangible property is at the same time a subject of property rights. Once, for 
instance, a property subject to such rights is totally destroyed, absolutely transferred, or 
transformed into a new thing, 155  the property rights stored within it consequently 
disappear. In contrast, to make a claim for a right to payment incurred by a receivable, 
the creditor must assert his right over the debtor personally. By this it means the claim is 
not specific to any property of the debtor. It focuses on the debtor’s monetary 
obligation. Consequently, although the debtor’s property is gone, the creditor’s right is 
still in existence.      
Therefore, as far as a receivable is concerned, the words ‘ownership’ and ‘possession’ 
may be used if one prefers, but it should be made clear that the concepts must be 
adjusted and the rules changed accordingly, based on its real nature.  
(2.3) Extended rights in property 
Rights in property involve not only a relationship between people and things, but also 
‘the effect of that relationship on the world at large’.156 This results in other prominent 
features of property rights which should be taken into consideration. They are: (a) the 
capacity to bind third parties, (b) the amenability to specific relief, and (c) the immunity 
to the consequences of insolvency.157 These characteristics of property rights derive 
from the idea that ‘property rights constitute strong legal rights’.158 In comparison with 
contractual rights, it is suggested that ‘contractual rights remain as weak as ever’.159 As 
far as this thesis is concerned, the three additional features should be classified as an 
expansion of the scope of property rights which are extended from the rightholder 
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himself to other relevant persons. They are the extended outcome of in rem rights 
affirming the effect of property rights against the world at large. Nevertheless, it is 
unsurprising in stating that contractual rights are weaker than proprietary rights in this 
regard. Furthermore, all three additional features of property rights are also a 
fundamental ground why rights in receivables should be separated from rights in a 
property. They are the reason demonstrating that receivables do not have the same logic, 
having been explained by the legal notion of property.  
A receivable is a contractual bond between the contracting parties. It is a right in 
personam of one party enforceable by an action in personam, in principle, only against 
another party. Initially, it has no capacity to extend its legal binding to or to impose any 
burden on third parties.160 This concept is known as the privity of contract. The ability 
to assert against a third party is generally a feature of a property right; conversely, 
assertion against a third party is the test for a property right.161 Nevertheless, there are 
some underlying grounds in saying that ‘obligations can only be subject to property 
rights in the hands of third parties’.162 This can be achieved through assignment, so that 
it has commonly been stated that one of its effects is that an assignment of receivables 
can bind a third person.163    
With regard to the amenability to specific relief, ordering a promisor to render a specific 
performance in accordance with a contractual term is not in a court’s favour, especially 
in a common-law country. Instead, the normal remedy for non-performance is damages. 
Specific performance has been regarded as ‘an extraordinary remedy’.164 It has been 
seen in the eyes of English courts as ‘an equitable remedy which is available in the 
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discretion of the court’,165 where traditionally damages are an inadequate remedy.166 
Moreover, there is no binding rule in this area.167 By contrast, the remedy of specific 
relief is preferable when enforcing a property right. It is typically issued in a case of 
wrongful interference with ownership or possession in order to keep and protect the 
legal status of the proprietary rights of the owner from being interrupted illegally.168   
The last content of extended property rights is their immunity in insolvency situations. 
In the event that a debtor is unable to pay for receivables he is subject to,169 a creditor 
who holds a secured transaction or other type of security granted by the insolvent debtor 
in supplement of the receivables-created transaction is likely to have a proprietary right 
over the debtor’s property which is subject to such an arrangement. The secured 
arrangement generates the same result as in case of the owner of a property, 
notwithstanding that that property is in the hands of the debtor. This is also true even if 
the insolvent debtor is in wrongful possession of that property. The rightful owner has a 
right to regain his property, since that property is regarded as never forming part of the 
insolvent’s estate.170 In contrast, mere receivables, however large the amounts they may 
be for, cannot constitute a property right over a specific property of the debtor. Claiming 
for a right to payment under an unsecured receivable must be done against the debtor 
and over the debtor’s assets in a general sense. Unlike a secured transaction, it does not 
direct to any particular unit of the debtor’s property. 171  An unsecured creditor has 
‘merely the right to sue for his money and to invoke the process of law to enforce a 
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judgment against the [debtor]’.172 This is true even when the debtor becomes insolvent 
and such creditor will likely gain nothing at the end of the insolvency collective 
procedures.  
A main aim of insolvency law is to establish a process for the orderly collection and 
realisation and the fair distribution of the debtor’s assets.173 Emphasisingly, a general 
terminology that is used is the word ‘assets’. The underlying reason of this is because 
this term refers to valuable things of the debtor that specifically constitute property for 
the purpose of insolvency law or insolvency estate.174 It includes but is not limited to 
tangible assets. Intangible assets like contractual rights to payment or receivables are 
also covered. Broadly speaking, this law intends to capture anything that have element 
of benefit or entitlement. 175  Seeing a receivable as a valuable contractual right to 
payment which is a thing in action and an asset does not differ or affect the law of 
insolvency. Rather, it is in conformity with the insolvency special regime.  
  
2.3 True nature of receivables 
This thesis therefore advances that, besides being an important kind of financial asset, 
the true nature of receivables is that of contractual rights. This is the approach that 
proposes that receivables should be treated as per their origins. The reasons for this 
proposal will be provided after the practical standing point that receivables are financial 
assets is set out.  
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2.3.1 Receivables as financial assets  
Financial assets may consist of a very wide range of intangible things.176 The essential 
characteristic of a financial asset is that it is a store of value which is capable of being 
exchanged for a real (or material) valuable thing. 177  There is no doubt about the 
financial status of receivables. Receivables in themselves are valuable assets, especially 
in terms of financial practice. By consisting of rights to claim for monetary payments, 
receivables are ‘mobile items of wealth, one of the many possible forms which “capital” 
may take as a factor in production in economic life, much like goods or land’.178 They 
are valuable storage and financial assets, both in financial and legal contexts. 
Economically, receivables are shown as assets on the creditor’s balance sheet. They can 
be utilised by converting them into cash or using them as collateral to secured creditors’ 
transactions with others.179 Legally, a receivable is a personal relation between creditor 
and debtor; the value in it is directly connected to the financial status of the debtor. It 
does not bind to, or depend upon, a specific property counted in the bulk of the debtor’ 
assets.   
Financing against receivables or ‘receivables financing’ is the term used to denote 
‘transactions whereby a business raises money on the basis of its receivables’. 180 
Commonly, it is in the context of the life cycle of assets. For instance, a stock in trade 
having been sold produces a receivable that can be turned into cash, and this is 
subsequently reinvested in a new raw material to produce a new stock. 181  It was 
observed by the Law Commission that ‘[for] many companies, a major part of their 
assets will be in the form of money due to them under contracts, particularly for goods 
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and services supplied’.182 In other words, these assets are receivables which companies 
can raise money against through assignment, by way of either sale or security. 183 
Receivables financing via bulk assignments, such as a large volume of low-value 
receivables, has been regarded as one of the financial methods that is ‘at the heart of 
significant financing practices’.184 
Although receivables have been regarded as a financial asset, they are not a concrete 
property like land or other corporeal items. Measurement of their value is based on the 
contracts generating them. At this point, it is submitted that there are two main factors 
which denote the economic value of receivables: ‘the length of time before they become 
payable and how likely the account-debtors are to fulfil their obligations’.185 In short, 
these are questions of enforceability, i.e. whether such receivables will be successfully 
enforced in order for the rightholders to receive actual payments.186 Their values rely 
considerably on, and attach to, their origins, which are the terms of the contracts 
generating them. 
From a broad perspective, no matter how a legal system treats receivables – i.e. whether 
as proprietary rights under property law or as contractual rights under contract law – it 
is not going to change the status of receivables as financial assets. This is part of the 
true nature of receivables which has been developed in financial practice. However, 
their appearance at law is undeniable and unavoidable. This generates a powerful force, 
in the sense that legal principles and rules are crucial factors facilitating this form of 
financial asset.   
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2.3.2 Receivables as contractual rights   
A contract is the result of a consensus intention of contracting parties. It is a private 
agreement recognised by law, and not a result of actions or things created by the law 
itself. The principle underlying this private action is the freedom of contract, and not the 
numerus clausus established in property law. This is the factor that distinguishes 
contractual obligations from other legal obligations. 187  A receivable or a right to 
payment is the result of a contract. Its content links back to the contract creating it. A 
receivable is a contractual right or interest recognised by law. 188  It is a personal 
relationship between debtor and creditor, and not a relationship of debtor or creditor 
with an unidentified indefinite class of person. The latter is typically a descriptive 
explanation of a property right.  
A receivable is indeed a contractual right to monetary payment which is a personal 
obligation between debtor and creditor. ‘[It] is not a sum of money belonging to the 
creditor, but in the possession of the debtor.’189 It only stores a valuable asset expected 
to be received by the rightholder. Being a creditor simply means to have an incorporeal 
asset, i.e. a right to payment or a right to sue (chose in action). He, in other words, is not 
an owner of a thing or a property. It is only when the debtor has actually paid him that 
the creditor definitely has some ‘thing’ that is real. That ‘thing’ then will be in his in 
rem dominant, i.e. in his ownership or possession according to the principle of property 
law. By contrast, before receiving such a real payment, the thing the creditor has is a 
chose in action, or an in personam right derived from the contract enforceable by an 
action in personam against the debtor, and as such the debtor only. From a legal 
standpoint, a receivable is thus owed to, not owned by, the creditor. The phrase ‘the 
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creditor owns a receivable’, as used in daily life, has no effect on this true legal nature 
of the receivable. It cannot change the legal procedure for exercising the creditor’s right 
to payment. This is the actual way for him to gain the monetary value stored in such a 
receivable.  
Theoretically, it is true that contract and property are integrated at some intersections in 
legal methodologies. Still, contract law and property law are essentially different.190 In a 
rights-based analysis of contractual and proprietary rights, a right incurred by a 
receivable is certainly not a ‘right to things’. It is a personal right against a person. 
Although a thing like an amount of money is the end result of that right, such a 
monetary outcome happens only after the creditor successfully enforces the receivable. 
This beneficial result might be called an ‘interest’ in a receivable, but that is not the 
‘right to a thing’ in the same manner as an in rem right. The thing the creditor purports 
to receive is derived from the value of the receivable linking to the contract creating it, 
and not a specific material thing in the debtor’s property. Moreover, is a receivable a 
‘right between persons with respect to things’? A receivable is of course a right between 
persons, but it has nothing to do with ‘things’ in a material sense. For all concerned, it 
highlights an ‘act’, whether of performance or even non-performance, by the debtor. 
Again, a thing, if any, is merely the end result of this act.  
In contrast, is a receivable a right to monetary payment against a person? The answer 
expressed by this research is positive. But, it should be noted that this thesis is unlikely 
to be on the same side as that of the ‘bundle of rights’ terminology. Rights in rem do not 
comprise only rights against persons. There is another dimension, i.e. ‘things’ which 
must be taken into account when analysing property rights. This additional criterion is 
to ascertain that there is a thing for property rights to be attached to or to reside in. 
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Consequently, the main argument of the thesis is that since the true nature of a 
receivable is a contract generating a valuable in personam right without a need for any 
‘thing’ to be attached to, the methodological approaches employed in examining a right 
in rem which connects to a material ‘thing’ do not match the receivable. 
In addition, considering the notions of receivables and the various important contents of 
proprietary rights, it can be seen that the nature of receivables does not align with 
property’s legal principles. A receivable consists of a positive right rather than a 
negative one. That positive right is a legal ‘claim’ whereby the rightholder has to take 
legal action before a court to enforce payment. Next, a receivable cannot be owned or 
possessed in accordance with the concept of ownership and possession. Nor can it come 
under physical loss or damage. Instead, its risk is the debtor becoming insolvent. If that 
happens, unsecured creditors are unlikely to survive the insolvency of the debtor. Rights 
within a receivable, which is a claim or a chose in action, do not expand like the 
extended rights in property identified under property law. They cannot, by themselves, 
affect third parties or strangers automatically. Their available remedies, if in breach or 
unpaid, are based on damages as set out in contract law.   
Although a contractual receivable has been treated as a financial asset, it has the same 
meaning when economists have analysed, in the widest sense, that ‘all “rights” are 
property rights’.191 For the particular word ‘rights’ is meant to cover anything valuable 
that can be traded economically. This does not mean it is necessary either to categorise 
those rights as objects of property or proprietary rights, or to put them under the 
umbrella of property law, unless it is logical and proper to do so. If one really needs to 
apply the word property to explain a receivable, it is the term ‘contractual property’ that 
is most appropriate. This term reflects the real character of a receivable in an ordinary or 
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economic sense of property. By contractual property, it means a property that stems 
from a contract or, in other words, a property that refers to a contractual obligation.  
As for legal nature of a receivable which is a contractual right, it is not crucial, at least 
in the eyes of the law, to view it otherwise. As far as this research is concerned, the 
property approach to receivables has made things less complicated only at first glance. 
This is mainly because it has omitted the true legal substance of receivables. 
Receivables do contain a bundle of contractual rights to monetary payment. They are 
intangible things that one can neither touch, possess, own, nor sell as is the case with 
tangible objects. Receivables are transferred not by delivery of possession or ownership, 
but instead through assignment. This is because a right residing in a receivable is not an 
absolute property right of the rightholder for him to transfer like a property right in a 
real object. It is, by contrast, a contractual right to payment receivable by him. 
Assigning a receivable is thus the transfer of a receivable contractual right, not a 
proprietary one. Regarding the proprietary effect of receivables resulting from an 
assignment as examined in this chapter, it is quite straightforward to enquire whether 
the proprietary effect can truly characterise the rights in receivables. Is it not the ‘effect’ 
likely to be created by assignment? ‘Receivables’, on the one side, are the object of 
assignment. ‘Assignment’, on the other side, is the method of transferring receivables. 
Though typically connected, they are in fact not the same legal matter. The claim that 
there is a proprietary effect arising out of the assignment of receivables is unlikely to be 
able to change the primary nature of receivables.       
Taking into consideration the condition of rights vested in receivables, they can be 
either present or future.192 Receivables are typically divided into two kinds: existing and 
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future.193 English courts have taken the position that ‘[all] contractual rights are vested 
from the moment when the contract is made, even though they may not presently be 
enforceable, either because the promisee must first perform his own part, or because 
some condition independent of the will of either party (such as the elapsing of time) has 
yet to be satisfied’.194 Thus, the term ‘existing receivables’ under English law covers a 
wide range of rights generated by contracts, though they are not currently due. This kind 
of receivable, such as a right to interest under a loan, a sum payable for goods or 
services not yet delivered or rendered, or a sum payable under an existing construction 
contract, might be labelled ‘unearned rights to payment’.195 These unearned debts are 
potential and, as such, existing.196 They are all categorised as existing receivables.      
In the case of ‘future receivables’, they are ‘[receivables] expected under contracts 
which have no present existence whatever, but which every going concern expects to 
result from future contracts into which it might enter. Such [receivables] are neither 
earned nor payable.’ 197  From a creditor’s perspective, future receivables are rights 
which do not yet exist or belong to him.198 From the English case law Tailby v Official 
Receiver,199 debts or receivables which are classed as future are those which may occur 
and become due in any business or trade the assignor may carry on after the time of 
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assignment. It was decided in this case that future book debts are, though mere 
expectancies, neither too vague nor too uncertain to be assigned in equity for value, if 
they are of such a nature and so described as to be capable of being ascertained and 
identified. Those future debts will be bound as the subject matter of an assignment and 
subsequently be subject to a good title of the assignee when they come into existence. 
Like bulk receivables, future receivables have been regarded as a significant financial 
asset employed in financial practice.200 The Receivables Convention, Article 8, also 
affirms the effectiveness of an assignment of future receivables. However, the term 
‘future receivables’ varies amongst legal systems.201 It is also used to define the scope 
of existing receivables. For example, the criteria which have been adopted under the 
Receivables Convention for making a separation between future and existing 
receivables are based on the time of the conclusion of the original contract and the time 
when the contract of assignment is concluded.202  A receivable arising under a contract 
which has been concluded before or at the time of the conclusion of a contract of 
assignment is considered to be an existing receivable. Otherwise, if a receivable arises 
after the time of assignment, it will be classified as a future receivable.203  
Considering those two kinds of receivables, namely existing and future receivables, they 
are by their natures based on contracts. Along the same lines as their basic features, the 
conditions of appearance of these receivables are rooted in the terms of the contracts 
creating them. Their real substance is a class of contractual rights to payments, either 
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already existing or likely to exist in the future. Receivables are therefore bundles of 
contractual rights directly related to the law of contract.  
      
2.4 Summary remarks 
By emphasising the true nature of receivables, this chapter contends that receivables are 
indeed contractual relations. Receivables are, by their very nature, different from land 
and other tangible objects though they are, in general, things and financial assets. But in 
legal classification, in particular, they are intangibles which need special legal 
treatment. A legal system should not adopt the property approach only on the grounds 
of their value and assignability. It should look at their origins and treat them as what 
they really are.    
Comprising a right to payment, receivables are from a legal viewpoint contractual 
interest. They constitute contractual assets that are subject to the domain of contract 
law, and not property objects like the content of property law. Receivables are not items 
of property by themselves. The real value contained in them is the possibility of turning 
them into money. Such money is the end result which can be achieved after a successful 
legal process of enforcing the contract creating those receivables. The true legal nature 
of receivables is contractual rights resulting from contractual relationships. Although 
receivables can be seen in practice as a financial asset or a contractual property, their 
concepts and principles do not belong to property law. They should therefore be treated 
as contractual rights according to their true nature and falling within the sphere of 
contract law, rather than a form of property subject to property law or a confusing 
combination of the two.  
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CHAPTER 3: ASSIGNMENT 
 
This chapter examines a method of transfer, assignment. ‘Assignment’ is a way of 
transferring receivables from one person to another, from assignor to assignee.1 In the 
general notion, assignment has been claimed to be a hybrid legal institution of contract 
and property. 2  This is the approach that has been adopted to the assignment of 
receivables. It will henceforth be referred to as ‘the property-contract approach’. 
However, the aim of this research and particularly of this chapter is to unravel the 
confusing picture of assignment under the property-contract approach. It is also to 
question whether an assignment really has such a hybrid nature, and to what extent each 
aspect of that nature controls the law of assignment. In answering these questions, this 
research attempts to deconstruct such hybrid compounds by studying and analysing 
each characteristic individually. In this way, a legal issue concerning the assignment of 
receivables will disclose whether it falls within the sphere of proprietary or contractual 
areas.3  
A task this thesis aims to accomplish is to resolve the confusing treatment of an 
assignment as contract and property. A new way of thinking about assignment will be 
proposed. A core idea of the chapter is to propose that, in contrast with the property-
contract approach, assignment should be treated as a method of transferring rights that 
is separate from the mixture of property and contract laws. This proposed idea is ‘the 
rights-based approach’. Assignment is not only a transaction involving transfer rights, it 
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 See also LS Sealy and RJ Hooley, Commercial law: Text, cases, and materials (OUP 2009) 933–939; AP 
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is also a transaction the result of which is to create a new class of rights.4 Assignment is, 
initially, a method of transferring contractual rights or interests. The things being 
transferred are classes of intangible contractual rights against persons. They are rights to 
payment which are derived from assigned receivables. But, as a result of assignment, a 
new class of rights is also created. This class of rights is relative rights between relevant 
persons. In terms of legal relationships, they can be divided into three classes: (1) rights 
of assignee against assignor; (2) rights of assignee against debtor; and (3) rights of 
assignee against third parties. Various important legal issues involved in assignment can 
subsequently be categorised into each class of these three groups of relations, 
notwithstanding that they are contractual or proprietary under the property-contract 
approach. A better way of treating assignment is therefore to regard it as a distinct 
method of rights transfer according to its legal nature.  
In examining the subject of assignment, this chapter is structured as four sections. It will 
first explore the conceptual developments of laws and assignment in light of both 
theoretical and practical prospects. Subsequently, detailed studies on contractual and 
proprietary aspects concerning assignment will be conducted and analyses performed in 
Sections Two and Three. Finally, summary remarks regarding the nature of assignment 
and the proposed rights-based approach will be advanced in Section Four. The results of 
the debate conducted in this chapter will lead to a significant formulation of conflict-of-
law rules for regulating assignment.    
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3.1 Conceptual developments of law and assignment 
 
In this section, historical developments in the law related to assignment are studied first. 
The law of assignment has long been a controversial issue.5 As shall be seen, many 
legal concepts of assignment have been advanced and opposed by legal scholars. The 
main legal point in conducting this research concerns the assignability doctrine of 
contractual receivables. This background will serve as a basis for the two legal notions 
of assignment, contract and property, which will be presented accordingly. After that, 
the principal methods of financing against receivables will be investigated. Whatever 
ways the legal theories may be, assignment is in a practical sense one of the most 
important methods for transferring receivables when financing business. Legal issues 
and disputes consequently arising from these transactions need to be correctly clarified 
and resolved under a proper area of law.   
 
3.1.1 Historical developments: from non-assignability to assignability   
From non-assignability, or formally inalienability, to assignability, or formally 
alienability, the principal matter this research casts doubt on is not the rules of the 
former, as stated in historical reviews. It focuses, rather, on the underlying reasons for 
the assignability doctrine which gradually becomes a significant factor in such a 
historical switch. To examine this fundamental development of laws on assignment, 
both doctrines will be discussed, respectively, below.       
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(1) Doctrine of non-assignability 
The law on assignment of receivables have been controversial. Debates mostly not for 
but against this matter were conducted centuries ago. Looking back at those times, an 
assignment of a receivable was, at the very beginning, not legally permitted. As the 
object of assignment, a receivable or a chose in action was originally not assignable.6 
Once, it was manifestly claimed that ‘[the] rule that a chose in action is not assignable 
was a rule of the widest application. A creditor could not assign his [receivable]’.7 This 
doctrine was claimed to be ‘a principle of universal law’.8 Nevertheless, such a view is 
incorrect and clearly not the law at the present time. Nowadays, a settled law is that 
intangible things such as receivables or choses in action are, to a large extent, 
assignable.9 As far as this thesis is concerned, it is worth mentioning the major reasons 
for the non-assignability of receivables as seen in the past. This will serve as a basis to 
counter the reasons why the transferability of receivables by way of assignment has 
been developed. It is also to show the participation of contract and property laws 
governing assignment.   
The early lawyers found it hard to think of the transfer of something intangible, like 
receivables or contractual rights.10 The early debate on this subject was probably a 
matter of inalienability relating to the assignment of receivables. A receivable, or a 
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chose in action, was regarded as an inalienable thing. It was a personal relationship 
giving a creditor a right to sue his debtor. ‘Historically, claims of action, choses in 
action, rights of suit, and lawsuits themselves have been treated as personal and 
inalienable.’11 The law did not recognise the assignment of ‘a bare cause of action’; 
consequently, it would be struck down.12 A lawsuit was not a property. To claim for, or 
enforce, a receivable is to bring a legal action. This could not be divided, hence it was 
non-assignable.  
The history of English law also shows that ‘contractual rights were personal and not 
assignable. Only gradually did the law permitting assignment develop.’13 A receivable 
which typically originates from a contract was considered too personal to be assigned. It 
creates a personal relationship between parties, i.e. debtor and creditor. It is thus implied 
that such a relationship ‘forbids the substitution of any other parties for the original 
ones’. 14  This is called the ‘too personal objection’. 15  Another objecting reason for 
assignability is based on the ground of public policy. This is the law of maintenance and 
champerty16 which, as an effect, prohibited the transfer of a mere right to litigate. A 
chose in action is a kind of right to action. Assigning it could be regarded as a transfer 
of a mere right to action. ‘[While] property can be fully assigned, a bare right to litigate 
cannot.’17 This objection was also rooted in the strictly personal character of contract.18 
It is primarily concerned with the contractual relations between, and only between, the 
parties who are persons that each contracting party intends to deal with in the first place. 
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The purpose was to protect a debtor, since it was argued that an assignment might lead 
to the oppression of the debtor, either by an assignee more powerful than the assignor,19 
or by someone whom the debtor does not trust.20 Once the non-assignability doctrine 
has been overruled by the assignability doctrine, it is then appropriate to develop some 
sort of rules to ensure that ‘[the debtor] is no worse off (or at least in legal if not 
practical terms in no worse position) by having a new creditor (transferee) thrust upon 
him’.21  
(2) Doctrine of assignability 
Through the development of legal principles, the doctrine of non-assignability has been 
replaced by its opposite – the doctrine of assignability.22 This new development permits 
and supports the free transferability of wealth which is driven by financial needs and 
interested commercial actors.23 The reasons of former times are not so cogent in a time 
when finance based on credit has evolved and subsequently been enlarged. ‘[Modern] 
legal systems tend to recognise that rights are transferable.’24 As per the statement of 
Rose LJ in Re Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA (No 8): 
The discovery in comparatively modern times that the right to receive 
payment of a [receivable] is a saleable commodity has been of enormous 
commercial and economic importance; it hugely expanded the opportunities 
for obtaining credit by permitting the recycling of receivables and their use 
as security for financing.25 
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The doctrine of assignability was developed in equity by the Court of Chancery.26 Since 
the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 187327 was enacted, and subsequently replaced by 
the Law of Property Act 1925 (the Property Act),28 a receivable has certainly been 
assignable. A legal claim comprising a claim of action or a right to sue has been seen as 
an alienable or assignable thing and, in various contexts, a form of property.29 The right 
to payment in a receivable is then counted as a kind of private property. The concept of 
alienability regards it as contrary to the public interest for assets to be tied up 
indefinitely.30 Consequently, free transferability is more important for the public interest 
than prohibiting it. Traditionally, this concept has been directed only towards physical 
property, such as land. At present, it has also been applied to intangibles, including, of 
course, receivables.31  
It is uncertain why such a change, though slow, finally happened. Besides being 
influenced by financial practice, fundamental arguments from a legal perspective 
supporting the doctrine of assignability are investigated next. Firstly and most 
interestingly, there exists a debate on the legal standpoint of assignment, i.e. whether it 
is in the ambit of contract or property, or both. Assignment is a method of transfer 
formulated by a contract. It constitutes a contractual relationship between the parties. A 
receivable is also a contractual right subject to the contract originating it. An assignment 
is thus considered a subject of contract law. As described above, the initial logic of the 
non-assignability doctrine was that a creditor could not assign his receivable because it 
was a contractual relation between him and his debtor which was regarded as too 
personal to be assigned. In order to regard a receivable as a transferable thing, a 
property approach has been employed to contest the strictly too personal view of 
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contract law. 32  Categorising a receivable as a piece of property is the idea of the 
property approach. By this, the assignment of a receivable will not be seen as the 
transfer of a contractual relation. Instead, it will be classed as a transfer of property. As 
a result of this idea, there will be no wrong if a creditor is made the owner of a 
receivable and exercises his ownership right by transferring it to others, in a similar 
manner to that of the owner of a tangible property. Subsequently, the legal principle of 
ownership is adopted as a basic understanding of the law of assignment. A receivable 
can be assigned or sold for a value by way of an assignment contract. In this line of 
development, an assignment is therefore composed of both contractual and proprietary 
perspectives.  
Next, another objection which was formerly known as the law of maintenance and 
champerty prohibiting the transfer of a bare cause of action has been reconsidered. The 
basic background of this law is to prevent a third person trafficking in litigation and 
thereby profiting from it. However, this objection was later found to be unconvincing.33 
The interest of a creditor invested in a receivable has been recognised and its 
assignment has been gradually accepted. The rules limiting the assignment of 
receivables or choses in action are, in contrast, minimised. Moreover, once a receivable 
is seen as property, assigning it is no longer the transfer of a mere right of action. ‘An 
assignment of a mere right of litigation is bad … but an assignment of property is valid, 
even although that property may be incapable of being recovered without litigation.’34 
An assignee with a legitimate or genuine commercial interest can therefore enforce the 
assignment of a right of action. 35  The objection based on the ground of litigation 
trafficking could not prevent developments in the law of assignment.    
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Nowadays, only certain types of receivables or choses in action have been classed as 
non-assignable. 36  The underlying reasons are either because such receivables are 
personal obligations or because transferring them is against public policy. For instance, 
if a receivable is a personal obligation the purpose of which is to perform solely for a 
specific person, such receivable cannot be assigned, since assigning it would render the 
obligation a different one. 37  In other cases involving certain sums, such as public 
salaries or pensions and rights to payment arising from divorce proceedings, it is public 
policy that precludes their assignment.38  
 
3.1.2 Contemporary legal notions of assignment 
As a result of legal developments, assignment has been regarded as a hybrid legal 
institution of contract and property. The notion of the property-contract approach has 
brought about property law and contract law to deal with assignment. This is one area of 
law where contract and property are intertwined. As the philosophical foundation of the 
law of assignment, a general statement is this:  
[There] is [a] related but distinct difference between: the transactional 
dimension of the proposed transfer, which relates solely to its impact on the 
immediate parties – transferor and transferee; and the proprietary dimension, 
which entails that it becomes binding on the obligor and other third parties, 
including the transferor’s other creditors or his trustee-in-bankruptcy.39  
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It calls for further investigation regarding the assignment and legal principles of 
property and contract.      
(1) Assignment, property law and contract law 
As a principle of contract law, assignment is a contractual method for transferring rights 
or choses in action from one person to another. It is legally formulated as a contract and 
subject to contract law. On the notion of assignment in property law, it has its roots in 
classifying a mere contractual receivable as property, as property law principally deals 
with, inter alia, the question of what things can count as property and can generate 
proprietary interests, rather than being a mere personal or contractual relationship.40 
Once a receivable is counted as property, it brings the transferability of receivables into 
the realm of property law. Although a contract can be regarded as generating an object 
of property, the content of rights attached to it is certainly determined by the contract 
and is a matter of contract law. However, ‘the position of the creditor as against third 
parties, including the validity of transfers, and claims arising from an invalid transfer is 
in principle a matter of property law’.41 The legal concepts of property originally used 
with land and movable tangible objects have then been applied by analogy to the 
assignment of receivables.     
(1.1) General principles 
A voluntary assignment is a contractual transaction between assignor and assignee.42 
There must be an agreement between them. It has thus long been acknowledged that 
‘[an] assignment always operates by way of agreement or contract’.43 Still, there seems 
to be an unsettled debate regarding the contractual legal status of assignment as it is 
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argued that ‘English law does not see assignment as a “contract”; accordingly there 
need not be any consideration given or promised by the assignee.’44 But this argument is 
unlikely to be true, especially in some aspects of assignment.45 Take, for example, an 
assignment to transfer future receivables, a consideration in this case is legally 
required.46 In addition, an assignment cannot be formed if there is not some sort of 
communication between the persons involved. ‘[An] assignment has no effect unless it 
is communicated to the assignee by the assignor, or by someone with his authority; or 
unless it is made in pursuance of a prior agreement between assignor and assignee.’47 
Consider also the concept of ownership, which is a fundamental idea of property law 
that has a significant effect on the understanding of assignment. Ownership is widely 
accepted as the greatest property right that one can have.48 For an intangible asset such 
as a receivable, a creditor is regarded as the owner of a receivable and as having a 
beneficial proprietary right in his hands. 49  He, as a rightholder – or, in property 
language, an owner – has legal powers in performing acts not only ‘which will bring 
about the extinguishment of the [receivable]’,50 but also ‘which will both divest the 
creditor’s right in personam against the debtor and invest an assignee with a similar 
right’.51 Consequently, the creditor holds the legal right to transfer as well as being the 
owner of a property. To put it in another way, other people, in principle, have no right to 
protest that a creditor shall not exercise his legal powers.52 This analysis is advanced by 
applying the Hohfeldian method of analysing the ownership of a chose in action.53       
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Influenced by the concept of property, proprietary rights have also been used as a basic 
explanation in constituting a set of rules on assignment. In itself, the assignment of a 
receivable is said to involve the transfer of some kind of proprietary right.54 Apart from 
viewing a contractual receivable as property, another principal reason is because an 
assignment has a legal effect that is able to be asserted not only against the debtor but 
also against other third parties – such as other creditors of the assignor or other 
competing assignees. This is a proprietary aspect of assignment. Property law has then 
become another main pillar of the law of assignment, in addition to contract law, both in 
terms of legal validity and legal effects.  
(1.2) Legal validity 
To make an assignment contract, either legal or equitable, the mutual intention of 
assignor and assignee to transfer a receivable is the main ingredient.55 Although, as 
opposed to an equitable assignment, a legal assignment must be in writing, no particular 
form of words has to be used.56 ‘The language is immaterial if the meaning is plain.’57 
As a minimum standard, the language used should be able to be understood as referring 
to the intention of the parties to conclude such an assignment. Moreover, as an 
assignment is a transaction between assignor and assignee, a debtor’s consent is 
typically not necessary.58 This general principle was identified and confirmed by Lord 
Millet in Mulkerrins v PricewaterhouseCoopers,59 by stating that ‘[the] benefit of a 
contract may be assigned to a third party without the consent of other contracting parties 
… A receivable is freely assignable both at law and in equity without the debtor’s 
consent.’ This is because, in the ordinary sense, it does not matter to the debtor whether 
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the benefit of the contract is enjoyed by the creditor or by a third person of the creditor’s 
choice.60  For the validity of an assignment in terms of property law, it focuses on 
assignability requirements. The appearance of a receivable as an object of property 
being assigned is taken into consideration. The requirement of a proprietary right is 
another concern being an important factor if an assignment is to be valid. 61  For 
example, an assignor must own the receivable assigned, and the receivable being 
assigned must exist as present property.62  
From a theoretical viewpoint, although an intangible thing has no material form that can 
be physically possessed, owned or delivered, a notice of assignment is established as a 
replacement for delivery of possession or ownership. Its function is analogous to taking 
possession or ownership of a tangible property. As has been submitted, formulating 
such a notice is the nearest equivalent to a performance that makes the assignment 
seems more actually and physically real.63 However, assignment under English law can 
take effect either at law or in equity. A legal assignment must be absolute and not 
purport by way of charge only, whereas an equitable assignment can be either. A legal 
assignment is subject to Section 136(1) of the Property Act whereby formal validity is 
required. It must be in writing. An express notice must also be given to the debtor. Until 
it is received the assignment can only take effect in equity. An equitable assignment, by 
contrast, is effective even without such a notice. In financial practice, the assignment of 
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receivables is conducted both on notification and non-notification bases.64 Notifying a 
debtor of an assignment is, therefore, not a requirement for every assignment.65  
 (1.3) Legal effects 
Being a valid assignment, one of its effects is to create a relationship, i.e. rights and 
obligations, between assignor and assignee. This relationship will be subject to the 
contract of assignment. An assignment is not a contract between assignee and debtor. 
Through it, there is no contractual relationship directly linking the assignee and the 
debtor. No contract is made between them. Consequently, a settled law regarding the 
position of a debtor is that the assignee does not become a party to the original contract 
which creates the receivables assigned. The assignor or creditor is not replaced by the 
assignee.  
A notice of assignment is used as a device to bind the debtor to an effective result of the 
assignment. Giving the debtor a notice of assignment will, as an example, prevent him 
getting a good discharged by paying the assignor; instead, he has to make payment to 
the assignee.66 Besides, it has a significant effect on a priority problem. The leading 
authority in this matter is Dearle v Hall,67 where one of the basic rules is that, amongst 
competing assignees, the first one who gives notice of assignment to the debtor prevails. 
Although notifying the debtor is not always necessary, it is in fact in the interest of the 
assignee. 
In terms of legal enforcement, rights that have been assigned to the assignee include the 
right of action. Principally, to enforce receivables there is no need for the assignee to 
resort to any help from the assignor. The law of assignment generally permits him to 
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sue the debtor to enforce the receivables assigned. As a procedural matter, the assignee 
can bring an action by himself and in his own name in the event that the assignment is 
legal, or by joining the assignor if the assignment is equitable.68 However, in terms of 
substantive law, the result of an assignment imposes that the assignee’s rights against 
the debtor are, using English law’s phrase, subject to equities. This means that the 
debtor is able to raise any defence that he has against the assignor to the assignee. This 
defence is not only limited to defects in the assignor’s rights but also include certain 
claims which the debtor has against the assignor.69   
From a proprietary viewpoint, the effectual result of an assignment does not manage to 
transfer contractual rights from assignor to assignee. What it does is more likely transfer 
ownership of the assigned receivables from the former to the latter. The assignment 
passes the assignor’s beneficial ownership right against the debtor to the assignee. More 
importantly, an effect of the assignment is to create proprietary effects for the assignee, 
not only against the assignor but also against other persons. Such effect gives him a 
right to claim from the debtor payments for the receivables assigned to him. It also 
provides him with a right to protect his interests against other third parties, i.e. the 
assignor’s creditors or other insolvency representatives, or any other competing 
assignees or third parties asserting a competing claim on the receivables.70 Whenever it 
comes to third-party effects of any rights, this is beyond the ambit of contract, and 
hence in the sphere of property law. In turn, this leads to other legal considerations 
based on general principles of property law when an issue concerning assignment is 
raised. For instance, a notice of assignment has been viewed as a way to perfect 
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proprietary rights in the receivable assigned. A problem of competing assignments is to 
be decided by an analogical understanding of a proprietary right to a thing based on a 
notice as the method for taking possession.71   
According to the present legal notion of assignment which is generally based on the 
property-contract approach, one thing that can be seen is confusion. Some matters relate 
to property law, while others contract law. This is a confusing combination deeply 
embedded in the law of assignment. It is rooted in the fundamental idea that assignment 
is a mixture of property and contract. As is accepted, ‘the difficulty of assignment is 
largely due to its character as a hybrid of contract and property’.72   
(2) Assignment and receivables financing   
In financial practice, receivables are a financial asset that can be used for raising 
finance. This is typically called receivables financing by which financing is raised 
against receivables. In this subsection, several scenes in which receivables financing is 
developed by way of assignment will be illustrated. Apart from seeing how the law of 
assignment is employed in practice, this will serve as a fundamental background for 
further practical analysis regarding the property-contract approach to the law of 
assignment and its role in international financing against receivables.  
A business sector that provides a method of receivables financing is commonly known 
as ‘factoring’.73 The ‘factor’ acts as a buyer to purchase receivables from the ‘client’ 
(the seller), who is the original rightholder or creditor of such receivables. A debtor of 
receivables is called a ‘customer’. Relationships between factor and client are governed 
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by a factoring agreement. 74  Via this mechanism, the factor finances the client by 
prepayment of the purchase price of the receivables.75 From a financial viewpoint, one 
of the main functions of the factor is to assume the credit risk, namely, the risk of non-
payment by the customer. That risk was formerly borne by the client. Another function 
attached to this is to offer the client the proposition of collecting receivables.76 From the 
factor’s perspective, unless the purchase price of such receivables has been discounted 
from their real value in such a way that it minimises that risk significantly, the 
enforceability of receivables is his primary concern. It is the way to obtain payment or 
gain a benefit as anticipated.77 
An assignment of receivables can be created by way of either sale or security. Through 
assignment, receivables can be transferred outright as an absolute sale or used as a 
security, such as to secure a loan.78 Economically, both of them can achieve the same 
outcome as they can provide finance for a business. Under English law, however, 
assignments by way of sale and by way of security are treated differently.79 The first 
method of assignment might be separated into discounting receivables and outright 
transfer.80 ‘Receivables, whether in a pure or negotiable form, may be discounted for 
immediate cash’,81 hence providing finance for a business. This is the case where the 
purchase price is discounted from the face value of the receivables. A transaction is 
typically called by several names, such as discounting receivables, blocks discounting 
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and invoice discounting.82  In case of financing by outright transfer, receivables are 
assigned outright from the rightholder to, for example, his creditor. It is stated that this 
will occur where ‘[a] creditor who presses his debtor for payment may be satisfied with 
an assignment of a debt owed to his debtor by a third party’.83  Financing against 
receivables through this method is then a way for the ‘discharge or reduction of an 
existing indebtedness’.84 As a matter of practice, both outright transfer and discounting 
arrangements are metaphorically seen as the sale of receivables. The creditor or client 
will immediately receive money from the financier or factor for the discounted price of 
the receivables. As a matter of law, nevertheless, either outright transfer or discounting 
of receivables is processed though assignment. An assignment is a contract employed in 
transferring intangible things. It differs from a sale contract as regularly used in 
transferring tangible property. The assignment of receivables is to transfer rights to 
payment, not to transfer ownership or possession of any property. This is one of the 
ways in which a transfer of receivables differs from a transfer of other tangible property.  
Furthermore, receivables are financial assets which can serve as a security to support 
another financial transaction, the result of which is to ensure the payment of money or 
the performance of an obligation under that particular transaction – such as a loan.85 
Receivables can be mortgaged or charged.86 In this context, they are another form of 
collateral creating security rights which are another form of property rights for a secured 
creditor.87 Likewise, this financial technique is completed through an assignment by 
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way of security, as opposed to by way of a sale. Whether an assignment is considered as 
a sale or a security depends largely on the real intention of the contracting parties to the 
assignment, and it shall be determined based on the substance rather than the form of 
the transaction.88 A transaction described by the parties as a purchase or a sale may be 
characterised as a loan based on the security of receivables, either because that does not 
represent the true intention of the parties or because, despite the description given by the 
parties, its legal effect is that of a secured transaction.89 Though these security rights are 
characterised as a property right, it can be claimed that they are actually created by a 
contract.90  
There exists a further important legal aspect resulting from the distinction between 
outright assignment and assignment by way of security which should be mentioned 
here. Formally, an outright sale of receivables is not registrable while the creation of 
security over receivables usually is.91 Under the Companies Act 2006, an assignment by 
way of a charge on the book debts of a company needs to be registered principally 
within 21 days after the day on which the charge is created, otherwise it is not as 
effective against third parties.92 However, this legislation has recently been revised by 
the Companies Act 2006 (Amendment of Part 25) Regulations 2013 which came into 
force on 6 April 2013. According to this new regulation, the criminal penalty against the 
company as a result of failure register charge within the 21-day limit has been removed. 
But, in terms of civil validity, delivery of particulars relating to a charge created to 
registrar within the time limit has still of profound important and should continue, 
otherwise the charge is void against third parties. 93  Another difference between 
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assignment by way of sale and by way of security is that a statutory assignment subject 
to Section 136(1) of the Property Act must be absolute and not purporting to be by way 
of charge only. An assignment by way of charge is constituted as an equitable 
assignment which can take effect only in equity. 94  Considering the effects of 
assignment, one distinctive point can be made.95 Assignment by way of sale involves an 
outright transfer, in which a receivable must be absolutely transferred from the assignor 
to the assignee. As such, the assignor has no right to redeem. In contrast, where a 
receivable has been assigned by way of security it could be said that the ownership of 
that receivable has not been transferred. What is given to the assignee is merely a 
preferential right over the receivable. The assignor thus retains a right of redemption. 96 
 
3.2 Contractual-based rules of assignment 
Assignment operates by way of a contract. It is formed by an agreement between the 
parties. The law of contract thus plays a significant role in regulating it. In this section, 
the legal rules specifically founded in the contractual aspects of assignment are 
examined. Insofar as this research is concerned, contract law relating to assignment can 
be divided into four main groups: assignment contract, non-assignment clause, the legal 
relationship between assignor and assignee, and the legal relationship between debtor 
and assignee. They will be discussed in turn.  
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3.2.1 Assignment contract  
According to the principles of contract law, the subject of assignment was originally 
treated as an adjunct to the privity of contract. It was regarded as an exception to 
privity.97  The doctrine of privity of contract effectively prevents contracting parties 
from conferring rights or imposing obligations upon a person who is not a party to the 
contract.98 And at the same time, it prevents a third party from having a right to enforce 
the terms of the contract. According to this doctrine, ‘a contract can be enforced neither 
by nor against third parties’.99 However, with assignment, contract law does allow a 
contracting party to transfer his rights under a contract to a third party.100 By being able 
to put a third party into a contractual relationship, the assignment is therefore seen as an 
exception to privity.  
To see the characteristics of assignment more clearly, another transaction which is 
regularly used when making a comparison with it is novation.101 Assignment differs 
from novation. While the former is a deal between two parties, assignor and assignee, 
the latter involves three parties. They are the debtor and creditor who are the parties to 
the original contract to be novated, plus a third party. Unlike assignment, novation 
requires the consent of all three parties. Besides, novation, as opposed to assignment, 
does not merely involve a transfer of rights.102 The method of novation is such that the 
parties to the original contract agree to extinguish the contract between them, and one 
party agrees to enter into a new contract with the third party. As a consequence of 
novation, the extinguished contract is replaced by a new contract. The replacement 
contract can itself create not only new rights, but also new obligations. The new contract 
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may, otherwise, fully substitute a third party for a party to the original contract, but not 
have the result of altering the rights and obligations of the parties as originally 
contracted.103 By formulating a new contract, there is then no need to resort back to the 
original one. Unlike assignment, the debtor in the original contract can become a party 
to the novation. As a substantive result, contractual rights, obligations and liabilities can 
thus be transferred. In contrast, it is only contractual rights that can be transferred by 
way of assignment.104 But one thing that these two types of transaction have in common 
is that they are both contracts. 
Operating as a contract, assignment is substantially ruled by contract law. There are two 
further points regarding the contractual side of assignment that should be considered. 
The first point concerns one of the main ingredients of an assignment, i.e. an intention 
to transfer. ‘It is a requirement of all consensual assignments that the assignor intends to 
assign.’105 An intention to create legal relations is an essential element of a binding 
contract. It is the way that parties to a contract exhibit and express their intention to be 
bound by the terms of an agreement.106 In the case of assignment, a requirement is that 
the assignor must intend to pass his rights against his debtor to the assignee. Whether 
such intention exists or not is a matter of fact. In determining it, the transaction in 
question must be considered. As a matter of law, it largely depends on the construction 
of the contract, since it evidences the intention to assign.107 Relevant statements and 
documents will be construed in order to seek such an intention. The form of word is 
immaterial as long as they show an intention to assign.108  
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The second point is about contractual formalities. According to a general principle of 
contract law, a contract can be in any form. ‘[An] oral contract is generally just as 
binding as a written one.’109 Purposes that require a certain form, such as in writing, in 
the law of contract mainly involve reasons of certainty, protection and proof or 
evidence.110 An assignment subject to Section 136(1) of the Property Act must be in 
writing. Along the same lines as its predecessor,111 ‘[the] object of this section was to 
dispense with the necessity for joining the assignor as a party in cases in which his 
presence was unnecessary and inconvenient’.112 However, this statute only provides an 
alternative method for making an assignment. It has been remarked that this 
requirement ‘does not affect the substantive law of assignment, but merely provides 
improved machinery’.113 As a consequence of this statutory requirement, it confers on 
an assignee a legal right to sue. To this extent, the position of an assignee as a question 
of procedure has been improved. He can effectively sue the debtor, not in the name of 
the assignor but in his own name as the assignee.114 The statutory rules are unlikely to 
be a contractual formality. In contrast, it primarily serves the purpose of procedural law. 
Furthermore, the requirement for a form is only for a statutory assignment. In the case 
of an equitable assignment, there is no need for any written document. An assignment 
can take effect in equity even though it is not in writing. From an international 
perspective, most legal systems, e.g. in Europe, do not impose any formal requirements 
for validating an assignment.115 Additionally, there appears to be some movement on 
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the deformalisation of assignment laws. The purpose of this is to facilitate financial 
activity involving the transfer of claims.116 An example can be taken from the UN 
Receivables Convention where there is no rule imposed as to the formal validity of 
assignment.117  
 
3.2.2 Non-assignment clause 
On the one hand, the general principle of a right to assign states that ‘a party is free to 
assign all or any of its rights under a contract’.118 The benefit of a contract can be 
assigned to a third party. On the other hand, the parties also have a right according to 
the principle of freedom of contract to preclude or limit such a right to assign. A 
contractual term functioning like this is called a non-assignment, or an anti-assignment, 
clause. It is a contractual prohibition on the transferability of receivables subject to it. 
Take for instance the words of Lord Millet:  
[The] general rule is that the benefit of a contract may be assigned to a 
third party without the consent of the other contracting party. If this is not 
desired, it is open to the parties to agree that the benefit of the contract 
shall not be assignable by one or either of them, either at all or without the 
consent of the party. There is nothing objectionable in this; a party is 
entitled to insist that he deals with only the particular party with whom he 
has contracted … But, unless he takes the precaution of including in the 
contract a prohibition of assignment, he has no right to object to it. 119 
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From a legal viewpoint, there is no reasonable objection to such a contractual term. In 
contrast, a non-assignment clause is inserted in a contract for a number of reasons.120 
Firstly, it is a genuine commercial interest of a contracting party that underlies this 
clause. The purpose of a non-assignment clause is to allow a party to ensure that his 
contractual relations are only with the person he has agreed and no one else.121 A debtor 
may hold a legitimate interest in prohibiting an assignment.122 He is entitled to insist 
that he wants to deal only with the particular party with whom he has contracted.123  
Aiming to protect a debtor from potentially negative results arising out of an assignment 
is the second ground behind the insertion of a non-assignment clause. In a circumstance 
where there is no non-assignment clause, a debtor who overlooks a notice of assignment 
and pays the assignor does not get a good discharge. And he can be compelled to make 
a second payment for the benefit of the assignee.124 Besides, the debtor cannot rely upon 
new equities against the assignor if they arise after receiving a notice of assignment. By 
preventing an assignment, it is a debtor’s desire that ‘rights of set-off arising from 
continued mutual dealings between the debtor and the assignor are not cut off’.125 
Another consideration for non-assignment is the fact that, in contrast to continued 
relations with the assignor, the assignee is a one-off relationship with the debtor. He 
might have no incentive to preserve the debtor’s goodwill.126  A further supporting 
statement is that an assignor ‘would be less interested in the performance of his side of 
the contractual bargain if he has assigned his right to benefits under the contract to a 
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third party’.127  Moreover, from the debtor’s perspective, there might be a potential 
difficulty in ‘tracking down the assignee so as to make payment’.128    
To support the unfettered operation of financial activities, the topic of non-assignment 
is, nevertheless, considered to have a conflicting purpose, between protecting debtors 
and promoting free assignability. It is also a contest between freedom of contract and 
freedom of commerce. 129  Anyway, a point which should be made first is that the 
following debate concentrates on the prohibition of the assignment of contractual rights 
or receivables that has not yet been performed. It does not concern a non-assignment 
clause that seeks to prohibit a transfer of the proceeds of receivables after they are 
received by the creditor. Whenever the debtor pays the receivable, it is the money – or 
property – that is in the hands of the assignor. The debtor has no legitimate interest in 
restricting the assignor if he wishes to transfer his property to a third person. This kind 
of non-assignment clause, if any, would be contrary to a public policy that prohibits 
absolute restraint on the alienation of property.130  
Initially, it is a matter of contract construction whether and to what extent a contract 
prohibits or restricts the assignment of contractual rights.131 Prohibiting a creditor from 
assigning his rights under contract prior to performance can be seen as a condition of 
the debtor’s obligation to perform, not a restraint on the creditor’s right of alienation of 
property.132 As such, non-assignment can be effective. In principle, it will, subject to the 
terms of the contract, render an assignment in breach of such prohibition ineffective. A 
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result is that the assignee cannot assert his assigned rights against the debtor. 133 
Assignment in breach of such a clause will not give the assignee a right to claim for the 
assigned receivables against the debtor. The assignee will, as a result, not be able to 
receive the beneficial interests assigned to him. Still, it does not follow that an 
assignment in breach of a non-assignment clause is in total ruins. It is still effective 
between the assignor and assignee. A non-assignment clause cannot prevent the 
assignee from acquiring rights against the assignor, 134  as this solely concerns the 
relationship between them, in which the debtor plays no part. 
Regarding the effects of assignment, it has been claimed that a contractual prohibition 
against assignment ‘operates purely as a matter of contract and does not affect the 
transfer of ownership of the contract right’.135 Assignment certainly operates by way of 
contract. However, it is a means of transferring a contractual right, not a physical object. 
In the case of a receivable, it is a transfer of a right to payment from assignor to 
assignee. Such payment is purported to be performed by the debtor. On this line of 
reasoning, it has been stated that ‘[unlike] tangibles where title and possession can be 
vested in different people, the nature of contractual rights as choses in action does not 
allow a transfer of title without a transfer of the actual right to performance’.136 The 
thing being transferred by assignment is a legal title to such a contractual right. 
Although it has been argued that this is not true in terms of equitable ownership,137 there 
is a counter argument. By referring to equitable ownership in this context, such 
ownership is but a right to receive a performance in general or a payment in particular. 
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On this point, there is no material substance to which the purported assignment can 
actually attach for the benefit of either assignor or assignee. This is the essence of equity 
that regards as done that which ought to be done. A legal event is seen to be initiated 
even before it actually happens. Therefore, a contractual prohibition against assignment 
operates purely as a matter of contract. It does not involve the transfer of ownership, 
even an equitable one. 
Although, a non-assignment clause can effectively prevent the result of assignment 
between assignee and debtor, it cannot operate to invalidate an assignment contract 
between assignor and assignee.138 The assignment can still be effective as far as they are 
concerned. In a case where a contract expressly prohibited assignment, even between 
assignor and assignee, it was claimed that this contractual term was ‘repugnant to the 
creditor’s ownership and ought not to be countenanced’.139 Since a receivable is a form 
of property and such a term will render the receivable inalienable, it can no longer 
function to invalidate the assignment. 140  Nevertheless, this opinion was later 
commented on in Helstan Securities Ltd v Hertfordshire County Council,141 that it was 
obiter dictum and only concerned the relation between assignor and assignee. An 
assignment can be a good assignment between them. Such a non-assignment clause can 
still prevent the debtor affecting from the assignment in relation to the assignee. The 
debtor’s legal status is still protected by this type of non-assignment clause.     
The contractual analysis is indeed consistent with the effect of a non-assignment 
clause.142 This is where contracting parties can conclude an agreement not to dispose of 
their rights under a contract to a third party. ‘[If] assignment were viewed only in 
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proprietary terms, it would be significantly harder to give effect to non-assignment 
clauses.’143 The property in a receivable would belong to the assignor; and it would be 
his sole decision, as the owner of a property, whether to assign it or not. The position of 
the debtor would be unlikely to be taken into account. 
Considering the contractual approach to an assignment of receivables, ‘all receivables 
are assignable unless the assignment is prohibited by agreement, statue, or owing to 
public policy consideration’.144 Before making an assignment, one should therefore look 
through an individual receivable that is intended to be assigned in order to ascertain that 
such a receivable can be legally transferred. Otherwise, one may not obtain a beneficial 
interest in the receivable as expected. Legal issues that should be reviewed are the 
validity and content of the contract creating the receivable. Additionally, the financial 
status of a debtor subject to it should be checked to clarify whether he is likely to pay 
for the receivable. Despite its usefulness, a common concern is that this examination is 
unlikely to occur in reality where a bulk of receivables is assigned. Transferring 
receivables in bulk is the transfer of a bundle of contractual rights to payment, a detailed 
examination of each and every receivable is consequently regarded in financial practice 
as impractical.145 
Also, it has been argued that it is impractical for a transferee of bulk receivables to 
conduct an examination of each receivable to see whether it has a non-assignment 
clause or not; such a clause has thus been regarded as an obstacle to assignment.146 If 
this argument is accepted and one wishes to override a non-assignment clause created 
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by the intention of the parties to a contract, the next consideration has to be made on the 
ground of public policy. According to one view: 
[If] there is shown to be some legitimate public interest (and it should not be 
assumed that what is convenient for banks and financiers necessarily equates 
with the public interest) in denying effect to such clauses, the only 
appropriate legal route for such a public policy over-ride is through 
legislation.147  
This is a contest between the principle of free transferability and the legitimate interests 
of the debtor. For the sake of facilitating the free flow of credit in the present economic 
atmosphere, favour is given to the former principle. Taking into account the aim of 
creating a continuous flow of receivables for financing an ongoing business, it is then 
proposed that this is a reason of public interest and declaring that a non-assignment 
clause should not be effective.148 Freedom of contract is, in this regard, overridden by 
freedom of commerce. Creating such a rule in legislation is the next step. The 
Receivables Convention, for instance, provides in Article 9 that an assignment of 
receivables is effective, notwithstanding an anti-assignment clause.149  The Factoring 
Convention also adopts such an approach.150 Another example can be derived from the 
UCC, Article 9, where it is declared that an anti-assignment term in an agreement 
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between assignor and debtor is ineffective. Moreover, an assignor acting contrary to 
such a term is not deemed to be in breach of the agreement with his debtor.151  
 
3.2.3 Relationship between assignor and assignee 
There are two categories for the legal relationships arising from an assignment; one is 
between assignor and assignee, the other is between debtor and assignee. Here, the 
former relationship is examined.   
An assignment creates a contractual relationship between assignor and assignee. Their 
relation is governed by the terms of the assignment contract,152 subject to the law of 
contract. Firstly, the assignor is bound by the assignment. He must answer to the 
assignee for non-performance or breach of contract according to the remedial rules of 
the applicable law.153 Secondly, assignment involves a transfer of the right to receive a 
payment from a debtor under the contract. It is not a transfer of the entire contract. The 
transferred right is a right against one specific person, i.e. the debtor. It is not a 
proprietary right against the whole world. Furthermore, after an assignment, neither 
debtor nor assignor completely drops out of the picture.154  As a matter of law, an 
assignment does generate legal relationships between assignee, assignor and debtor. The 
original contract creating the assigned right and the relationship between assignor and 
debtor have still to be taken into consideration. The right of the assignee is not fully 
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formulated. He is not the sole rightholder, or some might say the owner. Property rules 
are unlikely to be applied at this stage. Another point which should be mentioned here is 
that a notice of assignment to the debtor is not required to make an equitable assignment 
effective between assignor and assignee. 155  It is only in the case of a statutory 
assignment that giving a written notice to the debtor is required.156  
 
3.2.4 Relationship between debtor and assignee 
With regard to the legal relationship between debtor and assignee, a core principle is 
that ‘[the] assignment of a [receivable] transfers the benefit of the contract to the 
assignee but does not substitute him as a party to the contract’.157  This means the 
assignment does not substitute the assignee for the assignor. Also, as a matter of 
contract, there is neither a contractual arrangement nor a contractual relationship 
between the assignee and the debtor. An assignment does not create privity between 
them.158 This is not the case with novation. As such, the assignee might be seen as a 
stranger to the original contract generating the receivable assigned. However, the whole 
point of an assignment is for the assignee to receive the beneficial rights assigned to 
him. So, the question is how and in what way the debtor, as a result of the assignment, 
has to pay the assignee instead of the assignor.  
                                                             
155
 Gorringe v Irwell India Rubber and Gutta Percha Works (1886) 34 Ch D 128. 
156
 S 136(1) of the Property Act. 
157
 Goode, ‘Assignment Clauses in International Contracts’ (n 118) 391; additionally, an assignment does 
not confer rights on the assignee under the Contracts (Right of Third Parties) Act 1999. Peel and Treitel 
(n 10) 720. 
158
 Therefore, it was stated that, as a result of this doctrine, ‘the assignee is dependent upon the 
continued existence of the contract and the continued legal existence of the parties to the contract’. 
Tolhurst (n 37) 63 referred to an Australian case, Re Kenneth Wright Distributors Pty Ltd (In Liquidation) 
[1973] VR 161.  
92 
 
Basically, it does not matter to the debtor whether the benefit of a contract is enjoyed by 
the creditor or by a third person of the creditor’s choice.159 Subject to the terms of a 
contract, a creditor may ask his debtor to make a payment to another person, especially 
if the debtor agrees to do so.160 Anyway, an assignment differs from a mandate. By 
setting up a mandate, the creditor does not intend to transfer his right, but merely 
instructs the debtor to make a payment on his behalf.161 It is more like a contract of 
agency.162 A contract for an assignment is also different from a contract for the benefit 
of a third party. The latter type is, in principle, a contract whereby the parties mutually 
agree to render the benefit of the contract to a third party who is not party to this 
agreement. Compared to assignment, there is no need for the third party to agree with 
the promisee (creditor) in order to call for the benefit from the promisor (debtor). As a 
principle, it follows that this contract cannot be enforced directly by the third party.163 
But, according to the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999, an exception to the 
general principle is provided. A third party, subject to certain conditions, has a right to 
enforce a term of the contract that grants him a benefit.164    
Moving on to another aspect of the relationship between debtor and assignee, a notice of 
assignment is established as a means of communication to a debtor subject to the 
receivable assigned. From a proprietary perspective, a notice is seen as a concrete act in 
transferring a receivable. It is the nearest equivalent to the physical features of 
possession and ownership. In fact, sending a notice has nothing to do with the 
ownership and possession of the assigned receivable. A notice is only a method of 
                                                             
159
 Southway Group Ltd v Wolff and Wolff [1991] 57 BLR 33 CA (Bingham LJ). 
160
 See Peel and Treitel (n 10) 714. 
161
 See Re Williams [1917] 1 Ch 1; Rekstin v Severo Sibirsko Gosudarstvenoe Akcionernoe Obschestvo 
Komseverputjand the Bank for Russian Trade Limited [1933] 1 KB 47. 
162
 Smith (n 16) 193–194. 
163
 This is generally because there is no consideration that moves from the third party to the obligor 
(debtor). ibid 98–99; see Tweddle v Atkinson (1861) 121 ER 762, 764 (Crompton J); Dunlop Pneumatic 
Tyre Co Ltd v Selfridge & Co Ltd [1915] AC 847. 
164
 S 1, the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999; see also Smith (n 16) 99–100. 
93 
 
communicating an intention to transfer. Although, a valid assignment may not need a 
notice, a notice of assignment can serve as concrete evidence of an assignor’s intention 
to assign.165 Through a notice, the contracting parties to the assignment can inform the 
debtor about the assignment. It is for the debtor to acknowledge that the right of the 
assignor has been transferred to the assignee. An analogy to property concepts as a 
supporting explanation seems unnecessary in this regard.166  Furthermore, not every 
assignment needs a notice for it to be effective. Under English law, a written notice is 
only a requirement for a statutory assignment.167 An equitable assignment, by contrast, 
can be made validly without a notice to the debtor. Besides, if the parties to an equitable 
assignment wish to give a notice to the debtor, it needs not to be in writing.168 Though a 
notice is not required for the perfection of an equitable assignment, it is highly 
recommended as it is necessary to constitute the right of the assignee against the debtor. 
Giving a notice of assignment is a way to involve the debtor in the effectual result of the 
assignment. Only after receiving a notice must the debtor account to the assignee.169 He 
can get a good discharge by paying the assignee, and not the assignor.170 Without such a 
notice, the debtor may discharge his obligation by paying the assignor. The reason for 
this is that before receiving a notice of assignment, the debtor has no knowledge of the 
assignment. He is entitled to assume that he remains liable to the creditor, and only the 
creditor. Payment to the assignor will thus discharge the receivable.  
Another issue on this topic concerns enforcement of the right assigned. Initially, even 
though there is an assignment, the assignee cannot enforce his right by himself. Mere 
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assignment does not give the assignee a right to sue. According to the privity of 
contract, ‘only the parties to a contract may sue or be sued upon the contract’.171 Since 
the assignee is not a party to the original contract, he cannot sue the debtor for the 
receivable assigned, joinder of the assignor as a party to the action is required, otherwise 
the assignee must sue the debtor in the name of the assignor.172 Nevertheless, it is now 
settled law that if an assignment is effective as a statutory one, the assignee has a right 
to sue the debtor in his own name.173 The position of an assignee as a matter procedural 
law has been improved by legislation.174 It is only for an equitable assignment that the 
equitable rule requires the assignee, when seeking to enforce his rights against the 
debtor, to join the assignor as a party or at least to sue the debtor in the name of the 
assignor. The equitable assignee ‘is not in a position to exercise directly against [the 
debtor] any right conferred by the contract on [the assignor]’.175 This is an aspect of 
procedural law. But, in light of contract law, enforcing the assigned right can be seen as 
a situation where the assignee is exercising his right derived from the assignment 
through the assignor who formerly held that right under the original contract. This is the 
nature and purpose of an assignment, i.e. passing a beneficial enforceable right from 
assignor to assignee.176   
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3.3 Property-based rules of assignment 
As for its hybrid character, apart from being a contract, an assignment is also considered 
to be a subject of property. Property law is another part of the rules governing 
assignment. Legal matters which are based on the property aspect of assignment are 
analysed in this section. It begins by looking at the notion that assignment is a method 
of property transfer. The three subsequent topics are: rights of an assignee, proprietary 
effects of assignment, and priority issues.  
 
3.3.1 Assignment as a method for property-rights transfer   
Firstly, it has commonly been said, from a proprietary viewpoint, that assignment 
involves a transfer of property rights. The word ‘transfer’ is usually used in a 
circumstance where one person passes something to another and, as a result, ‘the 
transferee obtains the exact same thing as that once held by the transferor’.177 In a legal 
context, transfer is used to describe the conveyance of property. Its scope is not limited 
to the transfer of tangible things but also covers the transfer of property rights.178 When 
a receivable is categorised as property, a right that resides in it is also classified as a 
property right. Passing it from one to another is within the general idea of transfer. 
Transferring it by way of assignment has therefore been regarded as a transfer of 
property rights. It has further been said that the legal concept of transfer requires ‘[the] 
extinction of rights’ on the one hand and ‘the creation and vesting of new but equivalent 
rights’ on the other.179 An example of this is a contract for the sale of goods.180 A sale 
contract is a method of transferring goods, the purpose of which is to transfer ownership 
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of the goods sold from seller to buyer. As the result of a sale contract, the buyer has a 
contractual right to demand that the seller deliver the goods or pass the ownership. The 
thing purported to be delivered is a specific physical object to which a property interest 
(or ownership) is attached. Generally speaking, assignment is consistent with this 
concept. It is the case where an assignor’s right is extinguished and a new and 
equivalent right is created and vested in an assignee. Undoubtedly, both sale and 
assignment comprise an element of transfer.181  
However, ownership is a property right that resides in identifiable property. In 
assignment, it is not a property but a contractual right or a right to payment that is 
transferred. This right must be pursued by a debtor, notwithstanding where the money 
the debtor uses to make payment comes from. Unlike a sale of goods where it is 
possible to transfer ownership without delivering its possession, ‘[all] true assignments 
of contractual rights require an actual transfer of the right to performance’.182 This is the 
thing that an assignee shall receive after an assignment. There is no specific property 
attached to the assigned right. Ownership in a specific property is not the purpose of 
assignment. Besides, as a matter of contract, a sale is a contract directly agreed and 
resulting in relationships between the parties to it, i.e. buyer and seller. A third party is 
not relevant in this method of transfer. In the context of assignment, by contrast, there 
must be an assignee. His position can be clarified as a third party to the contract 
between assignor and debtor.  
Assignment does involve a transfer, but the thing which is transferred is not actual 
property. It is the transfer of the title to a right to payment. This scenario differs from 
the transfer of tangible property, especially in the case of a future right, a future chose or 
future property. To illustrate this point, there is another legal doctrine that should be 
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discussed. It is the maxim nemo dat quod non habet. This Latin tag indicates that ‘no 
one gives what he does not have’. It is a fundamental rule governing a transfer 
including, of course, an assignment.183 For a sale of goods, it is necessary to know 
which goods are being sold and bought in order for their ownership to be transferred. 
Ownership can only attach to present existing property; principally, the ownership of a 
non-existing thing cannot be transferred.184 Under the Sale of Goods Act 1979,185 goods 
that have no physical existence, have not yet been manufactured or acquired by the 
seller are called ‘future goods’. They can be the object of a sale contract. Although, a 
contract for the present sale of future goods is valid, there can be no passing of property 
– or ownership – in future goods.186 Such a contract is treated as an agreement to sell – 
or transfer – those future goods.187 It is at this point that the seller cannot give the buyer 
what he does not have. In the case of assignment, an assignment of future rights will be 
treated as an agreement to assign.188 A difference between a sale and an assignment of 
future things is the way to distinguish how future goods and future rights come into 
existence. As described by the Sale of Goods Act, future goods are goods which have 
not yet been manufactured, or acquired by the seller. The emphasis is on physical 
appearance. Once the goods sold exist, ownership can exist and hence is able to be 
transferred. The assignment of future rights, by contrast, involves not only the existence 
but also the enforceability of the rights assigned.189 It links to a relationship between 
persons, i.e. debtor and creditor, not a physical thing. A future receivable is a receivable 
which does not yet exist, and ‘[there] is no legal relationship out of which an 
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enforceable right can grow.’190 As such, assignor and assignee can see no one able to 
enforce the rights purported to be assigned. The key point of assignment is the 
importance placed on the contractual relationship expected to be created between the 
assignor and his debtor in the future. Once this occurs, the assignment will transfer the 
beneficial interest to the assignee provided that and immediately upon the receivable is 
sufficiently identifiable as the subject matter of the agreement.191 Consequently, the 
assignee will have an enforceable right that can be asserted against the debtor. As 
always, no physical thing appears and no ownership of a thing is involved.  
Furthermore, one of the exceptions to the nemo dat rule is granted by the law of 
assignment.192 Although, principally, one cannot give what one does not have, it is 
however possible for someone to assign what he does not have. This is true in the case 
where the same receivable is assigned by an assignor more than once. After the first 
assignment, it can be said that the assignor has nothing left to assign. The second 
assignment should be ineffective and the second assignee should have no right to 
compete against the first assignee. But that is not the law of assignment. Such 
circumstance does happen and it leads to a priority dispute among assignees. 193 
‘Without there being an exception to the nemo dat rule such [a] priority dispute could 
not arise; if the first assignment was effective at law, then the assignor would have had 
nothing to assign to the second assignee.’194  
Notice of assignment is another issue that must be examined. In receivables financing, 
there are basically two main types of assignment: one is operated by way of notice, the 
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other is not.195 In notification receivables financing, the debtor is given a notice of 
assignment. Receivables financing can also be conducted on a non-notification basis. 
From a practical aspect, it has been admitted that this type of assignment is becoming 
the dominant form of receivables financing, since creditors (assignors) are reluctant to 
have their arrangements with factors (assignees) disclosed to their debtors with 
consequent disturbance to their relations.196 A non-notification assignment is effective, 
although it is more risky for the assignee than the notification kind. Without a notice, 
the debtor is, for instance, able to get a good discharge by making payment to the 
assignor. 197  It is apparent from the provisions of the Receivables Convention that 
although its effect is heavily involved with the assignee’s interest, notifying the debtor 
is a right, not an obligation.198 It can be done either by the assignee himself or by the 
assignor. As notice of assignment is linked to proprietary-based rules, its underlying 
function is regarded as equivalent to taking possession of property. However, it is 
obvious that such a function cannot be a reason in the context of a non-notification 
assignment. No notice is given to affect the so-called ownership or possession of the 
receivable being assigned. Moreover, giving a notice of assignment to each and every 
debtor in the case of bulk assignments of receivables is inconvenient, expensive and 
time-consuming.199 It is therefore inappropriate to require a notice to be given to the 
debtor as a method of effecting an outright sale or creating a security interest in 
receivables.200 Here again, a proprietary explanation seems to be disconnected from the 
legal principles and financial practice.  
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3.3.2 Rights of an assignee  
Once an assignment is established as a transfer of property, it follows that an assignee 
can obtain a proprietary right from the result of assignment. As far as this thesis is 
concerned, such a notion is not as straightforward as it seems. Considering the legal 
effects of an assignment more closely, there is another principal doctrine which 
deserves examination in this context. That is what ‘an assignee, whether statutory or 
equitable, takes subject to equities’.201 In other words, the rights of an assignee are 
subject to equities. 202  This doctrine is consistent with the fundamental idea of 
assignment which intends to protect the debtor by indicating that the debtor shall not be 
prejudiced by an assignment.203 It is part of the principle of debtor protection.204 It 
applies even if the assignee is a bona fide transferee of receivables for value.205 Since 
free assignability entails the debtor’s consent being irrelevant and unnecessary, it is thus 
appropriate to ensure that he is no worse off.206 This is one of the concepts of the law of 
assignment in that it ‘should be committed to free transferability but balanced by respect 
for the obligor’s legitimate interests’.207   
As a general principle, the subject to equities doctrine means that ‘the assignee takes 
subject to any defences which the debtor could have raised against the assignor, and 
also subject to cross-claims available to the debtor against the assignor’.208 The extent to 
which an assignee can be affected by these rules depends upon when the debtor receives 
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a notice of assignment. 209  However, some defences, such as fraud and 
misrepresentation210 or other illegalities which are rooted in the contract generating the 
receivables assigned itself,211 are grouped as vitiating equities and affect the existence 
of enforceability of the assigned receivables.212 These are defences that shall render 
contract voidable, thus creating defects in the assignor’s rights under the original 
contract. They can be raised irrespective of the date on which the debtor receives a 
notice of assignment.213 Because the assignee cannot acquire a better right than the 
assignor, when those defective rights are transferred to him he must also be bound by 
them.214 As a consequence, he will unable to enforce the assigned receivables against 
the debtor to the same extent as the assignor.  
Regarding cross-claims, a notice of assignment also has a vital role in drawing the line 
as to their availability.215 A cross-claim will be available for a debtor to contest the 
assignee’s rights only if it is incurred before the time of notice. If the debtor is given the 
notice after a cross-claim accrued due, he may set it off against the assigned receivables. 
An example is where the debtor has already paid half of the receivables to the assignor 
before receiving a notice of assignment.216 However, if the cross-claim accrued due 
after the notice is given, it cannot use to set off against the assigned receivables. This is 
the debtor’s rights to set-off, both at law and in equity.217 As is stated, ‘[the] right of set-
off is subject to this – there is no right of set-off against an assignee of whose 
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assignment the person claiming to set-off had notice at the time when the [receivable] 
due to him was contracted’.218 
According to English law, there are two main sources of the right of set-off outside 
insolvency: one is contractual, the other is non-contractual.219 An interesting issue here 
concerns the former, a contractual set-off. This is the case where the contracting parties 
make an agreement between them that a payment of money by one person to another 
may be set off against any cross-claim for which another is liable on some other 
account.220 ‘[The] purpose of a contractual set-off is usually to extend the right beyond 
that which would be given at law or in equity.’221 Such agreement will bind an assignee 
of the creditor’s claim on the ground that he cannot acquire rights greater than those of 
his assignor, prior to the debtor’s receipt of the notice.222 Considering this situation, it is 
clear that the thing being transferred to the assignee is a contractual right to payment 
subject to the contractual terms of set-off agreed between debtor and assignor. It is not 
an absolute piece of property, but rather rights created and limited by the contract. 
The final point in this regard concerns a right of the parties to vary the contract creating 
the receivable assigned. This issue significantly affects the relationship between debtor 
and assignee. Where a notice of assignment has not yet been given to the debtor, the 
position is clear. The contract can be modified by the parties to it. After notice, although 
there is a general rule that the debtor cannot do anything to diminish the rights of the 
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assignee,223 the principle of transfer does not necessarily prevent the assignor and the 
debtor varying their contract. This general rule applies only to an executed contract. In 
the case of an executory contract or a contract which has not yet been fully performed, 
modification or even rescission is allowed, provided that it is done in good faith.224 This 
is because assignment does not create privity of contract between assignee and debtor. It 
is always the assignor who is the party to the original contract generating the assigned 
receivables. Modifying a contract is an inherent contractual right, or power, of and 
between the parties to that contract. ‘If parties to an executory contract cannot modify it 
to adjust to altered circumstances because the creditor of the debt obligation decides to 
assign his expectant entitlement before the entitlement is earned, the result is slavery.’225 
Based on the principle of transfer by which an assignee shall acquire the same right as 
an assignor, the right to modify the contract remains, even after a notice of assignment 
is received by the debtor. The assignee must also be bound by this contractual power, 
whether a result of modification will be detrimental or beneficial to him. The rights of 
an assignee are therefore subject to contractual modification.226  If the rights of an 
assignee are viewed as a piece of property, it is not a definite item. In contrast, it can 
easily be modified by the contractual power of the parties to the receivables. The 
concept of transferring ownership in a definite or identifiable piece of property might 
not be applicable. In contrast, this argument shows and supports the contractual nature 
of assignment. Here, the rational logic of the contractual principle cannot be overruled 
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by the property approach. It is but legislation that is required if one needs to limit or 
mitigate a harsh or an unwanted result which might affect or compromise the assignee. 
An instance can be seen in the Receivables Convention where it is imposed that, after 
notification of assignment, an agreement between assignor and debtor that affects the 
assignee’s rights is ineffective against the assignee.227 However, in the case where the 
debtor has not received notification, the result still affirms the principle of transfer. A 
modification of the original contract is effective against the assignee.228 
The rights of an assignee are therefore not exactly equivalent to those of an assignor. In 
fact, they can be more or less. The thing assigned to an assignee is not a definite item of 
property. It is but an unsettled right comprising controvertible claim against the 
assignor’s debtor. Assignment is the transfer of a contractual right. Through it, an 
assignee shall receive a contractual right subject to contractual defences, modifications 
and cross-claims.  
 
3.3.3 Proprietary effects  
Being established as a right against the world, a property right or a right in rem is not a 
limited right between parties to a contract. Its scope, as opposed to a right in personam, 
extends to a third person. Being seen as a way of transferring property rights, 
assignment has been proclaimed as generating not only contractual results but also 
proprietary effects. 229  Apart from property transfer between assignor and assignee, 
another significant proprietary effect of assignment concerns the relationship between 
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assignee and third persons. This is a question of whether rights of the assignee can be 
asserted against third parties. It consists of the opposability of an assignee’s rights 
against the creditor of the assignor, or against the liquidator or other insolvency 
representative of the assignor.230  
Before considering such proprietary effects of assignment, a preliminary issue is how an 
assignee can make his right received by an assignment contract having the third-party 
effects. Regarding the property approach, this issue is concerned with the proprietary 
formalities of an assignment, i.e. a method that creates and perfects proprietary interests 
in the receivables assigned. This is the legal subject of perfection. It involves how an 
assignee must complete in order to make his right effective against third parties or, 
according to a proprietary phrase, against the whole world. In English law, perfection 
can be achieved by notice of assignment. As it has been declared in Dearle v Hall,231 
‘[notice] … is necessary to perfect the title – to give a complete right in rem, and not 
merely a right as against him who conveys his interest’. Under Article 9 of the UCC, 
perfection of interest against third parties is processed either upon attachment or by 
notice-filing.232 By notice-filing, it means a financing statement must be filed to the 
specified filling office.233 
Although a notice of assignment is necessary for a statutory assignment under English 
law,234 it is not required for an equitable assignment. No form has to be completed to 
create a so-called proprietary interest in an equitable assignment. Besides, financing 
against receivables can be done on a non-notification basis. It has also been admitted in 
Dearle v Hall that ‘[if] you are willing to trust the personal credit of the man, and are 
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satisfied that he will make no improper use of the possession in which you allow him to 
remain, notice is not necessary; for against him, the title is perfect without notice’.235 
Furthermore, under the Receivables Convention, there is no rule regarding either the 
contractual or proprietary formal validity of assignment.236 To this extent, a conclusion 
that can be drawn is that using the concept of proprietary rights perfected by the formal 
validity of proprietary interests, e.g. by a notice of assignment, might not be very 
helpful. This is because, a real benefit in a receivable is, in the end, linked back to ‘the 
personal credit of the man’, i.e. the debtor subject to the assigned receivable. This is the 
true nature of a receivable comprising the debtor’s obligation to make payment. It is 
always the underlying characteristics of the interests residing in it, even after being 
transferred by way of assignment. 
Although the effectiveness of assignment against third parties may be achieved through 
the method of perfection, it is doubtful whether this effect of assignment should be 
classified as a proprietary or property right. A question is whether this effect really falls 
within the domain of property law. As the research proceeds, some problematic issues 
have arisen regarding the notion that this effect of assignment is proprietary.   
By assignment, the rights of the assignor are passed to the assignee. At a doctrinal level, 
the rights vested in the assignee shall be equivalent to those formerly vested in the 
assignor. Considering this doctrine and the proprietary effects more closely, a question 
is thus, before an assignment is concluded, does an assignor have a property right in a 
receivable? Can an assignor assert his right in that receivable against the whole world? 
Or does he only have a personal right against his debtor, and his debtor only? If it is 
correct that a receivable originating from a contract gives a creditor a right in personam 
enforcable only against his debtor, then why after assignment does the assignee have a 
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property right in the same receivable? What source of property right does the assignor 
transfer to the assignee when originally he holds no property right? In this line of logic, 
the assignee should receive, and have, only a personal right against the debtor, not a 
property kind of right. Moreover, if the assignee really does have a property right in the 
assigned receivable in the same way as the owner of a tangible property, another 
criticism follows. What if, after the first assignment, the assignee wishes to transfer his 
assigned right not to other persons, but back to the assignor; by this second assignment, 
will the assigned right still be regarded as property? In other words, can the assignor 
transform his personal right into a property right by completing a returning assignment 
like this? If the answer is yes, a property right could easily be created by individuals 
through a simple private agreement, notwithstanding the closed lists of properties 
established by the law of property. Should an account of property law still be subject to 
the numerus clausus principle? 
Though this argument might at first seem to be a very theoretical one, and of course it 
is, the whole point is to demonstrate that the proprietary approach based on property law 
does not suit the effects of assignment. Conflicting principles and confusing logics are, 
by contrast, the result of proprietary explanations. As a matter of fact, the hypothetical 
circumstance whereby an assignee assigns receivables back to an assignor does occur in 
the practice of factoring businesses. Basically, it depends on the type of factoring 
agreement that is used. Factoring can be done on a recourse, or non-recourse, basis.237 
By recourse is meant ‘the right of the factor to shift the risk of non-payment of any 
[receivables] to the client’.238 If the agreement is recourse factoring, the client (assignor) 
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is responsible for buying back from the factor (assignee) a receivable that is not paid for 
by his customer (debtor). Under such an agreement, the factor thus has recourse if they 
cannot collect the receivable assigned. But if the factoring agreement is on a non-
recourse basis, the factor does not have such recourse. They assume the full risk of non-
payment by the client’s debtor. From recourse factoring, the theoretical question 
analysed above can thus arise in practice. 
 
3.3.4 Priority 
A priority dispute arises where there is more than one competing claim over the same 
receivables which has been assigned. This matter is also regarded as being in the sphere 
of proprietary effects of assignment.239 According to this view, ‘priority rules exist for 
the purpose of determining priority between property interests’ 240  and settling the 
question of who owns the receivables. Where there exist two effective assignments of 
the same receivables, the situation leads to a priority dispute between successive 
assignees, i.e. who has better title to the assigned receivables.    
Under English law, priorities among competing assignments are governed by the rule in 
Dearle v Hall.241 This rule is not based on the order in which those assignments were 
made. Rather, the first limb of the rule is in fact determined by notice of assignment. 
The assignee who first gives notice to the debtor shall have the prior right, 
notwithstanding whether he was the first or a subsequent assignee, provided that he acts 
in good faith. This last condition is the second limb of the rule. It means that the 
subsequent assignee must, at the time of his assignment, not know of the prior 
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assignment.242 As elucidated in the stated case,243 this rule, which substantially relies 
upon notification, stems from the idea that in transferring a property one must do 
everything towards having possession. In the case of a receivable, one must give notice 
of assignment to the debtor in order to treat the receivable as his property. This is 
tantamount to possession. By failing to give notice, the first assignee has left the 
assignor in apparent possession of the beneficial interests in that receivable, and has 
enabled him to make the second assignment.244 According to these explanations, the 
concept of property, i.e. possession, has been applied to establish a rule for a priority 
dispute.  
The present law of assignment has attempted to treat interests in a receivable as if they 
are property, despite the obvious fact that they are personal. They are in reality not 
rights to obtain actual possession over a specific property, but to obtain actual payment 
from a debtor subject to it.245 By treating interests in a receivable as a personal right, 
priorities between competing assignments can be regarded as involving the question of 
who has a prior right to obtain interests in the assigned receivable. It is, in other words, 
to whom the debtor should make his payment.246 The rights of competing assignees are 
attached to the debtor’s obligation which derives from the contract generating the 
receivable plus the effects of the assignment. The debtor’s obligation is linked to these 
two types of contractual arrangements. In determining a priority by notice, the 
consequence of notice is to give the good-faith assignee, who first his assignment be 
notified to the debtor, the prior right to receive payment. It is not a reason for taking 
possession. While other rationales for priority rules can still be found and applied, 
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considering the interests in a receivable to be a proprietary right is irrelevant, and hence 
unnecessary.   
For bulk assignments of receivables, to notify each and every debtor is viewed by 
practitioners as impractical.247 The rule in Dearle v Hall which is based on notification 
‘has been widely condemned as an unsatisfactory determinant of priorities in the context 
of receivables financing’;248 it is ‘wholly unsuited to modern receivables financing’.249 
There exists, therefore, a proposal that other priority rules in relation to receivables 
financing be considered. For instance, priority should instead be determined by 
registration.250 Another alternative is based on Article 9 of the UCC where priority 
rights are ranked according to priority in time of filing or perfection.251 It, in other 
words, depends on a ‘first-to-file’ rule. 252  The assignee who first files a financing 
statement obtains priority, even though he is not the first assignee.  
The rights-based approach does not bar or conflict with a registration system. An 
explanation of this can be formulated without resorting to the proprietary nature of the 
issue. A fundamental question that must be asked here is what is the objective of 
registration?  Is it solely about transferring ownership or property rights? Registration 
does not always reflect property rights, otherwise we would have to have all things 
registered. Under English property law, a general principle is that various things have 
different and various ways in reflecting or transferring rights or interests in them. While 
ownership of goods or money could pass when those goods or money are delivered with 
an intention to transfer and a transfer of receivables should be notified to the debtor, a 
                                                             
247
 See Oditah, ‘Recurrent Issues in Receivables Financing’ (n 25). 
248
 ibid 351–352; McCormack, Secured credit under English and American law (n 85)245. 
249
 Goode and Gullifer (n 86) 177. 
250
 Law Commission Report on Company Security Interests No 296 (LAW COM No 296, 2005) part 4; 
Goode and Gullifer (n 86) 178; McCormack, Secured credit under English and American law (n 85) 244. 
251
 S 9-322; McCormack, Secured credit under English and American law (n 85) 242–245. 
252
 See ibid 79–84 and 242–245. 
111 
 
transfer of ownership in land needs to be registered.253 Registration is in fact a method 
of publicising information regarding rights or interests in things, the purpose of which is 
to preserve and protect legitimate rights of a rightholder and of a third party who may 
come to get involved.254 It is intended to ‘prevent the implication of false wealth’ and be 
‘a useful safeguard against fraud’.255 This procedure is not going to change or affect the 
true legal nature of assignment. Served as a rule for priority determination, the rights-
based approach regards registration of an assignment of receivables as the way for an 
assignee to declare against the public that he obtains the rights over the assigned 
receivables, and thus to advise anyone who intend to acquire the same rights that they 
could be subject to his prior status. This is the essence that matters and must be 
established in the law of assignment. Again, even no property explanation is 
supplemented, a registration system for the assignments remains consistent with this 
approach.     
 
3.4 Summary remarks  
In the present world where a right to claim for payment in a receivable is a financial 
asset and a form of capital in economic circles, it is essential to ensure that that right is 
definitely and easily transferable.256 Based on a remark pointed out in the previous 
chapter that the true nature of receivables is that of intangible rights, the assignment of 
receivables shall thus be approached on the basis of transferring rights. 
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Taking into consideration the generic meaning of assignment, a clear statement has been 
made as follows: ‘Probably what is meant is what is generally understood, viz. that [by 
an assignment] the assignee acquires rights similar to those of the assignor and is put in 
the same position with reference to those rights as that in which the assignor stood at the 
time of assignment.’257 However, from a legal viewpoint, this statement is unlikely to be 
totally correct. The rights of the assignee can be more or less than those of the assignor. 
There is no concrete guarantee that the assignee, as a result of assignment, shall stand in 
the exact same position as the assignor. In stark contrast, things can change depending 
on a situation that subsequently arises at or after the time of assignment. Several legal 
rules are formulated in order to deal with such a circumstance that might occur.  
Considering the true legal nature of assignment, it has been assumed that ‘the law of 
assignment involves treating interests as if they were proprietary (i.e. allowing their 
transfer), even though in reality they are personal’.258 With a rights-based approach, 
there is no need for such an assumptive treatment of those interests. In contrast, the 
assignment shall be treated as a legal institution according to its genuine concepts and 
consequences. The law on the assignment of receivables shall be explained as it really 
is, not as a confusing combination of contract and property. 
Rather than a combination of property and contract, the methodology proposed by this 
thesis is a rights-based approach. In this way, an assignment of receivables is regarded 
as a transfer of beneficial contractual rights or interests from assignor to assignee. The 
legal effects of assignment, as among assignor, assignee and debtor, or as against third 
parties, shall be treated as legal relationships deriving from the assignment itself. 
Assignment is by and of itself a method of transferring rights to payment, not a hybrid 
of contract and property. For it to be fully and freely developed, the law of assignment 
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should be recognised as a special area of law, thus departing from the law of contract 
and property. 
The key result of this is that property rules resulting from the property approach can be 
distanced or removed from the law of assignment, leaving it as a legal subject having its 
own rules and reasoning. The rights-based methodology is a direct way to explain and 
handle the true nature of assignment. It will unite the hybrid legal features of 
assignment, i.e. contract and property, into a single approach, i.e. rights. There is thus 
no need to link the rules back to any mandatory domestic rules of property law. As a 
consequence, it will be possible to formulate conflict-of-law rules on the basis of 
relationships of rights flowing from an international assignment of receivables as a 
whole. This subject will be studied in subsequent chapters.  
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CHAPTER 4: CONFLICT OF LAWS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 
 
This chapter will examine conflict-of-law rules in respect of international assignments 
of receivables. Conflict of laws or choice-of-law rules is a legal mechanism which has 
been developed in order to find an applicable substantive law in an international 
scenario. Before finding such a law, a prior matter of conflict-of-law methodologies that 
must be answered first is that of characterisation (or classification or categorisation). 
This is the methodology that puts a particular legal issue into a specific legal category 
where it can be properly dealt with.1 Conflict of laws in a jurisdiction fundamentally 
follows the legal classifications used in the context of substantive law. As once 
observed by Auld LJ in Macmillan Inc v Bishopsgate Investment Trust plc (No3), the 
process of legal classification in conflict of laws ‘requires a parallel exercise in 
classification of the relevant rule of law’.2  The assignment of receivables has been 
viewed as a hybrid of contract and property. Conflict rules for both contract and 
property are taken into consideration to deal with an assignment containing international 
or foreign elements. If a legal issue involving assignment is classified as a contractual 
matter, conflict-of-law rules based on contract will be applied. Otherwise, if it is 
categorised as a proprietary matter, it is conflict rules for property that will be referred 
to. Although an assignment is created by contract, some legal issues flowing from it – 
such as third-party effects, perfection and priority – are typically regarded as 
proprietary. As shall be seen, this is the property-contract approach contemporarily 
employed in various jurisdictions. However, the rights-based approach advanced by this 
thesis sees the property-contract methodology as one of the complexities in this legal 
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area. Here, it will also be seen how far such a property-contract approach has been 
successfully applied.  
A comparative legal research methodology is adopted in this chapter. Its purpose is to 
examine the fundamental principles, underlying reasons and policies of conflict-of-law 
rules currently employed; hence it compares and contrasts the rules of jurisdictions and 
relevant international instruments. Comparative conflict of laws has long had an 
intimate relationship with comparative law.3 Substantive laws founded in the previous 
two chapters, i.e. receivables as the object of transfer and assignment which is the 
method of transfer, will be very useful in offering an in-depth explanation of conflict 
rules. By making such a comparison, the similarities and differences of those rules will 
be pointed out. The results of this process will serve as a basic reasoning for further 
analysis of the current property-contract approach and the proposed rights-based 
approach.  
With regard to the chapter’s structure, its main content is crafted according to conflict of 
laws applicable in various jurisdictions. The jurisdictions compared in this thesis 
comprise England, the European Union and the United States. They are examined 
respectively in Sections Two to Four. English conflict-of-law rules are studied first as a 
legal basis of this research, as well as an example of a common-law jurisdiction. They 
will serve as a basic comparator in this analysis. Next, private international law as 
developed in the European Union is investigated. This has one of the more advanced 
levels of uniformity of rules among civil-law and common-law jurisdictions. 
Subsequently, the functional approach of American law, where the substance of secured 
transactions has priority over form, is studied as a leading alternative method for this 
subject matter. But, before examining the laws of those jurisdictions, the first section 
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briefly enumerates the general principles of conflict of laws for the assignment of 
receivables. It also provides further major reasons why those jurisdictions are chosen for 
study. After that, the legal rules imposed in international instruments, having been 
formulated as a way to harmonise the rules on this matter from a global perspective, are 
explored in Section Five. Finally, in Section Six, concluding remarks regarding conflict 
of laws for this assignment will be purposefully drawn as the outcome of this 
comparative research.  
 
4.1 Assignment of receivables in the conflict of laws 
For intangible things, an applicable choice-of-law rule could not be stated without some 
difficulty.4 Besides the general reason that intangibles cover a wide range of things,5 a 
more specific reason concerning the assignment of receivables is largely due to the way 
these have been treated as a hybrid of contract and property.6 Being such a hybrid, with 
both contractual and proprietary characters, a combination of contract and property 
approaches has been formulated to find an appropriate governing law. For a conflicts 
lawyer, this is a legal area that brings the autonomous law of contract into collision with 
the non-autonomous law of property.7 It is, on the one hand, the law of contract that 
grants freedom to parties to arrange an assignment in a way they see as fit for 
themselves. The mutual intention between them is all that matters. They could, subject 
to legal availability, conclude an assignment contract as either an outright or security 
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transfer. The autonomy principle also includes the freedom to choose the law governing 
their assignment. On the other hand, the law of property limits such freedom. 
Assignment itself is regarded by property law as a method of transferring property and 
any rights thereof from one to another. As the assignment creates an effect against a 
third party, it is thus subject to the mandatory aspects of property law and its conflict 
rules. It is not within the ambit of party autonomy to choose an applicable law. 
However, the collision between these two legal areas concerns the question of how far 
the law ought to extend the scope of freedom of contract into the strict legal sphere of 
property law, or to what extent the non-autonomous law of property should have a role 
to play in the context of international assignments and parties’ autonomy. This is a 
problematic concept of the property-contract approach that complicates the conflict-of-
law rules for assignment.   
For the property-contract approach to work properly in the context of international 
assignments of receivables, three principal methodologies of conflict of laws need to be 
clarified. 8  The first methodology concerns the question of classification or 
characterisation.9 Is a legal issue flowing from assignment to be classified as contractual 
or proprietary? What criteria are used to employ such characterisation? Can they 
provide a definitive result, or not? These enquiries are not free from difficulty for a legal 
system to respond. On top of this, another fundamental question is which jurisdiction’s 
law will decide such characterisation problems. Principally, it will be the law of the 
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jurisdiction where the trial takes place (lex fori) that shall determine this.10 If answers to 
those questions can be given with certainty it will lead to the next two collaborative, yet 
distinct, processes. What is a connecting factor in each classification? What choice of 
applicable law is adopted, either for a contractual issue or for a proprietary issue? 
Basically, the law chosen by the parties to the contract governs a contractual matter but, 
for a proprietary matter, no general rule can yet be formed. The possible connecting 
factors typically proposed are the lex situs of receivables, the law of receivables 
assigned, the law of assignment, the law of the debtor’s location, and the law of the 
assignor’ location.11 As a comparative study, the following sections focus on the three 
methodologies having been adopted in each respective jurisdiction, i.e. England, the 
European Union and the United States, and by relevant international instruments. 
 
4.2 England 
English conflict of laws for the assignment of receivables is investigated in this section. 
However, it should be noted at the outset that the English rules have now been 
substantially replaced by the laws of the European Community, first the Rome 
Convention and now the Rome I Regulation.12 These are European conflict rules which 
will be discussed in the next section. The English conflict rules shall be applicable only 
where a case falls outside the scope of European law; especially where a legal issue 
stemming from an assignment is regarded as proprietary, a leading and current 
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suggestion is that it is not governed by the Rome I Regulation, but by common law.13 
English common-law rules as they now stand are considered below. 
English common law regards an assignment of receivables as a transfer of choses in 
action. After long historical development, a chose in action – though originating from a 
contractual relationship – has been advanced as an item of property, and hence 
transferable.14 By this advancement, the assignment combines the contract and property 
aspects of law. The contractual aspect is based on the origin of a receivable which is 
created by a contract, and a contract of assignment which is a method of transfer. On the 
proprietary side, it derives from the idea that a receivable is property. To transfer it is to 
transfer an object of property. Property law, therefore, governs the assignment in 
addition to contract law. An assignment is analogous to the transfer of a tangible thing. 
This idea of a substantive law of assignment has taken root in the approach and has had 
a significant effect on the development of English conflict-of-law rules regulating 
assignment.  
 
4.2.1 Characterisation 
As a general principle of English law, an assignment contract creates not only rights in 
personam between the contracting parties – assignor and assignee – but also rights in 
rem in relation to the assigned receivables. A distinction between legal matters arising 
from the contract and the proprietary transfer of ownership must be made in the case of 
intangibles, in the same manner as for tangible movables. This leads to a problematic 
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issue of characterisation, which is the fundamental process of conflict-of-law 
methodologies. It must be decided before determining which connecting factor will be 
used and which jurisdiction’s substantive laws will be applied.15 As has been submitted, 
‘[characterisation] is done for the purpose of identifying the [most appropriate] choice 
of law rule’.16 Principally in the context of assignment, a question concerning 
contractual relationships between assignor and assignee shall be governed by the proper 
law of contract; but if the question at hand concerns the proprietary aspects of an 
assignment, the applicable law of contract would not apply. It would rather be referred 
to the appropriate choices of law for a transfer of property, e.g. lex situs.17  
Distinguishing between contract and property is therefore an essential matter that must 
be properly resolved in advance so that conflict rules can be properly applied. Still, 
drawing a line between contract and property is in this case not free of difficulty.18 
Operating according to a contractual agreement, the assignment of receivables –by way 
of either outright transfer or security – is certainly subject to conflict of laws for 
contracts. English courts regard an assignment as a contract between assignor and 
assignee. An authority on this point is a statement by Day J in Lee v Abdy: ‘[the] 
assignment here in question is an assignment that exists if at all by virtue of a contract 
between assignor and assignee, and I cannot see how, if there was no valid contract 
between them, there can be a valid assignment’.19 An assignment with an international 
element shall therefore be governed by choice-of-law rules for a contract. However, 
once receivables have been classified as an item of property there appear to be two main 
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reasons that lead straightforwardly to the idea that conflict-of-law rules for property 
should also be taken into consideration. Those reasons are based on the substantive 
ground of the law of assignment. They are the property concept of transfer and the 
effects of assignment against a third party.   
Firstly, an assignment of receivables is viewed as a transfer of property from assignor to 
assignee in accordance with the property concept of transfer. A statement about this 
concept based on the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1873, section 25(6), was made in 
Fitzroy v Cave: ‘a debt [or receivable] must be regarded as a piece of property capable 
of legal assignment in the same sense as a bale of goods’.20 An assignment of intangible 
things is analogous to a transfer or sale of tangible goods. A subsequent statement 
developed from this position is that ‘[just] as a contract of sale of goods involves the 
passing of property in the goods between seller and buyer, so a contract for the 
assignment of a receivable calls for the property in the receivable to be transferred from 
assignor to assignee’.21 For conflict-of-law purposes, a characterisation which can be 
drawn by analogy from these authorities is that passing rights in a receivable by way of 
assignment is a matter not merely of the applicable contract law, but also the lex situs of 
the transferred receivable. This is a proprietary matter in the same sense as transferring 
ownership of a tangible property by a sale contract.22 Such an analogy is, to a certain 
extent, reasonably plausible. Property law’s main purpose is to establish who has title 
over a receivable. After assignment, the receivable assigned will be regarded as the 
assignee’s property. It will no longer be the assignor’s. One important consequence of 
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the assignee having title in the assigned receivable is that if the assignor has received 
payment for that receivable from the debtor he is then bound by the assignment to hold 
that payment and any proceeds of the assignment for the benefit of the assignee.23 
Another significant outcome can be seen if either assignor or assignee becomes 
bankrupt. Since this scenario involves the significant question of who is the true owner 
of the receivable, the answer to which is that the receivable is divisible among his 
creditors. If the receivable is passed to the assignee, it will be beyond reach of the 
assignor’s creditors.24    
Secondly, an assignment is regarded as initiating a proprietary effect against a third 
party. Theoretically, unlike a contract which can only create mutual relationships 
between the parties to it, the rights in a property do have erga omnes, the effect of 
which is against the world at large. This basic theory clearly paves the way for the 
application of conflict-of-law rules for property in an assignment in international 
scenarios. This is because assignment is seen as a way of transferring property rights in 
receivables from assignor to assignee, and the property rights transferred by way of 
assignment can be asserted against any third parties who are creditors, liquidators or 
other insolvency representatives of an assignor. 25  The third-party effect of an 
assignment is similar to when one sells or transfers tangible property and its ownership 
to another. It is, at least, for a third person to respect that, after assignment, the assigned 
receivables no longer belong to the assignor but the assignee. This proprietary effect 
also links to problems of priority where there is more than one person competing over 
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the same receivables. There is, for example, a problem of priority between competing 
assignees or between an assignee and a third party asserting a competing claim to the 
receivable assigned.26 As shall be demonstrated below, this is a legal matter where 
conflict rules for property have primarily been applied.   
 
4.2.2 Conflict-of-law rules 
A general authority on English conflict-of-law rules has been crafted in the well-known 
Dicey, Morris and Collins textbooks on conflict of laws. Influenced by the developing 
terminology of European private international law, the English rules which were 
formerly individualised on the basis of the substantive legal issue of assignment were 
transformed into a European-like structured set of rules.27 Before that time the situation 
was unsettled or, as someoneone commented, ‘severely undeveloped’.28 Now, it is 
submitted that the approach of the common law is very closely structured on the same 
basis as that of the European Union.29  
The English conflict-of-law rules regulating assignment are distinguished into two 
domains: contractual and proprietary. Literally, they can be seen in rule 135.30 As a 
general principle, the mutual obligations of assignor and assignee under the voluntary 
assignment of a right against a debtor, or a receivable, shall be governed by the law 
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which applies to the contract between assignor and assignee.31 The assignability of 
receivables, the relationship between assignee and debtor, the conditions under which 
the assignment can be invoked against the debtor and any question as to whether the 
debtor’s obligations have been discharged are indicated as being determined by the law 
governing the right to which the assignment relates.32 Despite that, due to limited cases 
and conflicting literature, the application of the rule is neither clear nor certain.33 Yet, it 
continues to apply in a circumstance where the question at hand is beyond the scope of 
European law. Although it was originally founded by referring to several instances of 
case law on assignment, it was commented that it can ‘[reveal] no clear or consistent 
principles’.34 This comment is generally correct, especially when dealing with the 
property aspect of the rule. Before going to the property aspect, some issues about the 
rules and contractual aspects of assignment must be clarified first.  
(1) Contractual matters 
Under English rules, the contractual aspect of an assignment of receivables is governed 
by the conflict-of-law rules for contracts. Like between assignor and assignee, rule 
135(1)(a) leads to the law applying to the assignment contract concluded between them. 
And as between assignee and debtor, the law governing the right to which the 
assignment relates is imposed by rule 135(1)(b). It points to the proper law of the 
contract by which the receivables are created.35 This is where the common-law doctrine 
of the proper law of contract is applied. According to the proper-law doctrine, where 
parties to a contract have shown their intention – either expressly or impliedly from the 
circumstances – as to the law governing the contract, such intention shall determine the 
proper law of contract, provided that the choice is bona fide and legal and the 
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application of the chosen law is not contrary to public policy.36 In a case where no such 
intention exists, the contract is governed by the system of law with which it has its 
closest and most real connection.37  
According to the rule, the validity of an assignment contract between assignor and 
assignee is governed by the proper law of the assignment.38 This is directly consistent 
with the fundamental principles of conflict of law for contracts which is dominated by 
the principle of party autonomy or freedom of contract. Parties to an assignment 
contract are principally allowed to choose a governing law in accordance with the 
proper law of contract doctrine. Its effect shall be affirmed. Also, the question of 
whether a receivable is capable of transfer is governed by the proper law of the contract 
creating it. 39  As a matter of law, this question concerns two grounds of non-
assignability.40  The first is whether assignment is prohibited by a rule of law. The 
second is whether assignment is prohibited by the underlying contract between creditor 
and debtor. A significant difference between these two is their effects. Whereas the 
prohibition specified by law prevents property in the receivable being passed from 
assignor to assignee, contractual prohibition does not have such an effect although it 
may render the assignment ineffective against the debtor and result in preventing 
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enforcement by the assignee against the debtor.41 Still, both of these two grounds refer 
to the law chosen by the parties to the original contract. It is the proper law for the 
contract originating the receivable assigned. This approach appears to be a reasonable 
one, since it attaches the issue of assignability to the origin of the object assigned, i.e. 
the law that creates it.  
   
(2) Proprietary matters  
Based on the characteristic formula of English conflict-of-law rules,42 the applicable law 
for an assignment of receivables is divided into one that governs the mutual relationship 
between assignor and assignee and another that deals with the relationship relating to 
debtor. Apparently, no specific rule has been mentioned regarding the proprietary 
matters of assignment, i.e. its third-party effects and priority problems. Generally, it has 
been suggested that they shall be governed by either the lex situs of the thing assigned 
or the proper law of the thing assigned.43 They can be explained as follows. 
One of the most important effects of assignment is to transfer the assignor’s interests in 
the thing assigned to the assignee. Its final goal is to make the assignment effective and 
transfer the property title in a receivable from assignor to assignee. This is where a 
proprietary effect of an assignment between assignor and assignee is formulated. Using 
property language, it is a matter of who, between those two persons, owns the 
receivable or whose is the ownership of the receivable. Initially, it is a question whether 
an assignor, or an assignee, has taken all the necessary steps to complete an assignment 
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as a transfer of property. 44  For example, an assignment may be ineffective on the 
grounds of formal requirement, personal capacity, mistake, fraud and misrepresentation, 
or because it is an assignment of a future receivable.45 Though they are issues affecting 
the proprietary aspects of assignment, no clear explanation exists in the Dicey, Morris 
and Collins textbooks on conflict of laws, whether they should be governed by lex situs 
or something else. In fact, these matters are legal issues that are subject to the sphere of 
contract law.46 Based on rule 135 in particular, since they are matters between assignor 
and assignee which do not directly concern a debtor, they are then to be decided by 
reference to the law of assignment. This is of course unless the phrase ‘mutual 
obligation’ is interpreted to cover only purely contractual aspects of assignment. 
Considering some early English cases, it has been admitted that they are confusing and 
have little if anything to contribute. 47  This is true either when dealing with the 
proprietary effect of assignment or when drawing a line between the contract and 
property aspects of assignment. It is also not certain whether lex situs was the rule for 
English conflict of laws. In Re Queensland Mercantile and Agency Co, 48  it was 
concluded that ‘a transfer of property (by assignment), valid according to the law of the 
place where the property was situated, was not invalidated by anything in the 
transferor’s personal law’.49 In contrast, in Republica de Guatemala v Nunez,50 it was 
not the lex situs of the assigned receivable nor the lex domicilii (the law of domicile) of 
the debtor, but the lex loci actus (the law of the place where the assignment was 
executed) and the lex domicilii of the assignor and assignee that were held to be 
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applicable. Still, this was not a unanimous judgment. ‘It is thus difficult to extract any 
clear propositions of law from the cases.’51 
As for the legal relationship between debtor and assignee, the proper law of the 
underlying contract creating the assigned receivable shall apply according to rule 
135(1)(b).52  It governs the question of whether and to what extent the assignee is 
entitled to enforce the assigned receivable against the debtor, notwithstanding whether 
that question is seen as a proprietary matter or not. This approach is also consistent with 
the principle that the legal position of a debtor should not be altered or prejudiced by an 
assignment, as it is this law that the debtor agreed on in the first place.    
Another important proprietary effect of assignment lies in the opposability of the 
assignee’s right over the assigned receivable as against other persons. This is the 
effectiveness of assignment against third parties and priority issues. With regard to 
conflict of laws for a third party’ effectiveness of assignment, although in a court ruling 
in an earlier case the lex situs approach was adopted,53 the current textbook from Dicey 
Morris and Collins does not deal with this problem. It is unclear which of the conflict 
rules should apply. A suggestion is that so far as it affects a debtor, it may fall under the 
expression ‘the conditions [under] which a [receivable] can be assigned’.54 Such an 
expression is, under the present rule, covered by the term ‘assignability’, which also 
includes the conditions under which a receivable is assignable. It would thus refer to 
rule 135(1)(b) where the proper law of the assigned receivable will apply. This law shall 
decide whether an additional procedure to perfect the effectiveness of an assignment 
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against third parties is required or not, and if it is required, what that procedure is.55 
However, in a case where the requirement is public registration, it should be noted that 
‘the court will usually apply its own registration statue as a mandatory rule of the 
forum’,56 the issue of choice of law therefore does not matter.   
Turning to a priority dispute between competing assignments,57 there is, as well, no 
clear position in rule 135. Dicey, Morris and Collins do not deal with this issue in the 
present textbook. Again, if this issue is of a proprietary kind, it should be ruled by the 
lex situs of the receivable. However, this is not always the case.58 In previous editions of 
Dicey and Morris on conflict of laws, there appears to be a conflict-of-law rule for the 
priority issue. It is but the proper law of the receivable, which means that it is the law of 
the contract creating the assigned receivable that is chosen.59 Some comments are made 
to support its application.60 Despite its disappearance from the leading textbook, the law 
of receivables has still gained strong support in England. This is shown in a paper 
published by the Financial Markets Law Committee (‘FMLC’). By emphasising the 
important principle of debtor protection, the FMLC has indicated that ‘it is important 
for a debtor to know whom to pay the required sum in order to discharge the debt’, and 
‘[to] get to this point it is important that he knows who owns the debt and that, in turn, 
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he is capable of answering the question of the priority of competing assignments of debt 
and capable of identifying the law governing that question’.61 The law of the contract 
creating the assigned receivable is a choice that fulfils this concern.  
From an academic viewpoint, this is a controversial topic of debates: some support the 
application of lex situs, others the law of the assigned receivable. There also exists a 
suggestion of the assignor’s place of business. 62  No consensus can reasonably be 
identified. It is here once again that one cannot find a firm position of the English courts 
by investigating cases hinging on this matter. For instance, in William James Le Feuvre 
v John Sullivan and Anne Sullivan,63 although English law was held to govern the 
problem of prioritiy between two assignments of a life insurance, it was submitted that 
‘it is not clear from the case on what basis English law applied’.64 It might be because it 
was the proper law of the insurance contract or, as someone suggested but another 
disagreed, it would have been decided under the lex situs of the receivable which was 
also England.65 The idea of lex situs was once approached in the first instance in Re 
Queensland Mercantile and Agency Co 66  to determine the priority issue between 
competing assignments. However, in the Court of Appeal, the issue was instead treated 
as a matter of the recognition of a foreign arrestment proceeding.67 No clear position 
could be extracted for its choice-of-law rule. Another priority dispute was brought 
before the Court in Kelly v Selwyn.68 But again, this case cannot serve as a convincing 
authority since the proper law and the lex situs of the trust fund assigned and the law of 
the forum administering the fund coincided.  
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(3) Situs of receivables 
In order to find an applicable law for an item of property, the situs of that property has 
to be found, since it is the law of a country where a thing is situate (lex situs) that shall 
determine its nature and govern any rights connected with it.69  This is a necessary 
method for either immovable or tangible movable things.70 Such an approach has also 
been applied to find a governing law for intangibles and their proprietary aspect. One of 
the purposes of establishing this artificial locality is also to make them transferable by 
way of assignment.71 According to Dicey, Morris and Collins, the situs of choses in 
action ‘generally are situate in the country where they are properly recoverable or can 
be enforced’.72 For receivables, they shall be regarded as situate in the country where 
the debtor resides. A test by which the location of a debt or a receivable can be decided 
is elucidated by Atkin J in New York life Insurance Co v Public Trustee as follows:  
‘[The] test in respect of simple contracts was: Where was the debtor 
residing?... [The] reason why the residence of the debtor was adopted as that 
which determined where the debt was situate was because it was in that 
place where the debtor was that the creditor could, in fact, enforce payment 
of the debt.’73  
The situs of intangible things, therefore, depends on where the debtor resides. This rule 
has been used to find an applicable law for a legal issue involving a receivable, such as 
a right to recover a loan or money due under an insurance policy.74 Though this is a 
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general rule, it is not universal.75 The residence of a debtor is an essential element in 
deciding the situs of a receivable,76 but it is not a decisive factor. Choosing the place of 
residence seems reasonable for it is a place where a writ can be served, an action can be 
brought and a subsequent judgment can be enforced against the debtor as, presumably, 
his assets are located there. However, it is not certain where the situs of a receivable is 
in the case of a debtor whose residences exist in two or more countries. On this 
difficulty, a suggestion is that the receivable should situate in the county where ‘it is 
required to be paid by an express or implied provision of the contract or, if there is no 
such provision, where it would be paid according to the ordinary course of business’.77 
Still, the application of this rule is not clear in a case where a country in which the 
receivable may be payable is not that of the residence of the debtor.78  
The reference to the lex situs of a receivable has been strongly contended to be illogical, 
unnecessary and misleading.79 A receivable or chose in action, ‘being in effect a mere 
right to recover by action, has no actual local existence’.80 Lex situs is nothing but a 
preliminary consequence of the analogical method by which lawyers attempt to bring 
intangibles into the ambit of tangibles, notwithstanding their dissimilarities. Despite 
doing that, the lex situs rule actually only serves as a starting point for other connecting 
factors to be considered. It has no real force in the end. It is actually other connecting 
factors that are applied and which lead to a governing law.   
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In addition, a judgment conflicting with the lex situs rule was made in Brooks 
Associates Inc v Basu.81 It was held in this case that a debt due from a bank (the debtor) 
could be attached in England, even though the head office of that bank which served as 
the debtor’s residence was in Scotland. Furthermore, on some occasions, authorities 
have rejected application of the law of the situs. The former view preferring lex situs 
was changed and revised to favour instead the proper law of the receivable or the law 
governing the creation of the receivable.82 After the Rome Convention came into force, 
the English courts went further than rejecting the law of the situs of the assigned 
receivable. They apply instead a contractual approach.83 A dispute which involves the 
validity of an assignment and its effects on a third party has been characterised as a 
contractual issue. It has subsequently been decided by the law governing the contract 
giving rise to the receivable assigned. Since it is based on the European rules, this case 
will be investigated in detail in the following section.    
 
4.3 Europe 
Despite its diversity, the principal foundation of the law of obligations among European 
civil law is basically moulded by the Roman law tradition – ius commune.84 In a similar 
way to English common law where a right to a contractual claim used to be regarded as 
non-transferable, an original principle of the European legal system was that ‘a contract 
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right was something so highly personal as to be inseparable from the actual relationship 
between creditor and debtor’.85 As time went by, this legal principle changed, a 
contractual claim could now be assigned.86 It is recognised in most – if not all – of 
Europe that contractual rights are transferable by way of assignment.87 This recognition 
can be seen in the advanced harmonisation of European contract law. Concrete evidence 
appears where the fundamental principles of law of assignment have been declared both 
in the Principles of European Contract Law (‘PECL’)88 and in the Draft Common Frame 
of Reference for European Private Law (‘DCFR’).89 As the result of an assignment, the 
general submission is that ‘the new creditor takes the place of the old and can enforce 
the right against the debtor in just the same way’.90 In a case where an assignment is 
conducted internationally, a problem of conflict of laws arises as to, among the laws of 
connected jurisdictions, which one will be the most appropriate law governing the 
assignment.   
As far as this thesis is concerned, European private international law on contractual 
obligations also covers assignment. It has been unified since 1980 by the Rome 
Convention,91 and subsequently by its successor, the Rome I Regulation.92 Conflict 
rules in both instruments are studied in this section. Firstly, the section will explore the 
fundamental principles of those rules. Secondly, the issue of characterisation will be 
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examined. Contractual and proprietary aspects based on the application of European 
conflict rules will be scrutinised. Finally, the proposed conflict-of-law rules relating to 
this matter, being written into the drafting process of the Rome I Regulation, will be 
discussed.  
   
4.3.1 Conflict-of-law rules  
For the purposes of establishing the uniformity of private international law on 
assignment,93 a legal set of conflict-of-law rules involving the law applicable to the 
voluntary assignment of rights was firstly written into Article 12 of the Rome 
Convention. The article itself comprised two paragraphs: the first one dealt with the 
mutual obligations of assignor and assignee; the second the relationships between 
assignee and debtor. While the former was governed by the law of the contract between 
assignor and assignee, the latter was ruled by the law of the contract creating the rights 
assigned. Although the Rome Convention has been replaced by a European community 
instrument, its terminology and rules have been incorporated into its successor. At 
present, the European rules of private international law regulating assignment are in 
Article 14 of the Rome I Regulation. It reads as follows: 
1. The relationship between assignor and assignee under a voluntary 
assignment or contractual subrogation of a claim against another person 
(the debtor) shall be governed by the law that applies to the contract 
between the assignor and assignee under this Regulation. 
2. The law governing the assigned or subrogated claim shall determine its 
assignability, the relationship between the assignee and the debtor, the 
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conditions under which the assignment or subrogation can be invoked 
against the debtor and whether the debtor’s obligations have been 
discharged. 
3. The concept of assignment in this Article includes outright transfers of 
claims, transfer of claims by way of security and pledges or other security 
rights over claims. 
At first glance, it can be seen that both the Rome Convention and the Rome I 
Regulation adopt the same basic terminology. That is by way of setting out two distinct 
conflict-of-law rules based on dividing situations into two distinct relationships which 
serve to identify two distinct applicable laws. The two dividing relationships are: firstly, 
between assignor and assignee; secondly, between assignee and debtor. The relationship 
between assignor and assignee is governed by the proper law of assignment. In the case 
of the relationship between assignee and debtor, the proper law of the assigned 
receivables is applied. In general, the rules contained in both instruments are similar in 
their cores.  
Nevertheless, there are some differences between the two which deserve more attention. 
The first point concerns the wording of the object of assignment. While Article 12 uses 
the word ‘right’, Article 14 uses the word ‘claim’. By this change, it is claimed that ‘the 
word “claim” would seem to bring it even closer to the concept of a chose in action in 
English law’.94 However, the claim must be an intangible thing – such as a receivable. It 
is also clear that the rules relate to the assignment of rights or claims against a debtor in 
the sense that they do not include a transfer of obligations or liabilities. Secondly, in 
contrast with Article 12 of the Rome Convention, Article 14(3) of the Rome I 
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Regulation ensures that assignment by way of security is within the scope of this article 
as well as assignment by way of sale or outright transfer.  
The final and perhaps the most important difference between the Rome Convention and 
the Rome I Regulation concerns proprietary matters of assignment. Basically, both 
instruments, as per their official names, are only concerned with contractual 
obligations.95 They are not expected to govern any proprietary matters. At the time of 
the Rome Convention, it can be seen from its scope, Article 1(1), as also illustrated by 
the Official Report, that the Convention shall concern only the law applicable to 
contractual obligations.96 Property rights are not covered by its provisions. As a 
consequence, Article 12 shall govern only contractual aspects of assignment. 
Considering the content of Article 12(1), the phrase ‘mutual obligations’ restricts itself 
to the contractual effects of assignment, hence this excludes proprietary effects between 
assignor and assignee. Although there is no similar expression in Article 12(2), 
interpreting it to govern other proprietary effects of assignment might seem irrational as 
it goes beyond the generic scope of the Convention. These proprietary effects also 
include matters of competing assignments that should fall outside the article.97 Despite 
that, there exist at least two dissenting opinions indicating that Article 12 is not limited 
merely to contractual aspects of assignment; other aspects, between assignor and 
assignee or against other third parties, should also be covered, though they might be 
characterised as proprietary.98 The only conclusion which can be drawn at this stage is 
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that it is uncertain whether proprietary aspects of assignment are totally excluded from 
the text of Article 12 or not. 
When the Rome I Regulation was drafted, a further clearer response to this problem – in 
part, if not in full – was made. According to recital 38, the position now is that Article 
14(1) of the Regulation applies to some aspects of assignment even though those 
aspects might be treated as proprietary in character in some countries.99 Still, the 
implications of this recital are limited to proprietary matters between assignor and 
assignee. They do not extend to proprietary matters regarding third-party effects of 
assignment or priority disputes.100 This conclusion is supported by the review clause 
endorsed by Article 27(2) of the Regulation itself. It is stated that a proposal to amend 
the Regulation involving those two matters shall be submitted at a later time. Evidence 
of this can also be found in the drafting process of the Regulation where the rules 
regarding third parties and priority were omitted from its final text. It is therefore 
reasonable to assume that the proprietary aspects of assignment regarding third parties 
and priority issues do not fall within the scope of the present rules of the European 
regulation; thus every member state is free to apply its own laws.101 Compared with the 
Rome Convention, this point seems to be sufficiently clarified.    
Nevertheless, however the European rules are interpreted, there remains a legal problem 
which has never been properly clarified, even after three decades: What is the most 
appropriate conflict-of-law rule for the proprietary effects of assignment? If there is no 
applicable European rule, national courts must turn to rely on their own methodologies 
and subsequently their own conflict-of-law rules to answer this question. This means 
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that either the same or different approaches are used, e.g. the Raiffeisen case in the 
English court or the Hansa case in the Dutch court may still be applicable. Differing 
characterisations and various conflict-of-law rules leading to a different governing law 
are, in turn, a foreseeable outcome. The final goal of both the Rome Convention and the 
Rome I Regulation, that strive for uniformity of conflict of laws in Europe, might not be 
fully achievable. This problem is thus a gigantic lacuna of European private 
international law which has been waiting for quite a long time to be properly filled.    
A further point in this regard is that although there exists no clear position on conflict-
of-law rules, there do exist some clues on the Europeanisation of substantive law on this 
matter. According to the PECL, Part III, a priority dispute between successive 
assignments of the same claim will, in principle, be determined by the first-to-notify-
the-debtor rule if, at the time of a later assignment, the assignee under that assignment 
neither knew nor ought to have known of the earlier assignment.102 The assignee’s 
interest in the assigned claim is protected against creditors of the assignor.103 The same 
priority rule is also adopted in Book III of the DCFR.104 The rules in these two 
documents do therefore, when compared, differ from the filing system laid down in the 
UCC Article 9 or that suggested by the Receivables Convention in which priority rules 
based on registration are recommended. They, by contrast, rely on notifying the 
debtor.105 
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4.3.2 Characterisation difficulties 
Although assignment is conventionally seen as a hybrid of contract and property, 
drawing a clear line between contractual and proprietary matters is not always easy. It is 
a legal problem of characterisation as to whether a legal issue at hand is contractual or 
proprietary. This is a fundamental legal methodology for conflict of laws which seeks to 
divide a legal issue into a separate category, and thus be governed by a particular set of 
conflict-of-law rules.106 Here, it is conflict of laws for contract, otherwise property.107 
Considering that this characteristic problem lies in the application of European laws, an 
autonomous or community-wide methodology should be taken into account instead of 
any approach used in one member state.108 Authoritatively, it was announced that the 
Rome Convention would not apply to proprietary issues.109 However, if an issue is not 
characterised as proprietary, but contractual, it would then be subject to the scope of the 
Convention. An excellent example of this point is the well-known English court case, 
Raiffeisen Zentralbank Österreich AG v Five Star General Trading LLC.110  
The dispute in this case concerned a rival attempt to obtain the benefit of the proceeds 
of claims arising under an English insurance policy for the vessel Mount I. The 
insurance had been taken out by a Dubai company, Five Star General Trading LLC 
(‘Five Star’), that was the owner of the vessel, with a French insurer. Having purchased 
Mount I, Five Star obtained a loan from an Austrian bank, Raiffeisen Zentralbank 
Oesterreich AG (‘RZB’). Five Star insured the vessel with the insurer and assigned that 
insurance to RZB to support and secure the loan. The deed of assignment was entered 
into in London and expressly made subject to English law. A notice of assignment in 
favour of RZB was also duly signed by Five Star. After that, Mount I collided with 
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another vessel, ICL Vikraman, in the Malacca Straits. The owners of cargo on board 
ICL Vikraman brought proceedings against Five Star in Malaysia on the basis that 
Mount I was responsible for the collision. They had Mount I impounded by a Malaysian 
court order and obtained a provisional attachment of the insurance proceeds issued by a 
French court.  
In the proceeding before the English court, RZB claimed that the proceeds of the 
insurance were validly assigned to them and a notice of the assignment was given to the 
insurers. The validity of the assignment was to be based on English law as the proper 
law of assignment. RZB, as the assignee, thus had the right to sue the insurers. This was 
a contractual aspect of assignment concerning the right of the assignee against the 
debtor. It should therefore have been subject to the law of the insurance contract 
according to Article 12(2) of the Rome Convention. But the cargo owners, as the 
appellants in the case, argued that the notice of assignment was neither valid nor 
binding on them. They claimed that the validity of the notice with respect to them, as a 
third party of the assignment, was a proprietary matter. It had to be governed by French 
law which was the law of lex situs of the receivables and the law of the country of 
domicile of the insurer. Under French law, an assignment is not binding on a third party 
unless a notice of assignment is served on the debtor by a bailiff. This process had never 
been followed in this case.  
The issue raised for consideration therefore was whether the assignment made by Five 
Star (assignor) to RZB (assignee) of the insurance claims against the insurer (debtor) 
could take effect against the cargo owners (third parties) or not. In terms of conflict of 
laws applicable at the time of the case, a preliminary problem involved the scope of the 
Rome Convention, in particular Article 12. The problem was that if the issue was 
characterised as proprietary because it involved the third-party effect of assignment, it 
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should be regarded as being outside the scope of the Convention. Otherwise, if it was a 
contractual issue, it should fall within the ambit of Article 12. 
To find the most appropriate law governing the issue of the case, in his judgment, 
Mance LJ made a reference to the common-law methodology of conflict of laws which 
was formerly identified by Staughton LJ in Macmillan Inc v Bishopsgate Investment 
Trust plc (No 3).111 The methodology was stated as follows: 
[At] common law, the identification of the appropriate law may be viewed as 
involving a three-stage process: (1) characterisation of the relevant issue; (2) 
selection of the rule of conflict of laws which lays down a concerning factor 
for that issue; and (3) identification of the system of law which is tied by that 
connecting factor to that issue … The process falls to be undertaken in a 
broad internationalist spirit in accordance with the principles of conflict of 
laws of the forum, here England.112 
Hence the issue in question was characterised as not being proprietary, but contractual. 
It was expressed as an initial impression that ‘the case fits readily into a contractual, and 
less readily into a proprietary, slot’.113 There appear to be three stages in the reasoning 
given for such a characteristic approach. Firstly, it is a fundamental legal idea based on 
the principle of party autonomy that parties are free to choose and decide accordingly a 
person they are going to contract with. It is possible for them to change or modify their 
contractual terms. They are even able to revoke all their agreed contractual relations and 
make a new contract with a third party. Such freedom of contract also includes novation 
and assignment. This leads to the second stage. That principle applies in a case where 
there is an assignment contract purporting to transfer from an assignor to an assignee a 
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right under an original contract. It raises the questions of whether a contractual right 
from the original contract exists and whether it has been assigned. They are essentially 
contractual. Thirdly, as a result of assignment, the issues of whether the assignee 
obtains the assigned right and whether he can enforce that right against the debtor of the 
original contract are also essentially contractual. The latter issue works in a similar way 
to the question of whether a debtor must pay the assignee rather than the assignor in 
order to get a good discharge. This again, in the expression of Mance LJ, ‘falls readily 
under the same contractual umbrella’.114 
For the application scope of the Rome Convention, Article 12, Mance LJ provided his 
logical reasoning based on the text of the article itself. 115 Two steps can be extracted 
from this reasoning: firstly, dividing the governing scope between paragraph 1 and 
paragraph 2 of Article 12; and secondly, determining whether a particular issue 
addressed in the case falls within the scope of these paragraphs or not. The legal 
methodology that is used to draw a line between those two paragraphs is the 
relationship between specific persons. It is clear that Article 12(1) regulates the position 
between assignor and assignee. A legal issue between assignee and debtor is therefore 
beyond its application scope. Consequently, the real problem is how far Article 12(2) 
can be interpreted. From the language of Article 12(2), this article governs various legal 
aspects of assignment as between assignee and debtor, e.g. the issue of the assignability 
of a receivable, the relationship between assignee and debtor, the conditions under 
which an assignment can be invoked against a debtor and the question of whether the 
debtor's obligations have been discharged. According to this categorisation, it covers the 
question of whether, as a result of assignment, the debtor must pay the assignee or not. 
If giving notice of assignment is also a problem leading to the final answer to such a 
question, it shall therefore be subject to Article 12(2), as it is one of ‘the conditions 
                                                             
114
 ibid. 
115
 ibid para 43. 
144 
 
under which the assignment can be invoked as against the debtor’. It is, in other words, 
not a proprietary aspect of assignment. This issue cannot be regarded as being outside 
the scope of the Rome Convention. By contrast, it is covered by the very words of the 
Convention itself.  
The outcome of the characterisation process was that Article 12(2) of the Rome 
Convention applied to the dispute. The effect, as between Five Star, RZB and the 
insurer, fell to be determined by reference to English law. Under it, the assignment was 
found to be valid as an equitable assignment. The notice given to the insurers was 
effective. No process according to French law needed to be complied with. RZB, as the 
assignee, became entitled to the proceeds of the insurance. The insurer, as the debtor, 
was thus bound to pay RZB rather than Five Star or their creditors.116      
After the Raiffiesen case, it was commented that the approach adopted by the court was 
surprisingly striking, since it departed from the former treatment of English law of 
assignment under which such a dispute would be regarded as a proprietary matter.117 In 
comparison with other cases decided by other European countries’ courts, a clear 
conclusion on characterising the contractual and proprietary aspects of an assignment 
cannot be drawn. Instances can be derived from the following cases which are also 
mentioned in Raiffiesen. Firstly, the German Supreme Court made a judgment on 26 
November 1990118 stating that the proprietary aspect of a voluntary assignment would 
be decided under German law by the law of the assigned receivable. This law also 
reflected the conflict rules laid down in Article 12(2) of the Rome Convention and 
accorded with the outcome of the English case. Moreover, prior to this case, in a 
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priority dispute between successive assignments that was considered by the German 
Supreme Court on 20 June 1990, it was held that such a dispute should also be 
determined by the law governing the assigned claim.119 Another famous case came 
before the Dutch Supreme Court (Hoge Raad), namely, Brandsma qq v Hansa Chemie 
AG.120 An application of Article 12 of the Rome Convention was made in this case. The 
issue arose as to which law governed the question of who owned a receivable. In the 
Court’s view, Article 12 determines what is necessary to transfer a receivable in such a 
way as to have effect against third parties. However, it was not Article 12(2) but 12(1) 
that was held to be applicable. Based on the principle of party autonomy, it is the law 
chosen by the parties to the assignment that will determine the effects of assignment, 
even against third parties. Refusing to apply Article 12(1) was considered by the Court 
to render this article otiose or superfluous.121  
 
4.3.3 The proposed rule  
Desiring to solve the disharmony among European members, another attempt which 
must be taken into account regarding conflict-of-law rules and the proprietary effects of 
assignment is the earlier proposal of the Rome I Regulation. Though it is not adopted in 
the final text of the Regulation, it seems to be one of the most popular suggestions 
supported by scholars, hence it deserves attention. The proposed choice-of-law rule was 
written into the Commission’s proposal for the Rome I Regulation being drafted at that 
time. Set out as paragraph 3 of Article 13 at that time, it reads thus:  
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3. The question whether the assignment or subrogation may be relied upon 
against third parties shall be governed by the law of the country in which the 
assignor or the author of the subrogation has his habitual residence at the 
material time.122  
The conflict-of-law rule that was laid down to govern third-party effects of an 
assignment is the law of the country of the assignor’s habitual residence. In the 
commentary section, it was noted that: ‘[paragraph 3] introduces a new conflict rule 
relating to the possibility of pleading an assignment of a claim against a third party 
recommended by the great majority of respondents, which was also adopted in [the 
Receivables Convention]’.123 In addition, if such a paragraph was adopted it would be 
consistent with the conflict rule recommended by the Guide.124  
Many good reasons behind the preference for this rule were given.125 The main one is 
that the law of the assignor’s residence leads to legal certainty. It is easily ascertainable 
by third parties. This single conflict rule can govern the third-party effects of 
assignment and priority issues, even in a case of bulk assignments. Each court will 
apply the same law, hence preventing forum shopping. Despite all these advantages, the 
proposed rule is not adopted in the present text of the Rome I Regulation. From a 
political viewpoint, it was noted by a Dutch negotiator that although the law of the 
assignor’s habitual place of residence was supported by a majority, neither the United 
Kingdom nor the Netherlands agreed to it.126 While the former preferred the law of 
assigned claims, the latter pushed for the principle of party autonomy to be accepted. It 
was remarked that both of these countries regarded the location of the assignor as ‘the 
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worst possible choice of law rule for proprietary aspects of an assignment, more 
particularly the third party effects and priority thereof’.127 With this disagreement, a 
compromise could not be reached. The result was that neither conflict rules for third-
party effects of, nor priority disputes connected with, assignment could be imposed by 
the Rome I Regulation. It is only a review clause of Article 27(2) that could be written 
in as a compromise. 
In England, the Financial Markets Law Committee (‘FMLC’) strongly criticied a law 
hinging on the assignor’s habitual place of residence.128 Firstly, this choice would 
override the principle of party autonomy by which the parties that have created rights 
purported to assign should have a right to choose the law to govern the issues indicated 
in the proposed paragraph 3.129 Secondly, this proposed rule would not be a good choice 
if the need to protect a debtor is considered. In contrast, a negative impact on the debtor 
might occur if the law of the assignor’s habitual place of residence tells the debtor not to 
pay the assignee whereas, under the law of the contract creating the receivable assigned, 
the debtor would have to pay. Another argument is that either the law of the assigned 
receivable or the law of lex situs lets the debtor know to whom he must pay, but under 
the proposed law the debtor would not be able to see who the true rightholder of the 
assigned receivable is. Along the same lines, the law of the assignor’s habitual place of 
residence is considered by the Netherlands to be an unsatisfactory choice. There is only 
the principle of party autonomy that has been strongly proposed, since it would create 
flexibility for a transnational assignment by permitting the parties to choose the most 
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appropriate applicable law between them. This flexibility would not be possible if a 
rigid rule stating the law of the assignor’s habitual place of residence was accepted. 
Another point which has been made by the Dutch to support their choice is that their 
financial industries have been able to profit from the law of assignment ever since the 
Hansa case.130 And this could ease the concern that the parties in practice could abuse 
their freedom, as the Netherlands has not experienced it.131  
In addition to the above counterargument, adding additional choice-of-law rules as 
paragraph 3 proposed could cause further confusion as to what would remain a legal 
issue under this new rule. What would be its application scope in comparison to the rule 
of Article 14(2) as the law now stands? Since it could lead to two different governing 
laws, conflicting decisions might be the result. An example is the question of who owns 
the receivable in a priority dispute which should be subject to the proposed paragraph 3; 
this matter could, from another angle, be seen as a question of whom the debtor must 
pay to have his debt discharged, which should be subject to Article 14(2).132 Such a 
confusing outcome is undesirable. The proposed rule appears to undermine legal 
certainty.133 Hence no consensus position could be reached at the drafting stage of the 
Rome I Regulation.   
Recorded in Article 27(2) as a matter of political compromise,134 the effectiveness of 
assignment against third parties and the priority of an assigned claim over the right of 
another person have been left open for further revision in the future. The current 
situation is that there is still no agreement among member states of the European Union. 
To comply with Article 27(2), the latest concrete development has been advanced in a 
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report by the British Institute of International and Comparative Law (‘BIICL’).135 After 
detailed research and lengthy analysis of this topic, several recommendations were 
made. Three possible connecting factors which have been suggested are: the law 
applicable to the contract between assignor and assignee, the law applicable to the 
assigned claim and the law of the assignor’s location (habitual residence).136 However, a 
general conclusion is that no solution is perfect.137 There is therefore no clear position 
regarding conflict-of-law rules for either third-party effects or priority issues. As the 
FMLC correctly pointed out,138 these are matters that need more time, and perhaps more 
compromise solutions need to be considered and developed in order for there to be 
harmony throughout the European Union.   
 
4.4 The United States 
In the United States, the UCC provides a uniform law to govern commercial 
transactions in general. Article 9, in particular, governs secured transactions.139 This 
article is formulated from various theoretical approaches, namely party autonomy, state 
interest and consumer protection in addition to influence from the powerful financial 
business sector. Its core foundation, as far as this research is concerned, will be 
considered first. Subsequently, its choice-of-law rules regarding the assignment of 
receivables in international contexts will be examined in subsequent sections.  
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4.4.1 General principles 
Article 9 of the UCC deals with a secured transaction that intends to create, for a 
creditor, a security interest in a debtor’s asset. The expression ‘security interest’ is 
generally defined in Article 1, Section 1-201(b)(35), as an interest in personal property 
which secures payment or performance of an obligation. On basic principles, one of the 
most remarkable features of Article 9 is the functional approach.140 It is an approach 
that is based on the idea of ‘substance over form’, or ‘functional rather than formal’.141 
A primary goal of this approach is to lay down legal rules that facilitate financing 
secured transactions rather than regulating them. By providing certainty, predictability 
and flexibility, ‘the rules are based on practicality rather than theory, formulated with a 
view to the needs of [the] marketplace’.142 A security interest is created by contract, i.e. 
a security agreement.143 There is no language requirement.144 A purpose to create or 
provide for a security interest is all that matters. Article 9 governs a wide range of 
secured transactions where money debts are secured by personal property.145 Many 
kinds of personal property that can be used as security, alongside many transactions that 
can serve the same security purpose, are embraced under one roof. If they perform the 
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same economic function, Article 9 shall apply to them – regardless of their title, 
language or form.146  
Receivables, although this term is not used in Article 9, are categorised as rights to 
payment as referred to in Section 9-109(a)(3) under the heading of ‘a sale of accounts, 
chattel papers, payment intangibles, and promissory notes’.147 Since receivables which 
are not evidenced by chattel papers or instruments mostly take the form of accounts, a 
broad definition of ‘account’ is instead provided in Section 9-102(a)(2).148 By 
definition, the general meaning is a right to payment of a monetary obligation which can 
arise from a variety of transactions, e.g. a contract for the sale of goods or services. 
Another term this research is concerned with is ‘payment intangibles’ as defined in 
Section 9-102(a)(61). This term means a general intangible under which the account 
debtor’s principal obligation is a monetary one, such as a loan. The assignment of all 
these receivables or rights to payment just mentioned is therefore subject to Article 9.149  
The assignment of receivables can be conducted by way of either outright purchase or 
security transfer – such as being collateral security for a loan. Article 9 governs both 
types of assignment.150 Assignment by way of security falls directly within the scope of 
Article 9, since it is a secured transaction that creates a security interest in receivables 
assigned. Resulting from the definition of ‘security interest’ in Section 1-201(b)(35), 
outright assignments or sales of receivables are also covered by Article 9 even though, 
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strictly speaking, they are not assignments that secure an obligation.151 But they are 
artificially treated as if they are. This is because outright assignments in the factoring 
business are basically counted as a method of lending, which is a financing 
arrangement.152 ‘[Loans] and sales of receivables differ in form, they usually do not 
differ too much in substance.’153 In a functional approach where substance wins over 
form, both types of assignment are under the same set of rules. Subjecting them to the 
same legal regime also avoids the characterisation difficulty between outright and 
security transfers. As was remarked, commercial financing against an ‘account’ has 
often been conducted so that the distinction between a security transfer and a sale is 
blurred.154 Whether a sale transaction is intended as security or not, it comes into the 
scope of this article.  
Nevertheless, some criticisms have been made of this terminology. By comparison with 
English law where a line between an absolute assignment and a security assignment has 
been drawn,155 combining them brings complexity to outright sales of receivables 
transactions and factoring businesses since the parties to these transactions also have 
obligations under the legal rules – such as filing – the purpose of which is, in essence, to 
deal with security transfers.156 This increases the transaction costs for an outright 
assignment unnecessarily. Despite this combination, differences between the two still 
exist in Article 9 itself when it comes to the level of legal consequences and the 
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enforcement of each transaction.157 Unlike a secured transaction, a seller who has sold a 
receivable does not retain any interest in that receivable.158 The distinction between the 
two is still of profound significance in practice.159 No true achievement is reached by 
avoiding such difference. The only persuasive justification for including these two 
methods of transfer within Article 9, as has been submitted, is that they both fall within 
the general regulatory objectives underlying Article 9’s perfection and priority 
framework.160 
 
4.4.2 Conflict of laws 
(1) The Rules 
Besides its substantive aspect, choice of laws for assignments of receivables is also 
crafted in the UCC. At the beginning, the principle of freedom of choice is generally 
accepted. According to Article 1, Section 1-301, parties to an international transaction 
are entitled to choose an applicable law to govern their rights and obligations arising 
from a transaction between them.161 That law shall be applied whether the transaction 
bears a relation to the state or country of the law chosen, or not.   
Turning to Article 9’s choice-of-law rules that are used to determine the law governing 
the transfer of a security interest in receivables, they are set out in Sections 9-301 to      
9-307. The baseline rule is the law of the state in which the debtor is located. Legal 
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matters covered by these sections are perfection and priority. They are subject matter 
that the parties to an assignment contract cannot agree on. If an agreement exists to the 
contrary, it will be inoperative and overridden by the rules of Article 9. The governing 
law concerning perfection and priority issues shall principally be decided by the rules 
specified by the law, not by an agreement the parties might have concluded. This is the 
result of Section 1-301(g)(8). This underlying policy holds because these issues have 
legal effects on third parties, and so the two parties agreeing by contract to a result 
which would alter the rights of third parties cannot be granted.162 At this point, there are 
two legal terms that need to be considered: perfection and priority.163 The term 
‘perfection’ refers to the rules that must be adhered to to make a security interest 
effective against a claim by a person other than the debtor, i.e. a third party. By the 
word ‘priority’, it means the rules that will be applied to resolve a problem of 
competing claims to the same collateral. Although it might not always be the case, a 
priority issue normally links back to the effect of perfection or non-perfection of the 
security interest in question.164  
In order to ensure that a security interest can be invoked not only against the debtor but 
also against third parties, that security interest need to be perfected according to the 
rules set out in Article 9.165 The perfection of a security interest can be achieved by 
satisfying one of three methods: filing a financing statement, possession or control.166 
They are, in principal, processes of publicising a security interest. Among them, it is 
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filing that is the most common technique for most types of collateral, including 
assignments of receivables or rights to payment.167 Based on Section 9-310, a financing 
statement must be filed to perfect all security interests. The filing system of a financing 
statement is established as a public record. The system is primarily formulated as a 
simple and inexpensive mechanism that serves as an accessible database of information 
that suffices to tell a creditor about a security interest in an asset of an identified 
debtor.168 Regarding priority problems which may arise when there are two or more 
competing claims of security interest over the same collateral, the concept of perfection 
also has a significant effect on the way a priority dispute is decided. The rule can be 
found in Section 9-322, which states that the secured party that is the first to file or 
perfect prevails for this entitles him to gain a priority rank over competing claims.169 
This rule is based on the time of filing or perfection, ‘not the sequence of the creation of 
the competing security interests’.170 As such, a creditor who needs to ensure that his 
rights in collateral prevail over those of third parties, a necessary step that needs to be 
taken is to be the first one to file a financing statement to a designated public office. 
And, this is the stage where choice-of-law rules come in to the picture.  
A very important thing to do before filing such a financing statement is to decide which 
state’s filing system governs a particular security interest. Choice of laws is needed for a 
secured party to consult, since it is ‘a pointer as to where to file’.171 Section 9-301(1) 
provides choice-of-law rules applicable to the perfection and priority of a security 
interest. It determines which state’s law governs the perfection and priority of a security 
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interest. The rule is that perfection and priority issues shall be governed by the ‘local 
law’ of the jurisdiction where the ‘debtor’ is located. In the context of an assignment, 
the term ‘debtor’ refers to an assignor.172 By ‘local law’, it means the substantive law of 
that jurisdiction, exclusive of its conflict-of-law rules.173 In other words, it is the law of 
the assignor’s location that shall be applied to determine perfection and priority issues 
of an assignment. On the plus side, the law of the assignor’s location which leads to the 
assignor’s place of business has created predictability as it provides a single point of 
reference.174 In contrast to the lex situs of receivables or the law of the location of the 
debtor, of which there can be more than one, there is only one assignor; hence there is 
one single location to seek and one single law to comply with. It reduces the need to 
register or perfect the assignment in other jurisdictions. In this way, legal certainty can 
be achieved since these are mandatory choice-of-law regulations that work alongside 
mandatory rules of perfection and priority.  
Nevertheless, such legal certainty depends on how the location of the assignor is 
decided. A legal rule for determining a debtor or an assignor’s location is specified in 
Section 9-307. If the debtor is an individual, it is the principal residence that is set as his 
location.175 However, if the debtor is an organisation176 – e.g. a partnership or a 
corporation – the location is its principal place of business.177 If there is more than one 
place of business, the debtor is considered to be located in the jurisdiction of its chief 
executive office.178 The expressions ‘place of business’ and ‘chief executive office’ are 
further described, respectively, as ‘a place where a debtor conducts its affairs’ and ‘a 
place from which a debtor manages the main part of its operations; a place where 
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persons dealing with a debtor would normally look for credit information’.179 However, 
if a debtor is a registered organisation organised under the law of a state of the United 
States, its location is not determined by the residual rule. It is, instead, placed in the 
state under whose law the debtor is incorporated.180   
(2) Remarks  
In spite of laying down comprehensive rules, the choice-of-law provisions of the UCC 
Article 9 which shall apply to an international assignment of receivables are not entirely 
perfect. Some controversy continues. Some relevant remarks are made here.   
The first remark concerns the original foundation of Article 9. Originally, Article 9 was 
primarily concerned with domestic or multi-state secured transactions.181 Its core 
purpose was to let all types of personal property be available as security and bring them 
into being under not several separate statues but one.182 One of the primary aims of this 
idea is to unify substantive law and to make the law of the United States uniform.183 
Transactions having an international element were an afterthought.184 Although there 
were some rules on choice of laws in the former version of Article 9, it was not until the 
1999 revision that choice-of-law rules for international secured transactions were paid 
attention to. Persuasive reasons at that time were increasing transnational business, a 
dramatic increase in globalisation credit and the growing importance of intangible assets 
financing – especially against receivables.185 Despite this, even after the latest 
amendment in 2010, dissatisfaction has still been expressed with Article 9’s choice-of-
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law rules and more substantial revision has been called for.186 Resulting from this 
development, Article 9 does not draw a distinction between the rules of domestic and 
international secured transactions. By contrast, the rules applicable to international 
transactions have been blended with those that apply to the interstate kind. A point to 
note here is that, unlike international instruments whose fundamental elements are 
designed for international transactions in a global scheme so that conflict of laws is 
always potentially an issue, the UCC Article 9 is just an attempt to regulate domestic 
transactions and so its conflict rules cannot be regarded as a good comprehensive model 
for international activities.     
Legal problems of characterisation are the second point concerned herein. To apply 
Article 9’s choice-of-law rules, a legal issue that must be determined first is the question 
of whether a transaction at issue can be characterised as a secured transaction under 
Article 9 or not. If the answer is no, that issue is beyond the reach of the article. To 
decide this question, a prior problem is which jurisdiction’s law shall govern such a 
characterisation issue. Although it might be claimed that the scope of Article 9 is broad, 
this in fact leads to the question of how far its reach will extend.187 This is the problem 
on which Article 9 is silent, hence there is no clear answer. It will depend instead on the 
characterisation methodology of each single state. As a result, this can cause uncertainty 
in an international scenario for which a foreign law might have a different view 
contrasting with that of the American methodology. The uniform application of Article 
9 is not guaranteed. Additionally, there is no clear position on how to distinguish 
between assignment by way of security and outright sale, nor about the law pursuant to 
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which this matter will be decided. This could result in a disharmonious outcome, even 
within the United States itself.188       
Another remark concerns the substantive scope of Article 9’s choice-of-law rules. It is 
limited to ‘perfection, the effect of perfection or non-perfection, and the priority of a 
security interest’.189 No choice of laws has been laid down to clarify what is the 
governing law for others legal issues, such as the validity of security agreements or 
assignment contracts, the relationship between assignor and assignee and the rights of 
assignee against a debtor. This is particulary noticeable when a comparison is made to 
Article 14 of the Rome I Regulation. It is unclear whether these uncodified matters refer 
to the law chosen by the parties to a contract according to Section 1-301 or not.190 This 
again might result from the original purpose of the UCC, i.e. aiming to codify legal 
rules within the United States, not globally.     
The fourth remark concerns choice-of-law rules. By the same contentiousness advanced 
in the European context, adopting the law of the assignor’s location does have some 
flaws, specifically where an international assignment of receivables is being 
considered.191 In the context of Article 9, other difficulties and unpleasant outcomes, in 
addition to the choice of laws, are as follows. With regard to a foreign debtor whose 
location is outside the United States, an exception to the baseline rule of the law of 
habitual residence is laid down in Section 9-307(c), the result of which enormously 
limits the applicable scope of the residual rule based on Section 9-307(b). Under (c), the 
law of the habitual residence of a foreign debtor applies only if ‘a debtor’s residence, 
place of business, or chief executive, as applicable, is located in a jurisdiction whose 
law generally requires information concerning the existence of a non-possessory 
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security interest to be made generally in a filing, recording, or registration system as a 
condition or result of the security interest’s obtaining priority over the rights of a lien 
creditor with respect to the collateral’. It can simply be said that the law of the foreign 
debtor’s location will apply only if the law of the country where the debtor is located 
has a rule of public filing equivalent to that of Article 9. It is very doubtful that this 
requirement can be satisfied.192 If the foreign law in question does not qualify, the 
debtor is instead deemed to be located in the District of Columbia. Then, the foreign law 
will be inapplicable. The filing system of the UCC Article 9, which is an important 
factor of perfection and priority rules, shall thus apply, even if the debtor is not located 
in the United States. Furthermore, the rule of Section 9-307(c) has a direct consequence 
in terms of finding and ascertaining a country whose law governs perfection and priority 
matters.193 It points to an answer that specifies the place a secured party has to file a 
financial statement to perfect his security transaction. To do so, investigating relevant 
foreign laws is required. The secured party also needs to ascertain whether such foreign 
law has a public filing system comparable to Article 9 or not. This procedure is of 
course costly, yet leaving room for error.194 As a negative consequence, it increases the 
cost of and creates uncertainty for international secured transactions including 
assignments of receivables.  
 
4.5 International instruments 
Legal movement on laws of assignment has also occurred and been driven by 
international organisations. This movement can be regarded as a role model for 
harmonised legal rules. It inevitably has great influence on the consideration of 
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emerging legal rules of either a country or a region. In this section, there are four 
international instruments that will be investigated in turn. Those are the Factoring 
Convention, the Principles, the Receivables Convention and the Guide. As will be 
analysed below, while the first two only provide substantive rules for assignment of 
receivables, the other two also provide conflict-of-law rules for this matter.  
 
4.5.1 UNIDROIT Convention on International Factoring 1988 
Factoring is a vehicle used to illustrate a method of receivables financing.195 It 
commonly consists of an assignment to a factor from a creditor of receivables 
originating from goods and services supplied by the creditor to others. For international 
factoring, an international instrument that should be mentioned is the UNIDROIT 
Convention on International Factoring 1988 (‘Factoring Convention’) that came into 
force on 1 May 1995. It is a substantive convention.196 It only applies to factoring 
contracts arising out of international sales of goods contracts in which the factor 
(assignee) performs at least two of these functions: financing a supplier (assignor), 
maintaining an account, collecting receivables or providing protection against default in 
payment by a debtor.197 In conjunction with this, notice of the assignment must be given 
to the debtor.198  
The Factoring Convention does not cover every aspect of assignment.199 It only deals 
with some substantive legal issues, e.g. rights and obligations between factors and 
suppliers, and issues involving subsequent assignment.200 Priority rules and conflict of 
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laws were omitted from the drafting process. This was mainly because of their extreme 
complexity, hence they were considered to be too difficult to formulate, by way of 
either substance or choice of laws. Earlier in the drafting procedure, an attempt was 
made to propose the law of the place where the supplier has his principal place of 
business as the governing law for a priority dispute between a factor and any third 
party,201 but this was rejected. This was due to the wide variations in rules between 
countries,202 so no satisfactory solution could be reached. Incorporating a compromise 
solution might also have prevented the acceptance of uniform rules by a number of 
states that were not convinced. It was decided with regret by the committee that this 
matter must be left open.203 Though not perfect, the Factoring Convention is considered 
to comprise ‘important early steps in the direction of modern secured credit law’204 and 
‘the first step towards eventual harmonisation in the assignment of receivables’.205 As 
for the choice of laws, ‘[it] may depend upon the forum in which any conflict may be 
heard’.206 It leads to the application of conflict of laws of the court hearing the case.   
 
4.5.2 UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts 2010  
The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts (‘Principles’) were 
first published in 1994. Their core purpose is to set forth general rules for international 
commercial contracts.207 It was not until completion of the second edition in 2004 that 
legal principles concerning the assignment of rights were laid down in                 
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Articles 9.1.1–9.1.15.208 The rule remained unchanged under the current 2010 version, 
which is the third edition of the Principles.209 The Principles consist of various 
substantive rules for a law of assignment. Legal issues flowing from an assignment 
among assignor, assignee and debtor or against third parties are dealt with. They do, 
however, contain no conflict-of-law rules. The underlying reason which can be derived 
from the Principles itself is that its primary aim is to create a uniform set of substantive 
rules applying either directly or impliedly to an international commercial contract. It 
will be applied when the parties have agreed that their contract will be governed by the 
Principles. Additionally, it may be used as general legal principles or lex mercatoria, or 
even as a tool for the interpretation and supplementation of domestic or international 
law.210 Using conflict of laws which has a function to point to a substantive law might 
not be able to serve this kind of target.  
However, to the extent of this research, there are some interesting points that should be 
advanced. Firstly, the expression ‘assignment of a right’ is defined as including either 
outright or security transfer.211 Apart from assignments of monetary rights, it also 
covers, for example, partial assignments, assignments of future rights and bulk 
assignments.212 Secondly, assignment can be formed by an agreement between assignor 
and assignee, notwithstanding a non-assignment clause in the original contract creating 
a right purported to be assigned.213 Thirdly, regarding the debtor’s position, a notice of 
assignment to the debtor is adopted in order to make an assignment effective against 
him. Unless and until receiving the notice, the debtor can get a good discharge by 
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paying the assignor; only after receiving notice does he have to pay the assignee.214 The 
debtor also holds a right to assert against the assignee all defences that could be asserted 
against the assignor. This includes the right of set-off available against the assignor up 
to the time of being notified.215 Fourthly, the Principles also imposes rules for 
successive assignments. Priority is given to the assignee who is the first to give notice 
of his assignment to a debtor.216 Nevertheless, it is regrettable that the Principles do not 
provide any rules regarding competing disputes between assignee and creditors or 
insolvency representatives of the assignor. As this is a significant point in practice, ‘the 
complete absence of such [rules] leads to a significant decrease in the practical value of 
[the Principles]’.217 By virtue of legal policy, it has been commented that since this 
issue involves proprietary rights, it should be governed by the mandatory rules of the 
otherwise applicable law.218 This is therefore another instrument that pushes this 
problematic issue back to the law of the forum.  
 
4.5.3 UN Convention on the Assignment of Receivables in International Trade 
2001 
Desiring to establish a more modernised set of laws relating to an assignment of 
receivables, the United Nations Convention on the Assignment of Receivables in 
International Trade (‘Receivables Convention’) was completed in 2001.219 Although the 
major content of the Convention codifies substantive rules of assignment of receivable – 
or contractual right to payment of a monetary sum – within its application scope, 
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conflict-of-law rules are also laid down in order to deal with a number of issues left 
outside the law.220 In general, the Convention covers both an outright assignment of 
receivables and an assignment the result of which creates security rights in 
receivables.221 This is the same approach as that adopted by the UCC Article 9.    
Chapter V, Articles 26–32, of the Receivables Convention sets out autonomous conflict-
of-laws rules concerning various issues of the assignment of receivables. This is an 
independent section of conflict rules for matters that are not settled elsewhere in the 
Convention. And it may apply independently of any territorial link with a State party to 
the Convention.222 In the case of a priority dispute among competing rights over the 
same receivables, an applicable law is also found in Article 22. So far as this research is 
concerned, the conflict rules contained in the Receivables Convention can be 
categorised and illustrated as follows.  
(1) Law applicable to the relationship between assignor and assignee 
Article 28 of the Receivables Convention sets out choice-of-law rules to deal with 
mutual rights and obligations between assignor and assignee. Along the same lines as 
Article 14(1) of the Rome I Regulation, it is the principle of party autonomy that is 
accredited. The law chosen by assignor and assignee shall govern the relations flowing 
from their assignment contract. In the absence of such a law, the applicable law is the 
law of the state with which the assignment contract is most closely connected. Such 
freedom of choice is subject to mandatory rules of the law of the forum state or a third 
state with which the matters are closely connected.223  
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Still, Article 28 only covers the purely contractual aspect of a contract of assignment.224 
General examples are provided, including ‘the conclusion and substantive validity, the 
interpretation of its terms, the assignee’s obligation to pay the price or to render the 
promised credit, the existence and effect of representations as to the validity and 
enforceability of the [receivable]’.225 It could be said, to put in another way, that Article 
28 does not govern the proprietary aspects of assignment.226 This is because the proper 
law of contract was considered by the working group of the Convention, when being 
drafted, to be an inappropriate governing law for the transfer of property rights.227  
(2) Law applicable to the relationship between assignee and debtor 
As between assignee and debtor, most legal issues are covered by the substantive laws 
of the Receivables Convention. There are however certain issues, such as the question 
of when a right of set-off is available to the debtor under Article 18, or a question 
relating to the effect of anti-assignment clauses, to which Articles 9 and 10 do not 
apply, that fall within the application of Article 29’s conflict rules.228 The law adopted 
in this article is the law that governs the original contract from which the assigned 
receivables arise. This approach is akin to Article 14(2) of the Rome I Regulation.   
(3) Law applicable to the proprietary aspect of assignment  
The Receivables Convention focuses not only on the contractual but also the proprietary 
aspect of an assignment of receivables. Regarding the proprietary aspect of assignment, 
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there are two content items that will be considered. The first one concerns the law 
applicable to the proprietary effects of assignment, either between the parties or against 
other third parties. The second one is about the law applicable to a priority dispute.   
Neither a specific rule nor a clear position exists regarding the proprietary aspect of 
assignment between assignee and assignor, which is a question of whether and how 
assignment transfers property titles or creates security rights over assigned receivables 
and what law governs these issues. In a similar manner, no special rule is directly 
codified for legal issues concerning third-party effects of assignment. On this point, it 
was commented that such proprietary aspects are, to a large extent, dealt with in the 
various substantive provisions of the Receivables Convention.229 As ‘assignment’ is, by 
definition, explained as a transfer of property in the form of receivables.230 Also, it has 
been considered that the issues relating to the proprietary aspects of assignment actually 
refer to the law governing a priority issue.231 Article 5(g) defines the word ‘priority’ as 
follows:  
“Priority” means the right of a person in preference to the right of another 
person and, to the extent relevant for such purpose, includes the 
determination whether the right is a personal or a property right, whether or 
not it is a security right for indebtedness or other obligation and whether 
any requirements necessary to render the right effective against a competing 
claimant have been satisfied. 
Considering this definition, the meaning of priority is broad enough to capture the 
property rules of transfer and their effectiveness either inter parties or against third 
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parties,232 as well as to govern priority matters. It covers the question of whether a 
requirement to vest a property title in the assigned receivables to the assignee has been 
completed and whether the assignment can take effect against third parties, i.e. a 
creditor or insolvency administrator of the assignor and subsequent assignees. Another 
consequence resulting from the definition of priority is that the Convention’s priority 
rules also govern the problem of characterisation of an assignment, i.e. whether it is a 
secured transaction and whether the nature of the right in the assigned receivables is 
personal or proprietary, insofar as it is relevant to the priority dispute.233 
By recognising the priority rules of different legal systems, the priority rules imposed 
by the Receivables Convention are not substantive but relate to conflict of laws.234 The 
Convention does not determine priority, it merely indicates which nation’s law will 
determine such problems.235 These conflict rules are in Articles 22 and 30.236 The 
definition of priority serves the purposes of both articles. The proprietary effects of 
assignment, especially when they arise in the context of a priority dispute, are subject to 
the same law as that governing the priority issue.237 That is the law of the assignor’s 
location, which is defined as the assignor’s place of business or his habitual 
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residence.238 Subject to the public policy of a forum and any priority agreement between 
assignees, the law of the state where the assignor is located shall decide the priority of 
the right of the assignee to the assigned receivables over the right of the competing 
claimant.239 In this regard, Article 5(m) provides the meaning for ‘competing claimant’ 
including other assignees, a creditor of the assignor or an insolvency administrator.   
 
4.5.4 UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Secured Transactions 2007 
The UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Secured Transactions (‘Guide’) was completed 
in 2007. Its purpose is to assist states in developing modern, efficient and effective 
secured transaction law harmoniously.240 A functional approach is used to allow the 
Guide to encompass all transactions that perform security purposes.241 Although the 
main context of the Guide involves substantive rules, conflict of laws is also considered 
as a necessary tool to harmonise the laws of secured transactions.  
Conflict-of-law rules are proclaimed in Chapter X of the Guide. For purely contractual 
obligations arising from an assignment, it is suggested that it is appropriate to subject 
them to the law chosen by the parties. However, the property aspect of secured 
transactions is considered to be outside the domain of the freedom of contract. The law 
of the location of the assignor is proposed as the principal conflict rule for creation, 
third-party effectiveness and priority of a security right over intangible assets.242 By 
way of summary, on the conflict-of-law rules regulating assignments of receivables, the 
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Guide recommends the same approach as that adopted by the Receivables 
Convention.243 
 
4.6 Summary remarks 
Considering conflict-of-law rules for the assignment of receivables, either applicable in 
various jurisdictions or laid down in relevant international instruments, as compared in 
this chapter, there are four major points that can be remarked on.   
Firstly, all conflict-of-law rules are founded on the basis of two substantive areas of 
law: property and contract. Receivables are classified as intangible property subject to 
property law. An assignment is created by a contract between assignor and assignee 
according to the substance of contract law. The main purpose of an assignment is to 
transfer a proprietary title to receivables, either outright or by way of security, from 
assignor to assignee. While contractual conflict-of-law rules govern the contractual side 
of assignment, assignment as a transfer of proprietary title brings proprietary conflict-
of-law rules into operation. This principle is accepted, especially when the effects of 
assignment are seen as being able to constitute erga omnes against third parties. 
Contractual rules are regarded as either unable or inappropriate to cover these effects. 
This fundamental methodology of the property-contract approach can be read from the 
conflict-of-law rules imposed by all the sets of laws being compared.   
The property-contract approach, however, leads to the second point that this thesis 
intends to raise. That is such an approach results in a characterisation problem which is 
difficult to solve with certainty. A leading example is shown in the Raiffeisen case. 
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While the question was formerly regarded as a proprietary matter, it was decided in this 
case that it was a contractual one. Furthermore, disharmony in the application of 
conflict-of-law rules under the property-contract approach also exists among European 
countries. This problem cannot be resolved if there remains a need to draw a line 
between contract and property in the assignment of receivables, despite the fact that it is 
a contractual transfer of contractual rights.     
The third point concerns the connecting factors of conflict-of-law rules. Via the 
property-contract approach, the connecting factors are separated into two categories: 
property and contract. These, accordingly, are applied to the proprietary and contractual 
issues of assignment. The difficulty is not on the contractual side, where the freedom of 
parties to choose a governing law is dominant, but on proprietary issues, i.e. the 
effectiveness of assignment against third parties and priority disputes. Although the law 
of assignment or the law of contract creating the receivables assigned is preferred by 
some countries, the law of the assignor’s location or habitual residence seems to be the 
most favoured choice in the current trend. The latter has been adopted by international 
instruments as well as the UCC Article 9. It is also one of the sound conflict rules 
proposed by the BIICL in the context of European jurisdiction.   
Finally, there are two different viewpoints that can be derived from the core legal 
foundations and underlying policies between the rules of Europe, including England, 
and those of the United States. Realising these would be very significant if the law of 
the assignor’s location is to be accepted, for their consequences should not be 
underestimated. The first aspect is about the functional and formal approaches used in 
the law of secured transactions. From the desire to unify the law of secured transactions 
across American states and encompass all types of personal property to be available as 
security, the functional approach has been adopted in the UCC Article 9. The scope of 
this legislation is thus very broad. It includes any kind of transaction that intends to 
172 
 
create or provide for a security interest. Compared to the formal approach where 
secured transactions are principally divided based on their form and given name, e.g. 
outright sale, mortgage or charge, each transaction is subject to a separate set of law. 
Adopting the functional approach in a jurisdiction where the formal approach is well-
established would cause chaos and might be impossible on a global scale. ‘It encourages 
the disregard of well-entrenched doctrinal legal difference separating different forms of 
legal transactions.’244 No certainty or clarity would likely be reached without further 
difficulty via the catch-all approach of American functionalism.245  
Perfection, the third-party effectiveness of assignment and priority rules are another 
viewpoint to be considered. Based on the UCC Article 9, filing a financial statement to 
an appropriate state’s filing office is the key to perfecting a security interest over 
receivables, the result of which is to obtain a prior right in a ranking problem, according 
to the first-to-file rule. Nevertheless, this method will only work effectively if the filing 
system is formulated in the relevant jurisdiction. Article 9’s filing system may work 
well in a multi-state context, but not in an international scenario where other 
jurisdictions have no compatible filing system. It will be much more costly if such a 
system has to be established and maintained in each and every single country 
universally.246 Set-up costs and operating expenses are inevitable. In this line of 
reasoning, Article 9’s choice of the assignor’s location which operates closely with the 
filing system is unlikely to lead to uniform results in international secured transactions. 
Leaving this matter to be decided by conflict of laws would therefore be much more 
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appropriate. Attempting to find a better approach and more appropriate conflict-of-law 
rules, as seen in the European context – though a unitary harmonised approach has not 
yet been developed – still remains the preferred route to find a more effective solution.      
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CHAPTER 5: CONFLICT OF LAWS: AN ANALYSIS 
 
To consider the assignment of receivables as a legal mechanism of transfer, it basically 
entails a triangular relation among assignor, assignee and debtor. Between assignor and 
assignee, this is a contractual relationship created by an assignment contract. As the 
result of an assignment, receivables originating from the contractual relationship 
between assignor and debtor are transferred to the assignee. The legal issues arising 
from this triangular relation are categorised as contractual, and hence governed by the 
conflict-of-law rules for contract. Yet, this is not the end of the matter. Assignment is 
treated as a hybrid of contract and property.1 Besides inter partes, the assignment has 
erga omnes or proprietary effects for the broader public. It is seen as a method of 
transferring title to receivables in a similar manner to transferring ownership of tangible 
property. Other persons outside the triangular relation are also taken into consideration. 
By other persons, it means third parties that are not the assignor, assignee or debtor. 
They are, for example, subsequent assignees, creditors and insolvency representatives of 
the assignor. Legal matters, first described as contractual, become the subject of 
property. Assignment is thus also regulated by property law and conflict-of-law rules 
for property. As analysed in the previous chapter, this is the property-contract approach 
contemporarily adopted by the conflict of laws relating to assignment in various 
countries and in relevant international instruments.2 However, it is not the methodology 
that this thesis proposes.   
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As advanced in this thesis, an assignment of receivables is, in substance, a transfer of 
rights to claim for monetary payment. It is a method whereby rights to payment in 
receivables claimable against a debtor or debtors are assigned from an assignor to an 
assignee. It serves as a mechanism that provides and supports the free flow of this kind 
of intangible and marketable assets. Treating it as a transfer of rights, not as a 
combination of contract and property, suits it best. In the rights-based approach 
proposed by this thesis, assignment is handled according to its real nature. Assignment 
in an international case shall be treated as an international transfer of a right to payment. 
Conflict-of-law rules for assignment shall be formulated on this foundation, not on the 
property-contract mix. As willl be demonstrated, difficulties and confusion, especially 
involving characterisation, resulting from the conflict rules based on the property-
contract approach shall be resolved.  
The purpose of this chapter is to reveal the logical scope, limits and necessity for a 
property-contract approach to assignment, as well as the interaction between property 
and contract in conflict of laws. This will also reveal the strengths and flaws of the 
connecting factors of the conflict rules for assignment. Another aim is to demonstrate 
what the conflict-of-law rules developed by a rights-based approach are. In doing so, the 
main methodology will compare and contrast conflict-of-law rules between those based 
on the property-contract approach and those created by the rights-based approach. The 
structure of this chapter is therefore divided into two main parts. The first analyses the 
property-contract approach. The second illustrates the rights-based approach, its 
application and analysis which are formulated by using hypothetical legal questions that 
might arise in legal practice. A discussion of the underlying principles and reasons for 
which the two approaches are established, including their pros and cons, is spread over 
both parts. Finally, the chapter ends with a summary of this study.        
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5.1 Property-contract approach 
Conflict of laws principally follows on from the ground of substantive law’s 
understanding and classification of legal categories.3 A problem substantively regarded 
as contractual is governed by conflict of laws for contract. A problem substantively 
regarded as proprietary is determined by conflict of laws for property.4 As a general 
notion, receivables – though originating from a contract – are not regarded as merely 
contractual rights to payment but also items of property. The assignment of receivables 
– though formed by a contract – is treated as not only a contractual relationship but also 
an assignment itself.5 By the latter is meant a method for transferring proprietary rights 
in an intangible thing from assignor to assignee; likewise, a sale contract is to transfer 
the ownership of a tangible property from seller to buyer.    
Regarding the conflict-of-law rules regulating an international assignment of 
receivables, the property-contract approach adheres to the notion that assignment is a 
hybrid of contract and property. The legal issues arising from assignment are 
categorised into contract and property. Principally, the legal issues concerning the 
proprietary effects of assignment between assignor and assignee, the effectiveness of 
assignment against third parties and priority problems are classified as proprietary, 
whereas other legal issues – such as assignment contracts, the relationship between 
assignor and assignee, and the effects of assignment against a debtor – are classified as 
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contractual. Conflict of laws under this approach, therefore, comprises both property 
and contract rules. But first, to make the property-contract methodology work properly, 
an unavoidable problem concerns the characterisation of the contractual and proprietary 
nature of assignment.6  This is a preliminary matter that needs to be settled before 
considering conflict-of-law rules. The characterisation matter is discussed in the 
following section. After that, possible conflict-of-law rules for contractual and 
proprietary matters are clarified in the second section.  
 
5.1.1 Characterisation difficulties 
Based on the property-contract approach, a preliminary matter that must be decided 
before choosing an appropriate choice-of-law rule concerns the problem of 
characterisation. 7  Is a legal matter arising out of an assignment of receivables in 
question contractual or proprietary? 8  As observed by Auld LJ in Macmillan Inc v 
Bishopsgate Investment Trust Plc (No.3), solving this characterisation problem requires 
‘a parallel exercise in classification of the relevant rule of law’.9 Once this problem is 
decided, the answer will point to an appropriate conflict-of-law rule that will 
subsequently lead to an appropriate substantive law governing that matter. However, 
characterising legal matters flowing from assignment is a consequential difficulty.10 
While some matters can be characterised clearly enough, others are not straightforward.   
On the contractual side, a receivable originates from a contract. An assignment is also 
formed by a contract. The former is a contract between creditor and debtor, the latter is 
a contract between assignor and assignee. Substantive legal issues arising from these 
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two contractual relationships are certainly contractual matters. Thus they will be 
governed by the conflict-of-law rules for a contract. Digging deeper into these legal 
issues, they are as follows:  
 (a) Assignability of receivables;  
(b) Problems concerning a non-assignment clause;   
(c) Relationship between creditor (assignor) and debtor;   
(d) The requirements or conditions that a party to a contract of assignment needs 
to fulfil in general in order to make an assignment contractually effective or 
valid in the eyes of the law. This issue can be subdivided into:  
  (d1) the capacity of parties to contract;    
  (d2) formation of the contract;   
  (d3) form of the contract;         
 (e) Relationship between assignor and assignee. 
Other legal issues that can be stated on the contractual side, though some difficulties in 
a purely contractual explanation might be found, are: 
(f) Relationship between assignee and debtor;   
(g) Notice of assignment.   
On the proprietary side, receivables are regarded as an object of property in which 
proprietary rights reside. An assignment is not only a contract, but also a way to transfer 
property rights in receivables, the consequence of which is invokable against third 
parties. Legal issues resulting from these proprietary aspects are categorised not as 
contractual but property-related. Legal issues typically referred to as proprietary can be 
described as follows:  
 (h) Proprietary transfer between assignor and assignee;  
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 (i) Notice of assignment;  
(j) Third-party effects of assignment or, in other words, an assignee’s rights 
against creditors or insolvency representatives of the assignor;  
 (k) Priority.  
To analyse the property-contract approach, the question at this stage is what criteria are 
employed to distinguish the legal issues set out above into contractual and proprietary. 
As this research examines, while some issues are distinguishable others appear 
confusing.  
It is straightforward and certain that legal issues concerning contractual relations 
between parties to the contracts – either for assignment or from which assigned 
receivables originates – are categorised as contractual and so subject to the law of 
contract. For the original contract creating the assigned receivables, the legal issues 
concern questions of (a) assignability of receivables, (b) a non-assignment clause, and 
(c) relationship between creditor and debtor. The assignability of receivables is a legal 
matter that assures the legal existence of the receivables purported to be assigned. It 
depends on the law that governs the contract generating them.11  A non-assignment 
clause is a contractual clause agreed by parties to the contract creating the assigned 
receivables which is also the contract that imposes the contractual relations on them. 
They are therefore based on the contract of the assigned receivables, hence they are 
governed by contract law.12   
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In the case of an assignment contract, the legal issues include questions of general legal 
processes and requirements, if any, to make the contract legally effective (d). They are 
the formation (d2), and form or other formal validities (d3) – e.g. writing, notification or 
registration – of the assignment contract. 13  The relationship resulting from the 
assignment as between assignor and assignee (e) is also the result of the contract. These 
issues are thus governed by the law of the assignment contract. An exception which is 
generally specified is the capacity of a party to enter into a contract (d1). For instance, 
under the Rome I Regulation, legal questions involving status or legal capacity are 
excluded. 14  Also, there is no rule regarding personal capacity in the Receivables 
Convention. This matter is left to the national choice of laws.15 The reason is because 
legal capacity – such as that of a minor to make a contract – is not regarded as a purely 
contractual matter, but the legal status of a person.16 Such matter should be determined 
by looking at a connecting factor linking to that person which shall lead to a personal 
law, rather than by the law of the contract. Taking an example from English law, the 
capacity of an individual to enter into a contract is governed by the law of his domicile 
or residence, or the law of the country with which the contract is most closely 
connected, e.g. the lex loci actus or the proper law of the contract.17 In the case of a 
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corporation, its capacity is governed both by its constitution, which refers to the law of 
the place of incorporation, and by the law of the country which governs the contract.18  
Assignment also creates a kind of relation between assignee and debtor as indicated in 
(f), though there is no direct contractual contact between them. While the debtor is a 
party to the contract creating the assigned receivables, the assignee can be seen as a 
stranger to it. But, as a result of assignment, the assignee can become a person who has 
a right under the original contract between the original creditor and debtor. This is the 
reason why assignment is regarded as an exception to the privity of contract doctrine.19 
Before an assignment, a debtor holds his contractual obligation to pay his creditor, and 
only his creditor. After assignment, the scenario is changed. On one side, the creditor’s 
right to payment has been transferred to an assignee. As a result, the debtor will, subject 
to certain conditions, receive a good discharge only by making payment to the 
assignee.20 On the other side, the assignee does – possibly under some requirements – 
have the right to force the debtor to make such payment.21 This is, after all, the main 
purpose and outcome of an assignment contract. The relation so created between 
assignee and debtor is an effect granted by the law of assignment. This is, of course, not 
a contractual kind of relationship as there is no contract between them. Perhaps a 
proprietary explanation is more plausible in this context. From a property viewpoint, an 
effect of assignment is to transfer the ownership of receivables from assignor to 
assignee (h).22 This is why the rights of an assignee can go beyond a typical contractual 
reason and against a debtor subject to the assigned receivables. Despite this explanation, 
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there exist conflicts in the methodology of the law of assignment under the property-
contract approach. This is because the true nature of receivables as well as assignment is 
contractual generating and transferring contractual rights to payment in the receivables 
assigned.23 They do not have any proprietary character. It is therefore not correct to see, 
or better to explain, them otherwise. If receivables really are treated as property, then 
assigning them from one party to another would result in a proprietary transfer from 
transferer to transferee. Between assignor and assignee, such proprietary transfer 
resulting from an assignment contract would have of the character property. This should 
be governed not by contractual rules but by proprietary ones. In spite of this basic 
background, the proprietary effect of assignment between assignor and assignee is not 
currently regulated by the lex situs of the assigned receivables or any conflict rules for 
property.24  In the European context, it is, by contrast, governed by the law of the 
assignment contract. An example for this is in the Rome I Regulation, Article 14(1) and 
recital 38,25 under which the law of assignment shall apply to the property aspects of 
assignment as between assignor and assignee.  
When it comes to the issue of a notice of assignment, the underlying reasons of the 
property-contract approach are less clear. As stated under headings (g) and (i), 
explanations exist in terms of both contractual and proprietary perspectives.26 Giving a 
debtor notice is the way to bring the debtor into the effectual result of the assignment. 
Contractually, its purpose is to tell the debtor that he will only be able to get a good 
                                                             
23
 WW Cook, ‘The Alienability of Choses in Action’ (1916) 29 Harv L Rev 816, 819. 
24
 See M Moshinsky, ‘The assignment of debts in the conflict of laws’ (1992) 108 LQR 591, 624, where it 
was suggested that ‘the lex situs of a debt should in general govern the transfer of property in a debt 
between the assignor and the assignee’.   
25
 “In the context of voluntary assignment, the term ‘relationship’ should make it clear that Article 14(1) 
also applies to the property aspects of an assignment, as between assignor and assignee, in legal orders 
where such aspects are treated separately from the aspects under the law of obligations...”. 
26
 Bridge (n 1) 688–689. 
183 
 
discharge by making a payment to the assignee.27 After receiving notice, the debtor 
must account to the assignee. ‘He cannot deal inconsistently with the assigned interest, 
for instance by making payment to the assignor.’28 If he does pay the assignor he does 
so at his peril, since he must pay again to the assignee.29 This is the contractual result of 
a notice. However, if the purpose of the notice requirement is to establish that ‘the 
[receivable] assigned no longer falls with the patrimony of the assignor’, 30  or to 
announce to the world at large that the receivable falls within the proprietary power of 
the assignee, this will support the proprietary character of the notice of assignment. In 
Dearle v Hall,31 it was remarked that notice is necessary to perfect a title, the result of 
which is to give complete rights in rem and erga omnes effects against the world. But, it 
has also been stated that notice is not always necessary if the assignee is willing to trust 
his contractual relationship with the assignor. 32  Considering also the Receivables 
Convention, a legal rule on notification is not compelled, nor is a link to either a 
contractual or a proprietary explanation given. 33  Thus far, it is uncertain what the 
purpose of notification really is under the property-contract approach.    
Regarding the other two issues, the third-party effectiveness of assignment (j) and 
priority (k), they are classified as proprietary effects of assignment. The foundation of 
this is that it is possible for an assignee to invoke his rights under an assignment 
contract against other third parties, i.e. creditors of the assignor and liquidators or other 
insolvency representatives of the assignor. The contractual sphere is principally limited 
only to relationships among parties to a contract or persons who agreed to it. Once a 
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legal action can affect other third persons, such effect cannot be categorised as 
contractual. It is, by contrast, an erga omnes of the proprietary feature by which the 
public have to respect an owner’s proprietary right, i.e. ownership, in the thing.34 This is 
also to protect the owner’s interest in that thing if other persons attempt to override it. In 
a case where the same receivables have been assigned more than once, an assignee can 
also assert his rights to compete with other assignees. This is a priority dispute, the 
outcome of which substantively depends on the applicable priority rule. Take for 
example the leading decision in Dearle v Hall,35 the priority of competing assignments 
was determined by the date upon which notice of assignment of receivables was 
received by the debtor, and not by the principle of first in time is first in right and rank. 
The underlying reason for this is because a notice of assignment is required to complete 
the property title of an assignee in a receivable which is intangible. By way of 
comparison, it is equivalent to taking possession of a tangible property.36 If the assignee 
fails to give such notice, his right is not perfected against a subsequent assignee who 
does not know of the prior assignment but does give notice of his assignment to the 
debtor. The notice thus performs a proprietary function and so is a priority factor.   
 
5.1.2 Possible conflict-of-law rules 
The property-contract approach ascertains that the law of assignment is a legal area 
where contract and property collide with and also invade each other. Rather, it makes 
this complex area of law far more complicated as drawing a clear line between them is 
not easy. This complication arises not only in the context of substantive law, but also in 
conflict of laws. According to the legal characterisation, a legal issue flowing from an 
                                                             
34
 See Dearle v Hall (1828) 3 Russ 1; Bell (n 22) 4–5; Bridge (n 1); J Perkins, ‘Proprietary issues arising 
from the assignment of debts: a new rule?’ (2010) 6 JIBFL 333.  
35
 (1828) 3 Russ 1; see also J de Lacy, ‘Reflections on the Ambit of the Rule in Dearle v. Hall and the 
Priority of Personal Property Assignments-Part One’ (1999) 28 Anglo-Am L Rev. 87. 
36
 Dearle v Hall (1828) 3 Russ 1, 22–24 (Plumer MR). 
185 
 
assignment of receivables is governed by either conflict of laws for contract or conflict 
of laws for property. In this section, the conflict-of-law rules based on the property-
contract approach is criticised. Initially, the difficulty is not in the contractual but the 
proprietary aspects of assignment.  
(1) Contractual matters 
Regarding contractual matters, either arising from a contract of assignment or involving 
a contract creating receivables assigned, they are less troublesome. Principally, they 
shall be decided by reference to the law of the contract. The doctrine of party autonomy 
is widely and firmly established in this context. The law chosen by the contracting 
parties is recognised by law and enforceable by a court hearing a dispute over a 
contract. In the case of an assignment contract, it is the law of assignment. Examples of 
this rule can be extracted from various sources of conflict of laws for contract, in 
general. It applies of course to assignment, in particular. The Rome I Regulation, Article 
14(1), indicates that the law that applies to the contract between assignor and assignee 
shall govern the relationship between them. To find that applicable law, Article 3, under 
which the applicability of freedom of choice is guaranteed, must be consulted. 
According to this rule, a contract for the assignment of receivables shall be governed by 
the law chosen by the parties to it. Under the Receivables Convention, the same 
principle is imposed by Article 28. The mutual rights and obligations of assignor and 
assignee arising from their agreement are governed by the law chosen by them. From a 
national perspective, both the United States and England affirm the parties’ freedom to 
choose a law governing their contract. They can respectively be found in Section 1-301 
of the UCC and Dicey, Morris and Collins on the proper law of contract.37 The English 
proper law of contract is a conflict of laws’ fundamental principle by which the parties 
to an assignment contract are entitled to decide on and select what law is to apply. The 
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selected law shall be applicable, provided the intention to choose such law is bona fide 
and legal.38 Subject to Section 1-301 of the UCC, parties to an international assignment 
contract are able to choose a governing law, notwithstanding whether the assignment 
relates to the state or country of the law chosen or not. 
Limitations or exceptions to the party-autonomy principle should also be mentioned. 
They are typically based on a country’s general public policy and, if any, legislation. 
According to the Rome I Regulation, the non-derogable provisions of a country –
previously called ‘mandatory rules’ in the Rome Convention39 – will apply if all the 
relevant elements are located in that country.40 In a case where all relevant elements are 
located in a member state, the parties’ choice of law does not affect the application of 
provisions of European Community law which cannot be derogated from by 
agreement.41 It has also been declared in the English case that an intention of the parties 
to select a law of contract can be affirmative if ‘there is no reason for avoiding the 
choice on the ground of public policy’.42 Also, under the UCC, the choice of law is 
ineffective if the application of that law would be contrary to a fundamental policy of 
the state or country whose law, according to the United States’ conflict-of-laws 
principles, would govern in the absence of such choice.43   
(2) Proprietary matters 
To choose an appropriate conflict-of-law rule for a proprietary matter arising from an 
assignment of receivables is much more complicated than for the contractual kind. 
Various connecting factors rooted in the property-contract approach are submitted. 
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Various conflict-of-law rules are proposed. Debating choices and conflicting reasons 
appears to be unavoidable. In this research, there are five connecting factors that will be 
analysed. These are situs of receivables, debtor’s location, assignor’s location, assigned 
claim, and assignment contract. Academically, some choices have gained support 
whereas others have been ignored.44 Despite such controversy, some of them have been 
seen in current application in some jurisdictions.45  
(2.1) Law of situs of receivables 
Having been regarded as property, a connecting factor commonly used for a tangible 
thing has found its way into use for an intangible thing. This connecting factor is the 
situs or physical location of a property. It is formed as a main choice of conflict-of-law 
rules for a tangible property – either movable or immovable. As an intangible is 
categorised as movable property for the purpose of conflict of laws, such a conflict rule 
is subsequently extended to apply to intangible things, including receivables.46 The lex 
situs or the law of a country where a receivable is situate has been employed in 
traditional English conflict of laws as a governing law for proprietary matters of 
assignment.47 To find the law of a country where a receivable is located, a preliminary 
issue is to find the location of a receivable despite the fact, in reality, no physical 
location exists.48  Once the receivable can be placed in one country, that country’s 
substantive law can become the applicable law.  
This methodology might seem reasonable if one considers that it is based on the ground 
that an intangible thing should be subject to the same connecting factors and choice-of-
law rules as those governing tangible things. The rationale for applying lex situs to 
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intangible things is the claim that ‘the situs is an objective and easily ascertainable’.49 
Third parties might reasonably find it and be able to ascertain who has the title of a 
property. Plus, ‘the country of situs has control over the property and a judgment in 
conflict with the lex situs will often be ineffective’.50 This is convincing if the property 
with which it is dealing is land or some other tangible kind as the situs is attached to the 
place where it has its actual physical existence. But, in terms of receivables, ‘there is no 
universal agreement on where a receivable is located’.51 To find the situs of receivables 
is thus not so easily ascertainable.  
Lex situs is strikingly incompatible with the true nature of receivables. Unlike tangible 
objects, receivables have no actual physical existence and hence no physical location 
that one can look for. In fact, they are intangible rights to payment which are rights in 
personam. They are rights against persons who are debtors in position. Searching for the 
location of a receivable depends upon an assumption of where it could likely stand. 
Because there is no physical locality, when the lex situs is referred to by implication, in 
the end, it does not direct to any location of a receivable but instead to the location of a 
person, the debtor. Under English common law, a statement posed in rule 129(1) of 
Dicey, Morris and Collins on the conflict of laws is that ‘choses in action generally are 
situate in the country where they are properly recoverable or can be enforced’.52 By this, 
in the case of a receivable, it means the country where the debtor resides.53  This 
foundation does not match the lex situs rule applying to a tangible property where its 
location depends on where the property itself is situate. The real methodology involves, 
by contrast, using one connecting factor to lead to another one. The former is lex situs 
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and the latter is the location of debtor. Strictly speaking, this is not a location, even in an 
artificial way, of a receivable. It is, in fact, a personal factor of a debtor. For the reasons 
of recovery and enforcement of a receivable, though it is important but it does not really 
concern the situs of the receivable. It concerns rather the debtor who has an obligatory 
duty to pay. Adopting the situs as a conflict-of-law rule has therefore been considered 
‘illogical, unnecessary and misleading’. 54  Furthermore, finding the location of 
receivables in practice is not always easy, particularly in the cases of assignments of 
future receivables and bulk assignments. In the former, the lex situs is unidentifiable as 
the receivables do not yet exist. In the latter, many laws based on the lex situs of each 
receivable are constituted and this results in complexity of the transaction if the assignee 
needs to comply with them all.55 The reasons for lex situs are therefore unconvincing 
and impractical in this context. 
(2.2) Law of the debtor’s location  
The location of a debtor subjected to an assigned receivable is another connecting factor 
which has been used in dealing with an international assignment of receivables. Besides 
being based on lex situs’s terminology, it is also a distinctive connecting factor by itself. 
In English common law, the debtor’s location is a conflict-of-law rule that has resulted 
from an explanation of the lex situs of the receivable. According to rule 129(1) of 
Dicey, Morris and Collins, a receivable is supposed to situate in the country where the 
debtor resides. This location is considered to be a place where the receivable is properly 
recoverable or can be enforced, since it is there where the courts generally have 
jurisdiction over the debtor, and the creditor can bring a legal action to enforce 
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payment.56 However, this rationality has no connection with the location of a receivable. 
On the contrary, it is directed to the location of person who is a debtor. This is the real 
underlying logic for which the debtor’s residence has been chosen as the situs of 
receivable. An explanation was given in Commissioner of Stamps v Hope: ‘a 
[receivable], being merely a chose in action – money to be recovered from the debtor 
and nothing more – could have no other local existence than the personal residence of 
the debtor, where assets to satisfy it would presumably be’.57 The law of the debtor’s 
location is thus not a connecting factor based on the situs of a thing, but of a person.    
Some difficulties also follow this personal connecting factor. The debtor’s location may 
not always be easily ascertainable, particularly in the time of modern business activities 
where a commercial debtor tends to have more than one place of business. In a case 
where a debtor has residences in more than one country, a problem is which place will 
serve as his actual location. The rule of debtor’s location needs to be clarified at this 
point. For example, under English law, a receivable’s situs in this circumstance is 
decided as the place where the receivable would be paid in the ordinary course of 
business.58 Moreover, this rule must be supplemented if the debtor is a corporation 
conducting businesses by having branches in many countries. For instance, in the case 
of a bank account held by a transnational bank, the decisions of the English courts have 
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been that the situs of the account locates at the bank’s branch where the account is 
held.59  
Another difficulty of the debtor’s location and lex situs that also leads to the same 
indication – the residence of the debtor – is that a debtor’s residence can change, from 
time to time, from country to country. It moves with the debtor. It is subject to the 
debtor’s decision alone, and hence is unpredictable.60 Further criteria are needed in 
order to determine which location is the decisive one. This has to be decided at a 
particular point in time, and perhaps every time a dispute arises over a particular 
receivable and debtor. Further complications are, as a consequence, added.  
Moreover, the reasons why a debtor’s location is considered to be a place where a 
receivable can be recoverable or enforceable might not always be well-established. This 
is because a debtor’s residence is also the place where his assets are might not always be 
true. It is only a plausible assumption. The place where a debtor’s assets are situated can 
be different from the debtor’s residence. There might exist a situation that the debtor 
either has no assets in his country of residence or has many assets elsewhere. In a 
situation where a debtor resides in one country but his property is in another, bringing a 
legal action before a court of the former might not guarantee that a receivable will be 
recovered or a judgment can be enforced. Without any property in the country of the 
debtor’s residence, enforcing such payment in that country seems unlikely to be useful 
since the creditor is unlikely to get any proceeds in the end. In a case where a debtor’s 
assets are away from his residence, there is no explanation of why the place of assets is 
not submitted as the situs of the receivable or the debtor’s location, although it is here 
where the receivable could be payable. Besides, a receivable may be enforceable in 
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many places if the debtor has companies which are resident in many countries. 61 
Specifying the debtor’s location by reason of enforcement is therefore not so persuasive.  
As recently noted by the BIICL, the residence of a debtor is no longer a viable option 
for the connecting factor for proprietary effects of international assignments of 
receivables.62 In contrast, it has been submitted that three connecting factors – law of 
assignor’s location, law of assigned claim, and law of assignment – are viable solutions. 
They will be analysed accordingly.  
(2.3) Law of assignor’s location  
This is a connecting factor which has been considered by some scholars to be the best 
solution for the cross-border assignment of receivables.63 It also gained majority support 
from European delegations and was incorporated into the European Commission’s 
proposal for the Rome I Regulation, drafted in 2005.64 Additionally, this factor has been 
adopted as the conflict-of-law rule for the proprietary effects of assignment, both by the 
Receivables Convention and the Guide.65 So far, the assignor’s location seems to be the 
most popular choice for the proprietary aspect of assignment.66 But it has also been 
criticised as being ‘the worst possible solution for receivables based cross-border 
transactions’.67 
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The location of an assignor, who is a creditor of assigned claims, is – as has been 
claimed – easily visible.68  It can be determined by all third parties. Any detrimental 
effects on them are unlikely to be manipulated by parties to an assignment. Having said 
that, if this reason is only a convincing one, it is along the same lines as the law of 
debtor’s residence. A choice between a debtor’s location and an assignor’s location 
could not be made.    
In terms of the assignment of bulk receivables, the choice of an assignor’s location 
seems to have some advantages.69 It points to a single law for all receivables purported 
to be assigned. It suits financiers for whom it is unnecessary to examine each individual 
receivable. By leading to a single law, this connecting factor is also able to solve a 
priority dispute straightforwardly. It depends solely on the location of the assignor, 
regardless of the law of each assignment which probably leads to a different substantive 
law. The result is legal certainty and predictability for relevant people. This is a good 
resolution and a solid outcome. Additionally, for the assignment of future receivables 
where other connecting factors such as the law of assigned receivables cannot be known 
at the time of a contract for assignment, the law of the assignor’s location can be well 
ascertained. With this merit, the law of the assignor’s location is therefore, in terms of 
financial practice, the one most favoured by the factoring industry.70 This is because it 
brings an assignor’s portfolio of receivables owed by different debtors, each of which 
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might have its own applicable law, into a single system of law.71 This choice also 
responds to the need of a factor to know in advance the law that shall determine the 
effectiveness of his rights against debtors and other third persons, and the priority 
problem between him and other assignees.72     
Nevertheless, trying to specify the physical location of an assignor has some drawbacks. 
It might not be easily visible in every case. These drawbacks are comparable to those 
that apply to a debtor’s residence. The term ‘location’ needs more clarity. Based on the 
Receivables Convention, for instance, the rules for identifying a person’s location are 
defined in Article 5(h). The general rule is that a person is located in the country where 
he has his place of business. If there is more than one place, the central administration 
shall be referred to.73 If a person does not have a place of business, reference shall be 
made to the habitual residence of that person. The meaning of ‘location’ stated in the 
Guide is also in this manner. 74  Whatever definition is specified, either a place of 
business or a habitual residence, it is however subject to an assignor’s self-
determination. It can be changed as time goes by. A time factor must therefore be 
imposed in order to decide what is an assignor’s location at the relevant material point 
in time of each assignment. Another problem arises if an assignor has more than one 
place of residence, business or branch. Which place will be the ultimate choice, and 
under what rules? Uncertainty still underpins the application of an assignor’s location 
since it largely depends upon the factual situation of each individual assignor.  
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Considering this choice further, if the law of the assignor’s location were to be adopted, 
for example, according to the original proposal of the Rome I Regulation, it would 
mean that the third connecting factor hinges on legal issues arising from assignment.75 
And more connecting factors means further complication. The difficulties of 
characterisation for those legal issues and each factor will unavoidably be additional. 
And this will increase the transaction costs, hence it is an unpleasant option.76 The result 
of such disadvantages, perhaps equal to the advantages, is that the law of assignor’s 
location did not secure its place in the final text of the Rome I Regulation. Also, the 
Receivables Convention which upholds this conflict rule has not as yet, according to its 
present status, come into force.77  
(2.4) Law of assigned receivables 
Assignment is a method of transferring from assignor to assignee receivables which are 
claims against a debtor. These claims originate from a contractual relationship between 
assignor and debtor. If there are no such contractual claims, there can be no assignment. 
The law governing the contract creating assigned receivables, or the law of assigned 
claims, will have a vital role to play in the triangular relations between assignor, 
assignee and debtor. It is this law that gives birth to the object of the assignment. There 
is a strong theoretical ground for adopting this link as a primary connecting factor. 
Some concrete evidence can also be seen. Under the Rome I Regulation, the law of 
assigned receivables is already the law governing legal issues between assignee and 
debtor,78 It has also been supported by the Financial Markets Law Committee (‘FMLC’) 
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and the United Kingdom to govern proprietary effects of assignment.79 This choice was 
also adopted by the Supreme Court of Germany when deciding cases involving a 
proprietary effect of assignment and a priority dispute between successive 
assignments.80  
On the positive side,81 the law of assigned receivables is consistent with the principle of 
party autonomy. It upholds the freedom of parties to choose an applicable law for the 
effectiveness of an assignment against third parties. As this is also the law of the 
underlying contract regulating the debtor’s obligations, using it to govern proprietary 
effects of assignment will not hinder the debtor. If other conflict rules – e.g. the law of 
the assignor’s habitual residence – are to be applied instead, the debtor’s legal position 
under the original contract might not be properly protected. Additionally, the law of 
assigned claims gives the debtor the capacity to know with certainty who owns the 
receivables and whom he has to pay to get a good discharge. The principle of debtor 
protection is the core argument made by the FMLC in order to reject the law of the 
assignor’s habitual residence, and to support the law of the assigned claim.82 Still, as far 
as the Rome I Regulation is concerned, this argument has been contested as an 
exaggerated one.83 This is because the debtor receives such protection by the rule in 
Article 14(2) under which the debtor’s obligations, including how to discharge the 
receivables, shall be decided by the law governing those obligations. However, if this 
connecting factor is to be accepted, it must correspond with Article 14(2). A good result 
is that legal issues concerning either the debtor or third parties would be under the same 
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law and the problem of characterisation would be avoided. Furthermore, unlike 
choosing one’s location as a connecting factor, the law of receivables is unlikely to 
change.84 It does not solely depend on, for instance, an assignor’s decision.  
From a practical perspective, unlike the factoring sector, the law of assigned claims is 
preferred by the securitisation industry.85 Although these two types of financial business 
mainly focus on bulk assignments of receivables, there exist some significant 
differences between them.86  As opposed to factoring, 87  doing due diligence on the 
assigned receivables under the applicable law of each individual receivable is necessary 
for securitisation. Its purpose is to consider and obtain an appropriate credit rating for 
securities subsequently issued.88 Not doing so would adversely impact on such ratings. 
Adding the law of the assignor’s location would add further costs to securitisation, for it 
requires another legal investigation based on this law.89 Moreover, if the assignor’s 
location were enforced, in cases where the assignor changes his place of business or 
habitual residence, this ‘would make it impossible to give the kind of clean legal 
opinions on which the rating of the issued securities depends’.90 The law applicable to 
the receivables is therefore a better option here.  
The law of assigned receivables has, nevertheless, some negative aspects.91 Perhaps, the 
biggest flaw is its inappropriateness for factoring markets where a bundle of receivables 
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is assigned. Each one of them might be governed by a different law. Finding and 
applying each individual law for every single receivable would be impractical and 
perhaps unfeasible. Another drawback of this choice is that it is not suitable for the 
assignment of a future receivable. In this case, it is a receivable that is expected to be 
generated by a contract that has not yet been concluded. The applicable law is thus 
indeterminable until the receivable purported to be assigned comes into existence. Until 
that time, this connecting factor will cause legal uncertainty.  
From a third party’s viewpoint, there is a further debate that must be entered into. 
Although the law of assigned receivables is more stable in character than that of the 
assignor’s location, this does not mean that it cannot be changed. It has been remarked 
that the parties to assigned receivables can choose and change the applicable law.92 This 
would render third parties subject to the choices made by contracting parties, which they 
cannot control. It might have an adverse effect on their rights.93 However, this is again 
an arguable point. And it is not only the law of assigned claims that faces this kind of 
problem. It can also occur if the location of the assignor is applied. The fundamental 
ground is because the assignor’s location is nowadays trumped by the freedom to 
choose a location or an establishment – by this, it means either a habitual residence or a 
place of business.94 Broadly speaking, anything can change over time. The argument 
that third parties would be prejudiced by change is thus neither decisive nor convincing.    
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(2.5) Law of assignment 
Moving on to another possible rule, the law of assignment is one of the most viable and 
favoured connecting factors for international assignments of receivables. 95  From a 
theoretical viewpoint, this connecting factor departs from the property approach to 
assignment. It is closer to the contract one. The law of assignment encourages the 
application of the party-autonomy principle.96 It enables parties to an assignment to 
choose an applicable law to govern both contractual and proprietary aspects of an 
assignment. As a result, the chosen law shall govern the legal issues both between the 
contracting parties and those concerning third parties. But its great flexibility prompts a 
controversial debate. In Europe, this choice-of-law rule is adopted in practice and has 
strong support from the Netherlands. 97  The leading case is Brandsma qq v Hansa 
Chemie AG where the Dutch Supreme Court (Hoge Raad) determined the proprietary 
effect of assignment against third parties by reference to the law of the assignment 
contract.98 
Although the principle of party autonomy is generally accepted, this position is only 
solid within contract areas. It is not the case when it comes to the property domain. 
Property rights are erga omnes. They can affect any third persons, and third persons 
must respect the owner’s property rights. Contractual rights, however, do not have those 
effects. They create only rights inter partes. It follows that the law chosen by the 
contracting parties should govern only the contractual relationships between them. It 
should not be able to be extended in its scope toward third persons. To affect third 
persons, other law based on the property approach should be called upon. Still, as 
discussed earlier, the property approach which is fundamentally based on the lex situs 
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rule brings more problems than benefits. Its basic principle is inconsistent with the true 
legal nature of receivables, which are contractual rights. It is thus declared a non-viable 
option and likely to be abandoned.99 Using the law of assignment, by contrast, will 
subject both contractual and proprietary aspects of assignment to a single law. The 
problem of characterisation could be avoided.  
With regard to third parties’ arguments, the counterargument is on the same basis as that 
of the law of assigned receivables. Freedom of choice causes a similar result to freedom 
of location. They both involve a personal right to choose what one thinks fit for oneself. 
The difference in this context is that the freedom to choose a governing law of contract 
is a matter of agreement between the contracting parties, i.e. assignor and assignee, 
whereas the freedom to choose a location is exclusively the decision of one person, i.e. 
the assignor or debtor. It is therefore not a strong ground for arguing that adopting the 
law of assignment would cause any more severe consequences for third parties’ rights 
than those resulting from the law of the assignor’s location.     
On top of that, a theoretical question which has been raised is why third parties should 
receive special weighty concern in this area of law.100 For a solvent estate, an assignor is 
able to dispose or transfer his property or receivables freely, though it might adversely 
affect his financial position and perhaps result in an unpleasant effect for his general 
creditors. An unsecured creditor is not granted any special treatment because he has no 
particular interest in any specific property of the assignor. It is not the creditor’s 
property. The primary purpose of choosing a law for an assignment contract is to govern 
the relationship between assignor and assignee. It does not direct to a specific creditor. 
Whatever effects might or might not ensue for a creditor’s position are merely a 
byproduct of the law chosen. If assignment really creates some severe impacts on the 
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financial status of the assignor at a time when he faces financial difficulties and 
subsequently becomes insolvent, principally, this is not within the scope of the law of 
assignment. It is but a legal problem subject to insolvency law. It is here that the 
creditor will receive highly weighty concern through legal measures of insolvency 
law.101  
Considering financial practices further, the law of assignment could apply to 
assignments of future receivables and bulk assignments. It performs as well as the law 
of the assignor’s location. Adopting this choice, which is based on party autonomy, 
permits each business sector to choose the most suitable applicable law for its specific 
needs, hence avoiding specific sectoral conflict-of-law rules and characterisation 
complexities.102  It could therefore put an end to the controversial debate about the 
preferred choice of the factoring and securitisation industries.  
Allowing the freedom to choose an applicable law to govern all legal aspects of 
assignment is, however, not perfect. Some complications deriving from the law of 
assignment could exist.103 Firstly, this connecting factor principally depends upon a 
mutual intention, either expressed or implied, of the parties to a contract, i.e. assignor 
and assignee. In the absence of such an intention or if a choice of law has not been 
agreed, an extra rule needs to be imposed. It could lead to the application of a specific 
conflict-of-law rule which would be a default or rigid rule. The flexibility of party 
autonomy would be disregarded.104 Secondly, another difficulty could arise if a priority 
dispute among competing assignees is decided by the law of assignment, since in this 
situation there is more than one assignment and each one is possibly subject to a 
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different choice of law. One law might lead to a result that differs from others. It is 
therefore difficult – or perhaps impossible – to ascertain a priority position if a single 
law cannot be found.105 A solution to this must therefore be formulated if the law of 
assignment is to be applied effectively. For instance, as has been suggested, the law of 
subsequent assignment should determine not only the validity of that assignment, but 
also the assignee’s position in respect of competing prior assignees.106       
 
5.2 Rights-based approach 
The rights-based approach proposed by this thesis offers a new perspective on and a 
new approach to conflict of laws relating to the assignment of receivables. It is not 
based on the characteristic proposition between contract and property having been 
applied by the property-contract approach. It is, by contrast, found in the substantive 
basis of the true legal nature of assignment, i.e. a transfer of rights. As such, conflict-of-
law rules under the rights-based approach shall treat an assignment of receivables in an 
international context as an international transfer of rights.  
This section is divided into two main headings. The first will set up the general 
principles of the rights-based approach. It will include a comparative discussion of the 
rights-based approach and the property-contract approach. The second heading will 
consider conflict-of-law rules developed by the rights-based approach. Hypothetical 
legal questions regarding legal issues arising out of assignment will be studied in order 
to illustrate this approach thoroughly.  
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5.2.1 General principles 
Receivables are intangibles. They fundamentally and significantly differ from tangible 
things, either movable or immovable. They have no physical existence. Their true 
natures are intangible rights or interests recognised by law. They are rights to claim for 
monetary payments resulting from contractual transactions. Regarded also as choses in 
action under the law, it was remarked more than a hundred years ago that they are: 
…mere claims to have things (in the primary [or physical] sense) which others 
possess, or upon things, which others possess, or to have things or services 
rendered by others. They are claims which may be satisfied by acquiescence 
therein, but which, if disputed, can only be enforced by going to law. They are 
incorporeal because one who has only a claim has no thing (in the primary [or 
physical] sense) which he can keep safe for himself; he can only look to law for 
security, that is, he has a mere right.107  
From a substantive view of the rights-based approach, the assignment of receivables 
is all about transferring, from assignor to assignee, contractual rights to payment that 
the assignor has against a debtor.108  All the legal issues surrounding assignment 
involve the rights so assigned. For example, what is the content of rights in 
receivables that are assigned from assignor to assignee? To what extent can an 
assignee assert or enforce his rights in the assigned receivables against a debtor? And 
to what extent can an assignee invoke his right in the assigned receivables against 
third parties? Under the property-contract approach, these issues are regarded as 
either contractual or proprietary. The rights-based approach sees the purpose of 
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assignment being to create both internal and external effects for relevant persons. 
Legal issues arising out of assignment do not affect only assignor, assignee and 
debtor, but also third parties. To deal with them in terms of the rights-based approach, 
consideration must be given to these various aspects of rights that are generated 
among the relationships of those persons. In this way, they can be divided into three 
categories: (1) rights between assignor and assignee; (2) rights against debtor; (3) 
rights against third parties. While the first two are internal effects of assignment, the 
last one is an external type affecting persons outside the triangular relationship of 
assignment.  
To illustrate the rights-based approach, a comparison to the property-contract approach 
must be made. A considerable difference between the property-contract approach and 
the rights-based approach exists in the characterisation of the assignment of receivables. 
While the former approaches it as a legal combination of contract and property, the 
latter approaches it as a unique method of transferring contractual rights. As described 
in the previous section,109 the property-contract approach regards assignment as a hybrid 
of contract and property. Receivables are generated by contractual relations. They are 
however seen as items of property. An assignment is a contract. But it is regarded as 
creating proprietary effects, among assignor, assignee and debtor or even against third 
parties.110 This is not consistent with the true legal nature of assignment. Due to this 
misconception, the property-contract approach is followed by characterisation 
difficulties between the contractual and proprietary character of assignment. To find an 
applicable law for assignment, one must first identify whether a legal issue arising from 
assignment relates to contract or property. However good the attempts to draw a line 
between these two legal categories, it has never been made clear. No one can guarantee 
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with certainty either its result or its choice-of-law rules. 111  Raiffeisen Zentralbank 
Österreich AG v Five Star General Trading LLC112 is a leading example. In this case a 
contractual, rather than a proprietary, approach was used to find an applicable law for a 
legal question once regarded as a proprietary aspect of assignment. After the case, an 
overview submission has been made that ‘[for] some purposes it may be necessary to 
view assignment as primarily involving an issue of contract rather than property, e.g. for 
private international law purposes’.113  
The foundation of the rights-based approach is truly rooted in the difficulties and 
complexities that the property-contract approach produces. Via a proposition of the 
rights-based approach, where the assignment of receivables is treated as a transfer of 
rights, no line between contractual and proprietary character needs to be drawn. Legal 
issues flowing from assignment are not seen as a combination of contract and property. 
As an outstanding consequence, there is no characterisation problem between contract 
and property and no need for the legal issue of assignment first to be characterised as to 
whether it is a contractual or proprietary problem. It is, on the contrary, all about rights. 
It is a right to payment that is assigned, and thus it raises various legal issues 
surrounding that right. Characterisation difficulties and complexities resulting from the 
property-contract approach will be eliminated for the most part, if not completely.  
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5.2.2 Proposed conflict-of-law rules 
In the rights-based approach, conflict of laws regulating an international assignment of 
receivables is about choosing a connecting factor and a subsequent governing law for a 
transfer of contractual rights to payment. It is not about characterising contract and 
property and choosing a governing law accordingly. There is no need to resort to 
proprietary conflict rules – such as lex situs – for an assignment to be dealt with. To find 
an appropriate applicable law for an assignment, the legal issues flowing from it are 
characterised on the basis of rights to the assignment and the relations between relevant 
persons either within or outside the triangular relationship. These persons are assignor, 
assignee, debtor and third parties such as creditors or insolvency representatives of the 
assignor. The details and rationality of conflict-of-law rules are classified into three 
different divisions. Principally, legal issues between assignor and assignee shall be 
governed by the law of assignment. Legal matters concerning a debtor shall be decided 
by the law of receivables assigned. Legal matters that affect third parties shall be 
determined by the law of rights that relates to them.  
To elaborate conflict-of-law rules advanced by the rights-based approach in a much 
more detailed way, the legal questions arising out of an international assignment of 
receivables will be asked, analysed and answered. Hypothetical legal questions that 
might arise out of the assignment will be formulated. Various aspects concerning the 
triangular relationship between assignor or creditor (C), assignee (A) and debtor (D), as 
well as the effect of assignment on other third parties (T), will be considered. These will 
cover, using the words of the property-contract approach, both contractual and 
proprietary aspects of assignment. Outcomes of the rights-based approach will also be 
compared and contrasted with those that are likely to emerge from the property-contract 
approach.  
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(1) Relationship of rights between assignor and assignee  
An assignment of receivables is a contract between assignor and assignee.114 It results in 
a contractual relationship comprising either rights and, if any, obligations between 
them. This is the inter partes or internal effect of assignment.115 A legal issue flowing 
from this relation in an international circumstance needs to have a conflict rule to 
identify an appropriate governing law. By comparison to the property-contract 
approach, most of the issues are on the contractual side of assignment.  
Using the rights-based approach, the legal issues in this context are as follows:  
(a) The requirements or conditions that a party to a contract of assignment needs 
to fulfil in general in order to make the assignment contractually effective or 
valid in the eyes of the law. This issue can be subdivided into:  
  (a1) the capacity of the parties to enter into the contract;    
  (a2) formation of the contract;   
  (a3) form of the contract;         
 (b) Relationship between assignor and assignee; 
(c) Proprietary transfer between assignor and assignee.  
Firstly, assignment is a transaction between persons, either natural or legal. It is a 
contract created by mutual agreement of the parties to it. The first legal matter is 
whether the parties, i.e. C and A, have the legal capacity to make such an assignment. 
This, the issue (a1), is a question of the legal status and capacity of either a natural or a 
legal person, which is not part of this research. As explained earlier, this issue is 
excluded from the scope of both the Rome I Regulation and the Receivables 
                                                             
114
 Wright v Wright (1750) 22 ER 1111, 1112, where it has been stated that ‘[an] assignment always 
operates by way of agreement or contract’.   
115
 See Tolhurst (n 21) ch 8.  
208 
 
Convention. 116  But, for the sake of completeness, the issue of capacity shall, in 
principle, refer to the law of person, e.g. the law of domicile or habitual residence.117 
Other suggestions are the law of the place of contracting and the proper law of 
contract.118 Under English case law, for instance, it has been concluded that there is a 
lack of clarity.119 The problem of capacity is decided either by the law of domicile or 
the law of the place where the contract is made.120  
Secondly, for an assignment contract to be made effectively, legal questions regarding 
the formation and form of the contract – (a2) and (a3) – have to be considered. Rights 
and obligations between C and A are formulated by a contract of assignment, the 
purpose of which is to assign receivables from the former to the latter.121 It is their 
mutual consent that makes the assignment happens. Such intention to assign is an 
essential element of the assignment to be created.122  It is therefore the law of the 
assignment contract or the law that shall govern the contract between these two parties, 
C and A, that is the most appropriate choice-of-law rule.123 This rule, which is based on 
the principle of party autonomy or freedom of contract, links to the mutual intention of 
the parties to the contract. According to the principle of party autonomy, C and A have a 
right to choose and agree on an applicable law. In principle, it is the law that is chosen 
by C and A, either expressly or impliedly, that shall be the governing law.124 Suppose C 
concludes an assignment contract to transfer receivables to A, and the law of country X 
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is chosen as the governing law. It is certain that, between C and A, the law of country X 
as the law of assignment shall govern contractual problems that might arise from the 
assignment contract, i.e. its formation, form and other validity.125 For example, in case 
there is any doubt whether an assignment is done by way of outright sale or security, it 
is also the law of the assignment contract that shall decide this. This is because this 
issue substantially involves the construction of an assignment contract which depends 
upon the real intention of the contracting parties. 126  Additionally, if there exists a 
problem over there being any particular form of assignment contract that needs to be 
complied with, this issue shall be determined by reference to the law of the assignment 
contract.127 It is this law that shall answer as to the validity – not only materially and 
legally, but also formally – of the assignment contract in question.128 The nature of all 
these questions is contractual, its applicable law shall thus be the law of the assignment 
contract. 
Thirdly, with regard to the legal effects of assignment between assignor and assignee, 
these are issues (b) and (c). As between C and A, the result of an assignment contract is 
a relationship between them. According to the property-contract approach, two kinds of 
relationship are created. One is contractual, the other proprietary.129 But, in terms of the 
rights-based approach, there is only one type of relation. That is a transfer of rights in 
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the receivables assigned. Potential legal problems concerning the legal effects of the 
transfer can be found as follows. Suppose an assignment contract has been made by C 
and A; the first question in this regard is about its legal effects between them. It is 
obvious that this is a contractual transaction resulting in a contractual relationship 
binding C and A. That relationship shall be according to the terms of the contract.130 A 
difficult problem is the proprietary effects of the assignment. Using the words of the 
property-contract approach, this refers to the transfer of an item of property and also 
property rights from C to A.131 Considering this issue as proprietary, it should thus be 
governed by conflict-of-law rules for property, like lex situs of receivables assigned.132 
However, this is not the current rule, especially in the context of European private 
international law. Subject to the Rome I Regulation, a clear statement is provided by 
recital 38, in that Article 14(1) which leads to the law of the assignment contract applies 
also to the property aspect of an assignment as between C and A.133 Such recital has 
been posed despite the principle that this is a proprietary issue in character, the result of 
which is that it should fall outside the scope of the Regulation.134 The property effect 
between C and A is, thus, regulated by the contract rule. This is one of the conflicting 
principles and rules in the law under the property-contract approach. According to the 
rights-based approach, a logical explanation is straightforward. Assignment is the 
transfer of a contractual right to payment. It is not property or a property right that is 
assigned. The question of who, in proprietary terms if it must be referred, owns that 
property is in fact a question of who, between C and A, has the real right to receive the 
payment. After an assignment contract, such right is transferred from C to A. This is 
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simply the purpose and result of assignment. To consider a governing law for the legal 
problems concerning the effects of assignment, resorting to the assignment contract 
which is the source of such effects is unavoidable. These effects are all matters between 
C and A who are the parties to the assignment contract. Making a decision on the 
choice-of-law rules for these matters is thus not a difficult thing to do. It can only be the 
law of the assignment contract that shall govern them. It shall include the effectiveness 
of the assignment between C and A, notwithstanding whether it is contractual or 
proprietary.135  
However, there cannot be an assignment if there is no object to be assigned. 136 
Receivables or the object of assignment are another essential element of an assignment 
contract. However, a receivable is in itself a consequence of another contract. It is in 
substance a right to receive a payment subject to a contract. 137  The contract that 
originates the receivable purported to be assigned is the contract between C and D. In 
this consideration, there are thus two related choices of law: the law of the assignment 
contract and the law of the original contract creating the assigned receivable. Before 
making the most appropriate choice, legal questions concerning the object of 
assignment must be considered. Suppose C and A intend to make an assignment 
contract to transfer receivables that D is subject to, then, legal problems focusing on the 
receivables need to be investigated. More importantly, what will be the governing law 
for those problems? A fundamental problem concerns the legal existence of the 
receivables. If the original contract creating the assigned receivables is not effectively 
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made, there will be no receivables to be assigned. If the receivables have any legal 
issues as to their invalidity, such as the original contract being voidable on the grounds 
of fraud, misrepresentation, non-discourse, duress, undue influence or any other 
illegalities,138 it could constitute a defence that D is entitled to raise against A. This 
could be posted as the invalidity of the contract creating the receivables, the 
consequence of which could affect the enforceability of the receivables. It might lead to 
a result contrary to A’s expectations, in that D has no obligation to pay and A has no 
right to be paid.139 Another concern regarding receivables as the object of assignment is 
their legal status. The receivables purported to be assigned could, at the time of the 
assignment, be existing receivables or future receivables. This depends upon whether 
there exists a contract that originates the receivables C intends to assign to A or not.140 
If there are no problems with the legal existence or status of the receivables, the next 
concern that C and A have to consider is their assignability. On one side, the question is 
whether the receivables resulting from the relationship between C and D are legally 
prohibited from being transferred or not. Examples of this can be found in English law 
where personal obligations, public salaries, pensions and rights to payment arising from 
divorce proceedings are not transferable.141 On the other side, this concern involves 
whether there is a contractual term in the contract between C and D that prohibits 
assignment of the receivables. If C assigns the receivables contrary to a non-assignment 
clause, it is a matter of a governing substantive law as to whether such assignment will 
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be invalidated or not.142  It is the issue of a non-assignment clause written into the 
original contract creating the receivables assigned. To find a governing substantive law 
for questions relating to the object of assignment, there is just one important factor in 
common which is also the nub of the problem. That is, they all focus on the receivables. 
This is the main reason why the law that creates the receivables purported to be 
assigned is the most appropriate applicable law. All of the questions in this context are 
about how the relationships between persons who become involved with the assigned 
receivables, i.e. rights to receive payment, should be legally managed and regulated. It 
is not merely about the relationship between two parties to the assignment, but directly 
involves the receivables that one wants to transfer. This point includes legal matters that 
are subject to the law C and A are unable to agree between themselves. They, by 
contrast, have to accept them as they are concluded by C and D. And this includes the 
applicable law.   
(2) Relationship of rights relating to the debtor  
As opposed to the property-contract approach where receivables are seen as an item of 
property,143 the rights-based approach regards receivables as contractual rights or claims 
that must be asserted against a person who is subject to that right and has a contractual 
obligation to make payment. That person is a debtor or debtors. The purpose of a 
contract for the assignment of receivables is to make a transfer of those rights effective 
against both the debtor and third parties. In relation to the debtor, the rights assigned are 
contractual rights to payment claimable only against him.144 To achieve the purpose of 
an assignment for which an assignee shall obtain a benefit of the right assigned, any 
receivables transferred by way of assignment must affect the debtor subject to those 
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receivables. It is inevitable that this must happen to the debtor who has a contractual 
obligation to pay. This effect is basically that the debtor will pay for the benefit of the 
assignee instead of the assignor. The assignment therefore results in not only purely 
inter partes effects between assignor and assignee, but also effects on the debtor. 
Considering this point from a property-contract perspective, no clear distinction can be 
made as to whether the effects on the debtor relate to the contractual or proprietary 
aspects of assignment.145 In terms of the rights-based approach, it is a quasi-internal 
effect of the assignment that extends beyond the scope of the contractual relations 
between assignor and assignee. This is not a proprietary effect of the assignment, but a 
triangular relation resulting from it. Put simply, it is the way assignment is. The rights-
based approach concentrates on the object of assignment and the person subject to it. 
These are, respectively, the receivables and the debtor. It is contractual, not proprietary, 
based rules that play a significant part in this context.146  
Legal issues arising from assignment in relation to the debtor can be listed as:  
(d) Assignability of receivables; 
(e) Problems concerning a non-assignment clause;   
(f) Notice of assignment;   
(g) Relationship between creditor (assignor) and debtor;   
(h) Relationship between assignee and debtor.   
With regard to receivables, they are contractual rights to payment formed by a contract 
between C and D. Hence they shall, in terms of conflict-of-law principles, be governed 
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by the law of the contract creating them.147  This is the law that grants them legal 
appearance and guarantees their legal effectivenesses. Without such law, they will have 
no existence and will not be able to become the object of assignment. The underlying 
reason is that receivables are not property in a real sense. Right to payments created by 
contracts which are validly made in the eyes of the governing law are their only 
essential elements. Once those rights to payment are assigned, it is this law that shall be 
maintained to attach to them and follow their transfer. This is so as continuously to 
ascertain their legal existence. It is therefore the law of the contract that gives birth to 
those receivables – or, in other terms, the law of the receivables assigned, or the law of 
the obligations, or the law of the claims – that shall apply to legal issues concerning 
their substance.148 This of course includes issues of assignability (d).  
Regarding the debtor – the person subject to the receivables purported to be assigned – 
there are other legal issues that have to be considered. From a debtor’s viewpoint, there 
are three distinguishable aspects he is concerned with. For conflict-of-laws purposes, 
each individual aspect can lead to a separate set of legal questions. Those three aspects 
are debtor and assignment, debtor and assignor, and debtor and assignee.     
(2.1) Debtor and assignment  
After an assignment has been concluded by C and A, a principal concern in the eyes of 
D is what impact it is likely to have on him. One important question is to whom D has 
to pay his debts under the receivables in order to get a good discharge. The notice of 
assignment given to D, issue (f), is a vital matter in this context. Taking English law as 
an example, as long as D has not been given notice he can fulfil his obligation by 
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paying C.149 After receiving notice, D can only get a good discharge by paying A. 
Another problem here concerns a non-assignment clause (e). If there is such a clause in 
the original contract, a question is whether its effect will allow D to ignore the 
assignment. Under the Receivables Convention, an assignment is effective between C 
and A irrespective of a non-assignment clause.150 Although C may be liable for the 
breach of such a clause according to the law governing the contract, D cannot invoke 
violation of the non-assignment clause against A.151 Under English law, the effect of a 
non-assignment clause is a question of the construction of the contract.152 Its effect 
depends on how the non-assignment clause is framed by the original contract creating 
the receivables purported to be assigned. A non-assignment can either: firstly, not 
invalidate the assignment between C and A but only give rise to a claim by D against C 
for damages for breach of the prohibition clause; secondly, only invalidate the 
assignment so as to entitle D to pay the receivables to C but not impact on the sole 
relation made between C and A; thirdly, preclude C not only from assigning the 
receivables to A but also agreeing to account to A for the benefits of the original 
contract received from D; or fourthly, constitute a defence entitling D to terminate the 
original contract, refuse to make payment and claim for damages.153  
(2.2) Debtor and assignor  
As for the legal issues between D and C, (g), it is certain that their relations are formed 
and remain based on the original contract creating the receivables. After assignment, 
however, further legal problems arise. Firstly, if A decides to make the assignment 
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notwithstanding the non-assignment clause specified in the original contract concluded 
with D, a question between C and D is if there be any consequences from doing this. 
According to the Receivables Convention, the question of whether D is able to ask C to 
answer for any liability or any remedy for a breach of contract is subject to the 
applicable law of the original contract.154 Under English law, for example, the answer 
depends on the construction of the non-assignment clause. It could generally be said 
that D will have a right to claim damages for such a breach of contract from C.155  
The next series of legal questions is about the extent to which the relationship between 
C and D is impacted upon by the assignment. Basically, it is certain that the relationship 
between C and D remains based on the original contract creating the receivables 
assigned.156 The question, however, concerns the scope of their remaining rights and 
obligations under that contract. One issue is the right to modify the contract, particularly 
if such modification might have some negative impacts on A’s rights. Considering the 
Receivables Convention, this issue is covered based on the factor of notification of the 
assignment. If a modification is concluded before notice, it will be effective against 
A.157 By contrast, if the modification is concluded after notice, it will be ineffective – 
unless A consents to it, or the receivables are not fully earned by performance and either 
modification is provided for in the original contract or, in the context of the original 
contract, a reasonable assignee would consent to the modification.158 Another issue is to 
what extent will D be able to obtain a good discharge by paying C. The answer, again, 
depends on notice of the assignment. According to the Receivables Convention, D is 
entitled to be discharged by paying C in accordance with the original contract until he 
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receives notice. After receiving notice, D is only discharged by paying A or as 
otherwise instructed.159  Under English law, notice of assignment is also a decisive 
factor both for the problem of modifying and the question of D’s right to pay C. As a 
general rule, it is proclaimed that ‘after notice of the assignment, [D] cannot do anything 
to diminish the rights of [A]’160 After notice, D can neither continue to pay C nor vary 
the original contract to the detriment of A. Leaving the reason for notice aside, the 
underlying reason for this rule is because A is taking the receivables – i.e. the 
contractual right to receive a payment – which are vulnerable to rights and obligations 
under the contract creating them. This vulnerability includes the modification of that 
contract.161 Notice of assignment is thus a way to balance the interests of D and A. 
(2.3) Debtor and assignee   
More complicated legal questions concern the legal status of D and A, (h) above. A 
principal legal issue affecting A and D as a result of assignment is the enforceability of 
the assigned receivables. According to the rights-based approach, this is not a 
proprietary effect of assignment. It is a relationship of rights resulting from the 
assignment of receivables. This relationship is based on and links the assignment 
contract and the assigned receivables. 
From A’s perspective, the question is how and to what extent A can obtain or enforce 
the assigned receivables against D. In terms of substantive law, A certainly has a right 
to receive payment and any proceeds thereof from the receivables assigned to him.162 
A’s rights are based on the extent of the assigned receivables and the obligations 
                                                             
159
 Arts 17(1)–(2); UNCITRAL, Explanatory note by the UNCITRAL secretariat on the United Nations 
Convention on the Assignment of Receivables in International Trade (n 73) para 37. 
160
 Tolhurst (n 21) 416; Smith (n 11) 375–359; see also Roxburghe v Cox (1881) LR 17 Ch D 520, 526; Brice 
v Bannister (1878) 3 QBD 569, 577; The First National Bank of Chicago v The West of England Shipowners 
Mutual Protection and Indemnity Association (Luxembourg) (The Evelpidis Era) [1981] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 54, 
64. 
161
 Tolhurst (n 21) 416–419. 
162
 See art 14 of the Receivables Convention. 
219 
 
promised by D to C.163 Another problem here is the method of enforcing A’s rights. 
Under English law, for instance, in a case of legal assignment A can bring a legal action 
against D under his own name.164 In the case of an equitable assignment, however, 
taking C as a joinder of A seems to be a procedural requirement.165 In terms of conflict 
of laws, this enforcement problem depends on the governing procedural law. It is, as a 
matter of mandatory principle, subject to lex fori or the law of the court hearing the 
case.166 It is therefore outside the scope of choosing otherwise.  
Turning to D’s perspective, a substantial question concerns D’s legal position with 
respect to A. Apart from D’s right to be discharged from the receivables previously 
discussed in (2.1), here it is about D’s rights to a legal defence against A. These are the 
right to defence and the right to set-off. While allowing such an assignment and its 
impact on a debtor, it is at the same time that the principle of debtor protection is 
established.167 This is to prevent such a debtor from a severe effect that might result 
from the assignment. Considering the Receivables Convention, D is entitled to raise 
against A all the defences and rights of set-off arising from the original contract that D 
could have raised in a claim against C.168 Any other right of set-off could also be raised, 
provided that it is available at the time that a notice of assignment is received by D.169 
This position is, in general, similar to that of the English law of assignment where the 
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principle is that A’s right is subject to equities.170 According to this principle, D shall 
not be prejudiced by assignment. A will not be entitled to anything more than C first 
held. This principle also includes D’s rights to defence and set-off.171 
Considering (2.1), (2.2) and (2.3), investigated above, an additional problem is what the 
governing law is for each and every one of those legal matters. Focusing on the debtor 
subject to the object of assignment is the significant factor that all these problems have 
in common. They all involve, in various points, the debtor’s rights and obligations 
residing in the receivables assigned. They have their roots in the original contract 
creating the assigned receivables. Choosing the law of receivables assigned to govern 
them is reasonable. This choice matches with the present rule adopted by the property-
contract approach. It is the law that is imposed by both the Rome I Regulation and the 
Receivables Convention.172 Moreover, this choice reasonably stands alongside and 
supports the principle of debtor protection.173 Since an assignment can effectively be 
made by C and A without requiring D’s consent,174 forcing him to be subject to other 
laws might be seen as an unfair circumstance, particularly if the assignment is made on 
a non-notification basis where D might have no chance to know about the 
assignment.175 For D to be suitably protected, standing by the law that creates the 
assigned receivables as the applicable law for these legal issues is an appropriate 
position. It offers a balance between the free assignability of receivables and protection 
                                                             
170
 Peel and Treitel (n 11) 730; Tolhurst (n 21) ch 8(d); Smith (n 11) ch 13E; Guest (n 11) ch 7; for English 
cases law, see Mangles v Dixon (1852) 3 HLC 702, 731; Phillips v Phillips (1861) 45 ER 1164, 1166; Phipps 
v Lovegrove (1871) LR 16 Eq 80, 88. 
171
 See Roxburghe v Cox (1881) LR 17 Ch D 520, 526 (James LJ); Biggerstaff v Rowatt’s Wharf Ltd [1896] 2 
Ch 93; also Smith (n 11) 365–392; Tolhurst (n 21) 426–466. 
172
 Respectively art 14(2) and art 29; for English common law, see Dicey, et al. (n 4) rule 135(1)(b). 
173
 FMLC, Issue121: Suggestions for Amendments to Articles 7 and 13 (n 67).  
174
 Mulkerrins v PricewaterhouseCoopers [2003] 1 WLR 1937 (Lord Millet); Southway Group Ltd v Wolff 
and Wolff [1991] 28 ConLR 109 (Bingham LJ). 
175
 Goode and McKendrick (n 101) 788-789; Smith (n 11) 215–218; Akseli, International secured 
transactions law: facilitation of credit and international conventions and instruments (n 66) 28.  
221 
 
of the debtor’s legitimate rights.176 This reasoning supports applying the law of the 
assigned receivables to legal relations as they affect D with either C or A.  
Additionally, there exists a rationality which should be noted here regarding notice of 
assignment. Subject to the property-contract consideration, the notice requirement can 
be regarded as either contractual or proprietary in character.177 No clear conflict-of-law 
rules can be set. Considering the rights-based approach where a proprietary aspect is no 
longer in the picture, the notice of assignment shall be regarded as contractual in 
character. It is an additional tool for transferring rights to payment by way of 
assignment. The result of notice is to affect D’s legal position in connection with the 
receivables assigned.178 The law of the assigned receivables is therefore the law that 
shall govern any legal matters regarding notice of assignment, e.g. whether it is legally 
required and what its legal effects are. It is this law that will give a debtor, in advance, 
background knowledge as to whether there will be a possibility that he will receive 
notice if an assignment is agreed, hence providing him with proper legal protection 
regarding his obligations.   
(3) Relationship of rights against third parties 
The assignment of receivables creates also legal effects against third parties who are not 
parties to the assignment contract nor the debtor of the assigned claims. They are, for 
example, creditors of the assignor.179 This is probably the most complicated legal aspect 
of assignment. According to the property-contract approach, this is where a contractual 
assignment of contractual receivables will be regarded as a transfer of items of property, 
hence being able to constitute proprietary effects erga omnes, the result of which is 
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beyond the reach of the contractual domain of assignment.180 This aspect is regarded by 
the property-contract approach as a proprietary effect of assignment.181 Considering the 
rights-based approach, an argument to be made to the contrary is that there is no need 
for this effect of assignment to be resorted to for such proprietary establishment. Its 
logic can reasonably be found from contractual explanations on the basis of rights 
transferring. On this principle, the third-party effects of an assignment are the external 
effects of this method of transfer. For an assignment to achieve its goals, it is inevitable 
that the effectiveness of assignment against third parties must be established. It is for an 
assignee’s rights, which have been intentionally and voluntarily assigned by an 
assignor, to be protected against any invocation of third persons, and to obtain the 
benefit of the receivables assigned. Rights against third parties are therefore to serve and 
to protect the main concept and purpose of the assignment, i.e. transferring rights 
effectively.182  
The most challenging and problematic point of the conflict of laws regulating the 
assignment of receivables lie in this section. Unlike the previous two sections which 
limit their scope internally within the triangular relationship,183 this aspect is where 
assignment has an external effect on the world at large. Legal issues in this context are 
as follows:  
 (i) Third-party effects of assignment or, in other words, the assignee’s rights 
against creditors or insolvency representatives of the assignor;  
 (j) Priority. 
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(3.1) Effectiveness of assignment against third parties  
Third parties (T) are, in principle, persons whose rights might be in conflict with the 
rights of A. They are, for example, creditors and insolvency representatives of C. The 
question of conflict of laws regarding the third-party effectiveness of assignment, (i), 
concerns what law shall decide whether the assignment concluded by A with C can 
affect T and whether A can assert his rights against T or not. According to the property-
contract approach, this is a problem of distinguishing between the contractual and 
proprietary aspects of assignment. This is a problem of characterisation which is not 
easy to resolve with certainty. 184  It is the idea of erga omnes effects based on a 
proprietary or in rem right in a tangible property that is employed to offer an 
explanation of this effect.185  The property-contract approach sees rights in assigned 
receivables as property rights capable of affecting anybody.186  Conflict-of-law rules 
based on property, such as the lex situs of receivables and the law of a debtor’s location, 
are thus taken into consideration. An example of this can controversially be extracted 
from English common law, before the arrival of European rules.187 However, these two 
choices do not go along with the true legal nature of assignment. Later, they are strongly 
contested, hence they are not a viable solution at the present time.188   
The rights-based approach does not see it that way. An assignment of receivables is by 
its very nature a transfer of contractual rights to payment, and not of property. 
Recognising the effectiveness of transferring the right to payment from C to A as the 
main purpose of an assignment, it is necessary that those rights which are assigned to A 
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must be vested in him effectively. He must be able to assert – against not only C but 
also T – that he holds the right to receive payment in the receivables assigned.189 Legal 
protection for A’s rights has to be granted. The law needs to ensure that, on one side, A 
will be able to obtain the benefit of the receivables assigned to him and, on the other 
side, that no one else will seize or snatch it from him. Otherwise, the aim of the 
assignment cannot be reached. Third-party effects of assignment are indeed created by 
the substantive law of assignment to affirm and protect A’s rights.190 In this way, the 
extent of A’s rights is expandable against T. This issue basically concerns the external 
validity of assignment. From A’s viewpoint, a question is how to make an assignment 
effective against T, whether any special or additional methods are required in order for 
him to constitute or ensure such effects. From T’s perspective, a question is the extent to 
which A’s rights can effectively be invoked against him. In the rights-based approach, it 
is the law that grants those rights to A that shall govern the matter. The next question is 
what is the law of the rights?    
An important question prior to choosing an applicable law is where those rights come 
from. What is their most appropriate connecting factor that shall point to the most 
appropriate governing law? Based on the rights-based approach, to choose a governing 
law is to choose the law that governs those rights. As a matter of principle, A’s rights 
substantially link to the law of the assigned rights plus the legal effects created by the 
law of assignment. It is not merely the results of the law creating the assigned rights that 
constitute third-party effects by themselves. Merely contractual receivables cannot have 
such erga omnes consequences. Third-party effects are, in fact, consequential outcomes 
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of the substantive law of assignment.191 Its purpose is to guarantee the external effects 
of assignment and to serve as one of the final goals of assignment. It is thus the law of 
the assignment contract that shall be the conflict-of-law rule governing this matter.192 
Assume that T, a creditor of C, wants to attach receivables or claims that C has over D, 
but the receivables have already been assigned by C to A. The question in terms of 
conflict of laws is which law shall determine whether A has acquired the right over 
those receivables, the result of which can be invoked against T. The same question also 
occurs where C goes bankrupt and T is instead his insolvency representative.193 In the 
rights-based approach, this is a legal problem of whether A has taken every necessary 
step to make his rights assertable against T, or whether T holds an overriding right 
against A.194 The question also arises as to whom between A and T is entitled to the 
receivables. The fundamental issue concerns the effectiveness of A’s rights resulting 
from the assignment against T. It must be said that this is an effect originated by the 
substantive law of assignment. It is neither the law of the receivables, nor the law of C’s 
location that grants A’s rights against T. 
The method of the rights-based approach corresponds to the contractual approach 
adopted by Mance LJ in the Raiffeisen case. 195  The difference is that Mance LJ 
considers this problem of whom D has to pay according to the law of receivables, 
though it is the same as the law of assignment. This is correct, but only in terms of D’s 
obligations to A. It does not seem to be so when the problem concerns A and T.196 The 
rights-based approach gives weight to the law of assignment since this is the law that 
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stands at the core of the dispute between A’s rights and T who tries to override them. If 
no assignment contract exists, there will be no such dispute. Additionally, the outcome 
of the rights-based approach corresponds to the decision of the Dutch Supreme Court in 
the Hansa case.197 In this case, the law of assignment was decided on to govern the 
validity of an assignment, even against a third party, i.e. the liquidator of C.198 But from 
T’s perspective, the law of the assignment contract is not foreseeable until the contract 
has been concluded. And to know exactly what that law is, he has to resort to the 
assignment which is a bilateral relationship between A and C. It might therefore seem 
inconvenient for T to be subject to this law.199 However, an account must be given of 
the underlying reason for this choice rather than an individual’s concern. The 
foundation of the legal questions involving T is the external legitimacy of an assignment 
of receivables which generates external effects against third persons. Such effects 
cannot occur without resorting to and relying on the law that applies to the assignment. 
This is the core substance of this matter, hence it is a weighty foundation for the chosen 
conflict-of-law rule.200 Selecting otherwise would thus be unsensible.  
(3.2) Priority issues 
Turning to priority issues, (j), this occur when there is more than one assignment. To 
decide these issues, the problem in the conflict of laws is what law shall determine 
which assignees competing over assignments will have a better right over assigned 
receivables. If the property-contract approach is considered, this problem is again 
characterised as a proprietary aspect of assignment as it concerns the proprietary rights 
of an assignee against others.201 In the rights-based approach, the method to choose a 
governing law for this dispute comes from the same methodology as that for third-party 
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effectiveness of an assignment. But, in this circumstance, there are two or more 
assignment contracts and each contract can be subject to a different choice of laws. 
There can thus be more than one substantive law of assignment to consider. However, 
the correct question is not how many laws of assignment there are. It is a question of 
what law shall decide whether the existence of a competing assignment over the same 
rights residing in the same receivables is possible and what the legal consequences of 
this are. Assignment is a method of transferring receivables by way of a contract. 
However many assignment contracts are made for the same receivables, each and every 
assignment contract is required to comply with a governing substantive law. Certainly, a 
prior assignment as well as a subsequent one cannot be made if there is no act or 
consent of C. From C’s perspective, the question at the beginning is the legal possibility 
of subsequently making another assignment to another assignee (A2), after already 
assigning the same receivables to the first assignee (A1). To put it differently, does C, 
after the first assignment, still hold the right to assign? According to English law, for 
example, an assignment of receivables is considered as an exception to the property rule 
of nemo dat quod non habet, or no one gives what he does not have.202 This is the 
reason why C can make a second assignment, despite the fact that after the first 
assignment he should not have anything left to assign. This is an issue of the 
assignability of receivables. A preliminary answer to the choice-of-law rule for the 
priority dispute is thus rather obvious, it is the law of the right assigned – not the law of 
the assignment – that should regulate this matter. It could be said that, in reverse, if this 
law does prohibit a second or subsequent assignment, a priority dispute will not arise.   
Considering also the core substantive question of a priority dispute, it is the question of 
who, among competing assignees, has a prior right to receive payment for the 
receivables assigned. What is the legal rule that will be applied to answer this question? 
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In terms of conflict of laws, the key question is what is the governing law of the dispute. 
The rights-based approach classes the priority issue not as a proprietary matter but as a 
matter of an assignee’s right to receive payment subject to the assigned receivables. 
This is a dispute among the assignees’ rights, i.e. between A1 and A2, who has a better 
right?203 This question is all about the assignee’s right to be entitled to the interests 
assigned to him. These interests are the receivables which are the object of competing 
assignments. The law of the receivables or the law that creates the assigned receivables 
is the common core of this question. It is the law that governs the assigned receivables 
which are originally the source of the assignor’s rights and the debtor’s obligations and 
subsequently constitute the interests assigned to the assignees. It is the law that grants 
the assignor’s right to make a subsequent assignment. It is also the law that every 
assignment relates to and every assignee shares in common, thus being able to provide a 
single answer to the question of which assignee has a prior right. It is therefore 
appropriate and fair to prioritise this problem to be decided by reference to this law.204  
An example of this choice-of-law rule can be seen in a judgment made by the German 
Supreme Court (Bundesgerichtshof).205 Based on the facts of the case, C assigned his 
claim to payment under a shipbuilding contract twice: first, to a supplier (A1); and then 
to a bank (A2). Regarding the priority issue as one of the proprietary aspects of the 
assignment, the Court held that the question of whom, between A1 and A2, would 
obtain priority over the assigned claim was governed by the law applicable to the right 
to which the assignment relates. This means the law of the assigned receivables. Despite 
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the difference in approach, the decision of this case corresponds to the law proposed by 
the rights-based approach. Again, this is a sign demonstrating that treating an 
assignment as the transfer of a right to payment as its true nature does not affect the 
outcome of the case. The proprietary regime of the property-contract approach to 
conflict-of-law rules for assignment tends to make things more complicated and, as 
such, may not be so desirable.   
 
5.3 Summary remarks 
As a general principle, the assignment of receivables is a contract purporting to transfer 
the right to payments against a debtor from creditor, or assignor, to assignee. It creates 
not only a triangular relationship among these three persons, but also has external 
effects invokable against third parties. This is the true legal nature and function of 
assignment. It is not a hybrid of contract and property. The choice-of-law rules 
suggested by the property-contract approach do not reflect the true legal nature of 
assignment. As a matter of substantive law, the rights-based approach establishes that, 
firstly, the gist of receivables is contractual rights to monetary payment as originated by 
the contract between assignor and debtor. They are contractual rights against specific 
persons, and not proprietary rights in specific property against the whole world. 
Secondly, the assignment of receivables is a transfer of those contractual rights. The 
result of such assignment creates three legal relationships of rights: rights between 
assignor and assignee, rights against debtor, and rights against third parties. As a matter 
of conflict of laws, conflict-of-law rules based on the rights-based approach are 
developed on the ground of the substantive legal nature of assignment. They are 
proposed on the basis of the relationships of rights arising from assignment. In the 
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rights-based approach, the legal issues flowing from the assignment of receivables have 
four main categories, and each category is governed by the following laws:  
- The relationship between assignor and assignee, by the law of assignment; 
- The relationship between assignee and debtor, or between assignor and debtor, 
by the law that creates the assigned receivables;  
- The relationship of assignee and third parties, by the law of assignment; 
- Priority issues, by the law that creates the assigned receivables.   
Considering also the hypothetical questions about assignment, the result this 
methodology achieves confirms the proposed choices for governing laws. Contract or 
property is not the right question and not the most appropriate way of treating an 
assignment. Focusing on the real substance of the legal problems arising out of 
assignment is more appropriate. No characterisation problem between contractual and 
proprietary matter arises. It leads straightforwardly to the most appropriate connecting 
factor, conflict-of-laws rules and solutions. This can effectively be reached via the 
rights-based approach, and not by the property-contract approach. To support this 
remark, more analysis of the rights-based approach is conducted in the next chapter.     
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CHAPTER 6: RETHINKING CONFLICT OF LAWS FOR THE ASSIGNMENT 
OF RECEIVABLES: THE RIGHTS-BASED APPROACH 
 
After considering, in the previous chapters, legal principles and explanations by way of 
a comparison between the property-contract approach and the rights-based approach to 
conflict of laws relating to the assignment of receivables, the analysis of this subject 
continues. The main focus in this chapter is on the rights-based approach to conflict of 
laws for assignment. Here, it is analysed in terms of both legal principles and legal 
practice. The effects or impacts that might arise from legal theories and in financial 
practice if this approach is to be adopted are examined. Its aim is to consider the role of 
conflict-of-law rules in an international context and to evaluate the advantages and 
disadvantages, if any, of rules based on a rights-based approach. As a consequence, it 
will demonstrate and provide supporting reasons why the rights-based approach should 
be applied to assignment, instead of the property-contract one.    
To rethink conflict of laws for the assignment of receivables, this chapter is structured 
as three parts. The first part is an analysis of legal principles based on the rights-based 
approach. The second is a practical analysis of the rights-based approach. The final part 
draws a conclusion to the chapter. 
 
6.1 Legal-principles perspective 
In terms of legal principles, the rights-based approach establishes that an assignment of 
receivables is a transfer of rights. By rights, it covers both the contractual and 
proprietary rights categorised by the property-contract approach. The rights-based 
approach responds to the real and substantive legal nature of assignment. It is a way to 
harmonise and modernise the law of assignment. Conflict-of-law rules based on the 
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rights-based approach can manage legal issues flowing from assignment with no 
characterisation difficulties between contract and property. These positive propositions 
are explained below.    
  
6.1.1 Rights-based approach to substantive law on the assignment of receivables 
(1) The rights-based approach is consistent with the legal nature of 
assignment 
The assignment of receivables is a method for transferring contractual rights to 
payments claimable against a debtor from assignor to assignee. The result of such 
assignment is a bundle of rights which creates both internal and external effects for 
relevant persons. While the internal effect is a consequence of the contractual ties 
between assignor, assignee and debtor, the external one which affects third persons is a 
special result of the law of assignment. Receivables which are the object of assignment 
are contractual rights or interests recognised by law and enforceable by legal action.1 
From a theoretical viewpoint, a receivable is an interest in a contract and not in a 
property.2 It is a contractual right originated by a contract between creditor and debtor. 
Its legal existence depends upon the legal validity of such contract. Without this 
acknowledgement, there is no right to transfer, and hence no assignment can be 
formulated. Considering the legal substance of a receivable, its legal nature is nothing 
but a relationship involving a contractual right between persons. According to Kelsen,3 
this right of a creditor is merely an obligation on the other individual or individuals, i.e. 
a debtor or debtors. This right, in terms of a legal relationship, is merely a reflection of 
this obligation. ‘The “subject” in this relationship is only the obligated individual 
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[debtor] – the one who can violate or fulfil the obligation by his behaviour.’4 It is a 
claim that must be asserted against a debtor, if necessary by legal action. This is a 
reason to explain where the English words, chose in action, come from.5 A receivable is 
a thing that cannot be possessed. It is indeed a legally recognised right of action which 
‘can only be claimed or enforced by legal action and not by taking physical 
possession’.6    
Assigning a receivable is therefore a transfer of such rights in receivables from creditor 
to assignee. Assignment is a contractual method whereby the interests which are 
monetary payments subject to the original contract originating the receivables are 
transferred.7 The legal recognition and existence of the assigned receivables are passed 
from assignor to assignee. The interest the assignee receives must conform to the legal 
obligations of the debtor. This is where the logic of the principle of debtor protection, or 
the English doctrine that the right of an assignee is subject to equities, lies. 8 
Assignment, in this view, creates a legal interaction between debtor and assignee. 
Regarding the third-party effects of assignment and the priority issue, explanations can 
be formed against this background. Receivables are legally protected contractual 
interests. As has been expressed, ‘the right of a creditor is his interests protected by the 
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legal obligation of the debtor’. 9  After assignment, an assignee shall receive the 
contractual interest formerly being in the assignor’s reach. Its result is that legally 
protected contractual interests are transferred to the assignee. Firstly, on the same 
principle as for the assignor, the assignee’s rights are interests which are protected by a 
legal obligation of the debtor. This is one of the internal effects relating to the original 
contract originating the assigned receivables. Secondly, the law of assignment also 
provides the assignee with further legal protection. His rights, if perfectly formed, shall 
be good against a third person such as a creditor of the assignor.10 That is to say, after 
assignment, the title to the contractual interests not longer belongs to the assignor, hence 
beyond reach of his creditor, since it has been transferred to the assignee. This is 
outright assignment. In the case of a security assignment, the title to the contractual 
interests is not transferred but is used as security to give the assignee a priority right 
over the receivables.11 As a result of assignment, the assignee acquires legal protection 
against anyone who attempts to override or compete with his rights. If an attempt made 
by a third party to contest the assignee’s rights is not successful, the contractual interests 
over the receivables shall be securely within the assignee’s reach. Decisions on the 
assignee’s rights and their effectiveness against a third party are subject to the 
substantive law of assignment.12 It is not the concept of property ownership, but a legal 
process with reasoning provided by the law of assignment.13 It is not a proprietary 
explanation under property law that needs to be established to serve as a descriptive 
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taxonomy for the third-party effectiveness of assignment and the priority problem. By 
contrast, it is, on the one hand, the law of assignment that gives and guarantees such 
effectiveness and, on the other, the law of assigned rights that makes competing 
assignments possible. 14  Theoretically, the underlying purpose is to guard a legally 
protected contractual interest of the assignee. And this is one of the main functions of 
the law of assignment.  
(2) The rights-based approach is a way to modernise and harmonise the law 
of assignment 
Considering an assignment of receivables as a transfer of contractual rights to payment 
according to its true legal nature creates an opportunity to modernise and harmonise this 
complex area of law once and for all. On a legal foundation, it is widely accepted that 
assignment is the transfer of a contractual right. Evidence of this can be seen in various 
transnational instruments, the purpose of which is to promote the modernisation and 
harmonisation of laws on assignment. In Europe, assignment is referred to by the PECL 
as the assignment by agreement of a right to performance (or claim) under a contract.15 
By the same token, under the DCFR, the term assignment of rights is used to deal with 
the assignment, by a contract, of a right to performance of an obligation.16 Applying 
these established principles with reference to receivables, rights to performance are 
rights to the payment of receivables.17 A similar foundation can also be found in an 
international context. The Principles use the term assignment of rights as a basis for 
defining and developing legal rules for the transfer by agreement from assignor to 
assignee of the assignor’s right to payment of a monetary sum (or receivable) from an 
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obligor (or debtor).18 This foundation is in line with the rule adopted in international 
conventions such as the Factoring Convention and the Receivables Convention.19 The 
wording might be slightly different, but the meaning is the same. They all refer to the 
transfer of a right to payment of a monetary obligation.  
However, it is regrettable that most of these conventions and instruments do not address 
anything concerning the most problematic field of assignment, i.e. the legal issues 
regarding the third-party effectiveness of assignment and priority. There is a clear 
impression of incompleteness linked to them, hence decreasing the principal solution 
and its practical value.20 The difficulty in regulating these issues is largely due to the 
fact that they are classified as proprietary. 21  At this stage, a foundation under the 
property-contract approach that assignment is the transfer of property cannot be 
harmonisingly established at an international level. Property law elements in legal 
jurisdictions comprise different models and various mandatory rules. They present 
themselves as a harmonisation obstacle to the law of assignment.22 It is not an easy task 
to make the property law of a jurisdiction consistent enough to support international 
assignment. The attempts to promote international modernisation and harmonisation of 
the law of assignment are, in principle, forced to end here.23  
The rights-based approach proposes a different methodology. The foundation that 
assignment is a transfer of rights is not only a definition of assignment but its true 
nature. This shall not remain merely an opening statement for the law of assignment like 
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the conventions and instruments mentioned. The substantive aspects of assignment shall 
be classified as a transfer of rights all the way through, even when facing legal matters 
concerning the assignee’s rights against third parties, i.e. the third-party effectiveness of 
assignment and priority issues. In the rights-based approach, it does not matter whether 
these matters are contractual or proprietary. The important thing is to have the 
assignee’s rights against third parties established and recognised in a legal system.24 
This means a significant legal framework that shall support international assignments of 
receivables. Rights against third parties are one of the classes of rights between persons 
who are assignees and third parties, like an assignor’s creditors and other assignees of 
the same receivables. They shall be treated as such, which is a departure from being 
seen as proprietary matters under traditional property law.  
The rights-based approach brings the law of assignment into a single approach in light 
of the relationship of rights resulting from assignment. It creates a common 
methodology for the law of assignment, hence bridging the lacuna in the law of 
jurisdiction, the cause of which comes from the proprietary aspects of assignment, i.e. 
third-party effectiveness and priority issues. 25  By taking a substantial stand on the 
ground of contract law, the harmonisation of which has already made far more progress 
than the property area,26 the rights-based approach grants an opportunity to make the 
law of assignment harmonisable. As a consequence, it shall support the availability of 
credit by way of adequately accommodating the assignment of receivables in an 
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international context.27 The rights-based approach is the way to achieve this ultimate 
goal. 
 
6.1.2 Rights-based approach to conflict of laws for the assignment of receivables 
(1) The rights-based approach is a way to solve the characterisation 
difficulties of assignment 
Characterisation is part of the conflict of law’s legal methodology. Its function is to 
classify and allocate a question raised by the facts of a given case to an appropriate 
juridical concept or legal category.28 The object of this process is to reveal relevant 
conflict-of-law rules.29 In applying it, the property-contract approach requires a question 
raised by the assignment of receivables to be classified as either contract or property.30 
This application leads to further complications where a clear answer cannot be provided 
since a line between contract and property cannot be clearly drawn. Uncertainty in 
characterising the legal issues arising out of the assignment is thus a negative outcome. 
A leading and concrete example can be seen in the debate surrounding the decision of 
Mance LJ in Raiffeisen Zentralbank Österreich AG v Five Star General Trading LLC.31 
It is here that a legal question of assignment formerly regarded as proprietary was 
recharacterised as being within the contractual category.32 That question involves the 
validity of an assignment and the right of an assignee as it affects a third party – creditor 
of the assignor. A consequence of the property-contract approach is that no one can 
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predict how a court will proceed in the future. Will it be contract or property rules that 
will be applied by a court hearing a case? Will it be similar to or different from the 
understanding of the parties to an assignment? This creates a recharacterisation risk in 
conflict of laws.33 As has been submitted, ‘rules are important [in] so far as they help 
you to predict what judges will do. That is their importance.’34 So, what function and 
purpose does the rule of characterisation serve if it is neither certain nor predictable.  
Aiming to resolve such complication and create certainty and predictability, the rights-
based approach proposes fully to unite the contractual and proprietary character of 
assignment as the transfer of a contractual right to payment. An assignment of 
receivables is all along a transfer of intangible rights. It is not a hybrid of contract and 
property. The things transferred by way of assignment are only legal existences, and 
hence only capable of legal movement.35 Their legal existence is a contractual right to 
payment, and their legal movement is an assignment. This is not a physical movement 
of physical property. Legal issues flowing from assignment direct towards and gather 
around the transfer of contractual rights, not a combination of contractual and 
proprietary rights. This is the core concept of the rights-based approach. In it, any 
questions flowing from assignment shall be combined and classified as a problem of 
transferring a contractual right to payment, the effectiveness of which is capable of 
affecting not only contracting parties but also related third persons. This is a new legal 
concept of assignment which is based on the true legal nature of assignment itself. 
Characterisation between contract and property is unnecessary here. The difficulties 
arising from it shall be disappeared. The rights-based approach is therefore a 
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methodology that solves the characterisation complexities of conflict of law relating to 
assignment.  
(2) The rights-based approach is appropriate for legal problems arising out 
of assignment 
Conflict of laws functions as a legal methodology to find an appropriate governing law 
for an international transaction. Technically, it imposes a connecting factor found by a 
natural connection between a factual situation and a particular system of law.36  A 
connecting factor, in other words, functions as a signpost when resolving a conflict of 
laws by pointing to an appropriate substantive law. For an international assignment of 
receivables, the rights-based approach is a new way of imposing a connecting factor and 
justifying it based on the true legal nature of assignment.  
The rights-based approach regards an assignment as the transfer of contractual rights to 
payment against a person (debtor) from one person (assignor or creditor) to another 
person (assignee). A legal issue resulting from assignment shall be categorised based on 
the relationship of relevant persons and the receivables assigned. This process shall 
determine whether that legal issue is an internal or external effect of the assignment. All 
that someone facing a legal issue of assignment has to do is identify it as a legal 
relationship of rights between relevant persons. A connecting factor is established 
accordingly. This method shall reveal a connection between the factual situation of a 
particular case and a particular governing law.  
For the internal effects of assignment, problems concerning the validity of an 
assignment, as between assignor and assignee, shall be governed by the law of the 
assignment contract. Since this is the law that transfers receivables from the former to 
the latter, it shall decide legal issues arising out of the relationship between them. 
Problems that relate to the relationship between assignor and debtor shall be resolved by 
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reference to the law of the contract between them. If the legal problem concerns an 
assignee’s rights against a debtor, a connecting factor that these two persons have in 
common and that links them together is the law of the contract that creates the assigned 
receivables. The legal issue between them shall thus be determined by this law.    
For external effects of assignment that concern legal problems regarding the third-party 
effectiveness of assignment and priority issues, an appropriate connecting factor draws 
on the interaction between relevant persons. The effectiveness of assignment against a 
third party, such as a creditor of the assignor, is created by the law that grants the 
external validity of the assignment. It is this law that results in a conflicting connection 
between the assignee and third parties. The law of the assignment contract shall thus be 
the applicable law. In the case of a priority question among competing assignees, there 
is only one factor that links them all together. That is the assigned receivables. In the 
rights-based approach, it is the law of the assigned receivables that shall apply to a 
question of who will have a prior right over the receivables assigned to them. This law 
shall answer a priority problem among the assignees.  
If the property-contract approach is considered, the legal issues arising from assignment 
must be first classified into property and contract categories. A connecting factor is 
found in each category. For instance, a proprietary issue would be decided by the law of 
lex situs of the assigned receivables, or the law of the debtor’s or assignor’s location, or 
even by the law of assignment; a contractual issue, by contrast, would be decided by the 
law of the assigned receivables or the law of assignment.37 Here again is where this 
approach largely relies on the characterisation of property and contract methodology. 
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The result of this, as analysed under the previous heading,38 creates further difficulties 
in the conflict-of-law rules regulating assignment. In contrast, characterising the legal 
matters of an assignment by identifying a legal relationship between relevant persons 
provides a clear and certain answer. It eliminates the characterisation difficulties 
resulting from the property-contract approach. This method is also in line with the true 
legal nature of assignment which is the transfer of a right against a person from one 
person to another, which as a result has a legal effect on a third party. The rights-based 
approach is therefore more appropriate for delivering an applicable law for a legal 
problem of an assignment rather than one that characterises it into proprietary and 
contractual matters. It points to the law of the assignment contract and the law of the 
assigned receivables which are the same laws currently applicable, for example, under 
the Rome I Regulation, Article 14. All that needs to be done is to ascertain that these 
choice-of-law rules could govern every aspect of assignment, notwithstanding that that 
aspect might be classified as proprietary by a member state’s law. To apply this 
approach in the context of European Union, only a clear indication based on the rights-
based approach has to be added on.  
 
6.2 Legal-practice perspective  
In terms of legal practice, the rights-based approach is one that sees the assignment of 
receivables in the overall picture of the circulation of a right to payment which is an 
asset in financial practice. It responds to both financial transactions and financial 
businesses in which the law of assignment of receivables is utilised. Both an assignment 
of future receivables and bulk assignments of receivables can operate through this 
approach. Business practices are not undermined but clarified and supported by the 
rights-based approach. The positive prospects are examined below.  
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6.2.1 Rights-based approach to receivables financing transactions 
(1) The rights-based approach can deal with the assignment of future 
receivables 
The term ‘future receivable’ is generally defined by the Receivables Convention as ‘a 
receivable that arises after conclusion of the contract of assignment’.39 Article 8 of this 
Convention seeks to ensure that an assignment is not ineffective merely on the ground 
that it is an assignment of future receivables. The underlying policy is to set aside the 
legal limitations that a jurisdiction might have with respect to the assignability of future 
receivables.40 Allowing the assignment of future receivables varies among jurisdictions. 
If it is permitted, its governing rules still vary among those jurisdictions. The 
fundamental ground of this problem lies in the approach a jurisdiction uses to deal with 
this type of receivable. A problematic approach is that of property-contract. As a matter 
of property law, the effectiveness of an assignment of future receivables is not 
recognised by all legal systems.41 This is simply because ‘future property cannot be 
assigned for the simple reason that there is nothing to assign’.42 For instance, while 
English law regards it in equity as an agreement to assign which must be supported by 
consideration, German law generally allows it, but the situation in France and the 
Netherlands seems to be somewhat unclear.43  
Subject to the rights-based approach, an assignment of future receivables is an 
assignment of future rights to claim for payment. Compared with the property-contract 
                                                             
39
 Art 5(b). 
40
 UNCITRAL, Explanatory note by the UNCITRAL secretariat on the United Nations Convention on the 
Assignment of Receivables in International Trade (UN Publication 2004) para 26. 
41
 UNCITRAL, Receivables Financing: Analytical Commentary on the draft Convention on Assignment of 
Receivables in International Trade (A/CN.9/470) para 83. 
42
 M Bridge, ‘England and Wales’ in HC Sigman and EM Kieninger, Cross-Border Security over Receivables 
(Sellier 2009) 153.  
43
 See, respectively, ibid 153–156; JK Rakob, ‘Germany’ 98–102, J Leavy, ‘France’ 125–127 and S 
Timmermann and M Veder, Netherlands’ 203–204 in HC Sigman and EM Kieninger, Cross-Border 
Security over Receivables (Sellier 2009); also BIICL (n 37) part 4.4.  
244 
 
approach, it is not a future property that is assigned. The object that is assigned is, by 
contrast, a right to payment under a contract expected to be made and claimable in the 
future. This differs from a present right to future performance, in that the former is 
based on a contract not yet concluded whereas the latter comes from an already 
concluded contract. Future rights are, in other words, an expectancy that is purported to 
be assigned.44 Strictly speaking, under the rights-based approach, an assignment of a 
future receivable is a transaction whereby an assignor promises to assign his future 
rights to an assignee. As a result, it creates an assignor’s obligation to uphold such 
promise for an assignee’s rights under the assignment contract. Legally speaking, it is 
not a mere hope that is purported to be assigned. The assignor is bound by the 
assignment to perform an act that shall result in the receivables purported to be assigned 
being assigned. The future rights of the assignor are, as a matter of fact, grounded in his 
current going-concern business which subsequently becomes his present obligation 
bond by the assignment contract. Without such business, this legal topic could not have 
been raised. Considering the assignee’s part in terms of contractual practice, this is what 
the assignee bargains for and so agrees to the future turn of events. Here is where and 
why the assignment contract is made before the conclusion of the contract creating 
receivables. In this line of reasoning, a purported present assignment of sufficiently 
identifiable future rights to payment shall therefore be treated as an agreement to assign. 
This is not an assignment of what one does not yet have but a method whereby one can 
agree to assign what one will acquire in the future. By being sufficiently identifiable, it 
means that those receivables can be identified as receivables to which the assignment 
relates at the time of conclusion of the original contract.45 As long as the scope of 
receivables is agreed between assignor and assignee, and the assignment contract is 
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linked to it, the assignment of future receivables shall be effective.46 It shall be given 
automatic effect as soon as the future rights come into existence. This explanation is 
consistent with the English legal system, but without referring to the proprietary part.47 
It is an approach to future receivables assignment that can be adopted in jurisdictions, 
notwithstanding their mandatory property rules.  
Regarding conflict of laws for the assignment of future receivables, the legal questions 
which must be asked in order to find a governing law are: firstly, how a receivable is 
considered to be a future one; secondly, whether a future receivable may be assigned; 
and thirdly, are there any requirements to make the assignment effective. According to 
the rights-based approach, where a legal question is considered based on the legal 
relation of rights between persons, an applicable law for each of those legal questions is 
as follows. For the first question of what a future receivable is and the second question 
of assignability, it is unavoidable to state that they involve a contractual relationship 
that will be formed in the future between an assignor and his debtor. Since they concern 
the legal existence of the receivable, they shall be governed by the law of the contract 
creating it. This choice, as has been claimed, might lead to a problem in a situation 
where a contract creating such a receivable has not yet been concluded, as determining 
its governing law might be improbable.48 However, this concern is not always the case, 
nor the real problem. As a matter of practice, the assignment of a future receivable is a 
transaction that is based on an ongoing relationship of the assignor’s business, which is 
foreseeable to a certain extent. As a matter of law, a typical requirement is that that 
future receivable to which the assignment relates must, at least, be sufficiently 
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identifiable once it arises.49 A future receivable purported to be assigned as well as its 
applicable law is therefore not insufficiently unforeseeable. They will be revealed with 
certainty when that receivable comes into existence. After the conclusion of an 
assignment contract, the assignor is bound by it. One of his implied obligations is to 
conclude a contract that will bring the future receivable purported to be assigned into 
legal existence. If not, he must answer to the assignee. From the assignee’s viewpoint, 
this is what he transacts for. It is the risk he knows in advance, yet consents to bear. 
Moreover, according to the freedom of contract principle, there is no prohibition if the 
assignor and the assignee will contract a term agreeing in advance that when the 
assignor concludes a contract with his debtor what the choice of an applicable law will 
be. Sending legal matters concerning the assignment of a future receivable to be decided 
by any other law is thus not really a way out. Finally, for the third question about any 
requirements for the assignment of future receivables, this is a question that directs to 
the legal relationship between assignor and assignee. It also covers the consequences of 
assignment with regard to the assignee’s rights and third parties. As such, they shall be 
decided by reference to: for the requirements and the third-party effectiveness of 
assignment, the law of the assignment contract; and for priority issues, the law of the 
contract originating the receivables assigned.  
If a future receivable is to be assigned, it is impossible to deny that it shall depend on 
the law that creates the receivable and the law of the assignment contract. Contrary to 
this, choosing the law of the assignor’s location, as is frequently suggested by the 
property-contract approach, might be useful in this regard,50  but it is unsound and 
inconsistent with the legal logic of the substantive law of assignment. It seems that this 
choice is particularly relied on at the end if other choices look unpleasant and is done 
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solely to please financial practices such as factoring.51 It does not represent the true 
legal relations surrounding the assignment, nor answer all the questions relating to it. 
The problems of assignment will remain unsolved. It is therefore not easy to reach wide 
acceptance. The rights-based approach reasonably ensures that an assignment of future 
receivables is legally effective. With some resolvable difficulties, it supports future 
receivables financing in practice. Additionally, by applying the rights-based approach, it 
leads to a choice that does not differ from the case of an assignment of existing 
receivables. Distinctive treatment will not be required. Consistency and the uniformity 
of conflict-of-law rules regulating the assignment shall be a foreseeable outcome.  
(2) The rights-based approach can cope with bulk assignments of 
receivables 
The assignment of a single receivable can be simply conducted in general but, in 
financial practices, receivables are often traded in bulk, as when loans are securitised, or 
consumer receivables are sold to a factor.52  Bulk assignments of receivables are a 
transaction whereby two or more separate receivables, either existing or future, are put 
together in one assignment. 53  This is a situation where bundled receivables are 
transferred. Article 8 of the Receivables Convention is imposed to ensure that an 
assignment is not ineffective merely on the ground that it is an assignment of more than 
one receivable. In the same manner as for future receivables, this is because the 
effectiveness of bulk assignments, as a matter of property law, is not recognised in all 
legal systems. The policy behind the Convention is to promote the validity of the 
assignment of bundled receivables.54  
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In the rights-based approach, the assignment of bundled receivables is a transfer of a 
bundle of contractual rights to monetary payment against debtors from assignor to 
assignee. It does not concern any physical property of the assignor, but the rights 
originating from various contracts carried out through his business activities. The 
assignment contract in this circumstance functions as a master agreement that ties up 
receivables originating from different contractual relationships and transfers them 
altogether. The rule of law for this transaction can be established on the basis of 
contractual understanding, practice and law, irrespective of any counter area of 
proprietary kind. The following legal effects of bulk assignments of receivables shall, as 
a result, be in line with the assignment of a single receivable. A special additional 
attention on this matter should be recognised, but special distinctive treatment is 
superfluous. As the latter might result in unnecessary complexities between a single 
receivable assignment and bulk assignments, it is therefore not recommended.    
Besides the substantive aspect, one of the greatest difficulties regarding bulk 
assignments of receivables in the international scenario concerns their applicable law. 
Unlike the property-contract approach where the law of the assignor’s location has 
typically been suggested as a special rule for bulk assignments departing from a single 
assignment, the rights-based methodology points to the same treatment for these two 
types of assignment. The law of the contract originating the assigned receivables is the 
origin of the legal existence of those receivables. Functioning as a master agreement 
that ties up the assigned receivables, the assignment contract is a source that creates 
legal relationships not only between assignor and assignee, but also in respect of the 
debtors subject to those receivables and other third parties. For the relationship between 
assignor and assignee and the relationship of the assignee and third parties, it is 
therefore the law of the assignment contract that shall govern. For the relationship 
between assignee and debtors, as well as priority issues, they shall be governed by the 
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law of the assigned receivables. According to this, bringing conflict-of-law rules for 
bulk assignments into line with those for the assignment of a single receivable may be 
feasible.  
As has been commented, ‘[the assignor’s local law] has little or no connection with the 
relationship between an assignee and a third party to the assignment. The only 
justification for applying [it] is therefore that no other law can appropriately govern 
bulk assignments’.55 For a similar reason to that in the case of the assignment of future 
receivables, no legal foundation nor reasoning can be firmly established apart from a 
good end result that a choice might lead to. Such an outcome is however unlikely to be 
achieved. Increasing the transaction costs of a market practice is indicated as a negative 
aspect of this choice.56  It requires an assignee to make an enquiry regarding this law in 
addition to the law of the contract originating the receivables. An additional burden will 
certainly increase transaction costs. Setting up a specific conflict-of-law rule in a 
particular market sector might be needed to limit the application of the assignor’s local 
law. A further complication could thus result in some difficulty in characterising 
financial practice in a specific sector.  
Furthermore, the value of an assigned receivable is based on its enforceability against a 
debtor. To evaluate such value and ascertain such enforceability, examining each 
receivable including its governing law is significant and unavoidable. ‘The expectation 
of enforceability means that any diligent assignee will examine the law governing the 
contract creating each bundled [receivable].’57  Taking Article 14(2) of the Rome I 
Regulation as an example, such enforceability is indeed a legal matter of the 
assignability of a receivable which is already subject to the law of the contract creating 
it. An argument against the law of assigned receivables, i.e. that it is impractical for an 
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assignee to investigate the law of each receivable, might not be so appealing.58 In case 
any risk of non-enforcement exists, it is usually mitigated by market practices.59 Such 
mitigation is based on a business model of bulk assignments conducted by an assignee. 
It will be demonstrated by a contractual term agreed with an assignor in their contract of 
assignment. As has been remarked, ‘the assignee takes the risk of non-enforcement onto 
its books and prices the assignment accordingly. The value of the transaction consists 
not in the enforceability of [each receivable] but in the profit derived from the [bulk 
assignments].’60  
In the context of bulk assignments, it is the law of the assigned receivables and the law 
of the assignment contract that are the main concern. In contrast, proposing different 
connecting factors for single and bundled assignments is misleading and 
inappropriate.61 The future complexity of financial practice will be the result if a third 
kind of conflict-of-law rules is chosen to govern the proprietary aspect of assignment in 
addition to those two.62 Another practical reason for a rights-based approach which 
leads to the law of assignment is to create flexibility in an assignment transaction. It 
avoids the need for a specific sectoral rule in a financial industry. Each business sector 
can mould its own choice of law which is considered to be the one best-suited to the 
sector’s needs.63 For example, the law chosen in a factoring business could coincide 
with the law enforced at the assignor’s location. This is normally the case as it is the 
choice that seems to be most favoured by this sector.64 The rights-based approach is 
therefore an attempt reasonably intending to support bulk assignments of receivables in 
the real financial practice of relevant financial sectors.  
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6.2.2 Rights-based approach to receivables financing businesses 
(1) The rights-based approach does not impair receivables financing 
businesses 
The rights-based approach does affect the law of assignment but does not impair 
receivables financing practice. So as future receivables and bulk assignments can be 
effectively transferred, assignment, either outright or security, can be processed 
normally through the rights-based approach. The thing that this approach has a great 
impact on is the legal perspectives of the substantive law of assignment. Whereas the 
property-contract approach separates the law of assignment into contractual and 
proprietary, the rights-based approach does not require that. Via the latter, the law of 
assignment is united as a legal rule for transferring rights to payment. Valuable interests 
in rights to payment can be effectively transferred by way of sale or used as security.65 
Outright assignment is a contract whereby rights to receive payment from a debtor 
under a receivable are transferred outright from assignor to assignee. It is not ownership 
of property but rights to receive payment that are assigned. After assignment, the 
assignee shall become entitled to those rights in place of the assignor. Assignment by 
way of security is not a contract in which property is used as collateral. It is contractual 
rights to receive payment under an assigned receivable that are provided as security. 
This is, in economic terms, a process whereby money is exchanged for money. 66 
Contractual rights to payment in receivables are changed to become a sale price or a 
security benefit by way of assignment. In the rights-based approach, this business can 
still be carried out in the same manner. Adopting it does not cause any harm to current 
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financing activities against receivables. On the contrary, as shall be enlarged under the 
next heading, it supports such activities, especially on a global scale.             
(2) The rights-based approach facilitates receivables financing businesses  
Recognising the assignment of receivables as the free flow of contractual rights to 
payment facilitating receivables financing businesses – such as factoring, invoice 
discounting and securitisation – is the main object and outcome of the rights-based 
approach. The law of assignment as well as conflict-of-law rules shall serve as a legal 
foundation for these business operations in international contexts.67 The more that laws 
are clear and certain, the more that businesses run smoothly and soundly.  
Consider factoring as an example, this is a business where finance is raised against 
receivables. Its legal foundation is based on the substantive law of assignment. An 
assignor who holds original rights to payment in receivables concludes an assignment, 
namely a factoring contract, to transfer these rights to an assignee, or a factor. The 
factor is a purchaser of receivables from an assignor, typically called the client.68 From 
a financial perspective, factoring is a type of supplier financing which is explicitly 
linked to the value of accounts receivable.69 As has been submitted, ‘[the] legal and 
judicial environment may also play a critical role in determining the success of 
factoring’. 70  Substantially, this concerns a key question of whether that legal and 
judicial environment has a law that recognises the factoring business. In terms of 
international factoring, an account of the conflict-of-law rules of that legal and judicial 
system must also be given. The legal validity and enforcement of a factoring transaction 
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lies in the law governing the factoring contract, i.e. the law of the assignment.71 The 
value of accounts receivable is connected to the original contracts creating the assigned 
receivables, 72  and hence the governing law, i.e. the law of the receivables. Credit 
information on all debtors subject to receivables assigned is another important element 
of the success of the factoring business.73 The assessment of receivables in this financial 
activity is again consistent with the reason developed by the rights-based approach that 
the law of the assigned receivables cannot be ignored. Even if any other law is chosen to 
govern the third-party effectiveness of assignment and priority issues, investigating the 
law of the assigned receivables is still vital. The former does not negate the importance 
of the latter.74 Adding another law, such as the law of the assignor’s location, will in 
turn result in a further burden on a person involved in the business. And higher 
transaction costs will, of course, be a consequence. Factoring businesses would be 
impaired by this add-on. By contrast, the business practice matches the proposal of the 
rights-based approach. According to it, it is the law that governs the assignment contract 
that shall decide legal issues arising out of the assignment, and the law that creates the 
assigned receivables that shall determine the legal issues relating to them. The law of 
the assigned receivables shall be examined both for measuring the financial value and 
examining the legal existence of those receivables at the same time. No further practical 
complications or transaction costs will be added on. Maintaining the operation of the 
factoring facility is thus a positive outcome.  
For invoice discounting, which is a bulk funding facility, its business model is basically 
similar to that of factoring, except the condition that individual invoice details are not 
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known to a funder.75  Here, the substantive law of assignment functions as a legal 
foundation of the business transaction. It shall thus benefit from the rights-based 
approach in the same way that factoring does. By the same token, in the case of 
securitisation, the substantive law of assignment serves as a basic legal formula for this 
financial activity. ‘Outright assignment is the necessary first step in the true sale 
securitisation [of receivables].’76 Examining and applying the choice of law for the 
assignment contract and the law for the assigned receivables is therefore essential, and 
hence inevitable. Based on the rights-based approach, receivables shall be treated as a 
freely flowing financial asset. Facilitating all these financial techniques at the 
international level is a practical consequence of this approach.  
In contrast, if the property-contract approach is considered, laws of assignment must be 
divided into contractual and proprietary categories. The contractual category which is 
largely based on freedom of contract can be handled without much difficulty. But 
whenever a financial practice encounters the proprietary side of the law, this is where 
such freedom is limited. A relevant legal issue – such as notification, registration of 
assignment or notice filing – will have to be decided according to an applicable 
mandatory rule of property law, which might vary across countries. To know the 
applicable law depends on the conflict-of-law rules regulating this matter, which also 
varies across countries.77 The law of lex situs of receivables, the law of the assignor’s 
location or the law of assigned receivables are all proposed to deal with the proprietary 
aspects of assignment. Yet, no general solution can be found via the property-contract 
approach.78 It thus creates difficulties for financial businesses dealing with receivables 
assignment.  
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6.3 Summary remarks 
It is a correct philosophy, in terms of both legal and practical perspectives, to say that 
‘[receivables] financing cannot be viewed in isolation but must be seen in the context of 
a life cycle of assets’.79 What the rights-based approach proposes is, for substantive 
purposes, to treat the assignment of receivables according to its true legal nature and 
systemise it as such, according to its real financial cycle. For conflict-of-law purposes, 
this is to treat an assignment in international circumstances as an international transfer 
of contractual rights to payment. The legal issues arising from it shall be characterised 
and decided based on this methodology. As analytically indicated in this chapter, the 
main foundation and its consequence is this.  
The rights-based approach is consistent with the true legal nature of the assignment of 
receivables. It proposes rules, for both substantive aspects and conflict of laws, which 
are consistent with the true legal nature of assignment. In terms of legal theory, it offers 
a fundamental legal understanding and principle with the possibility of eliminating or 
limiting legal characterisation problems and other difficulties resulting from 
assignment. Unlike the property-contract approach where some obstacles are likely to 
be encountered, under the rules of the rights-based approach there is no need to 
distinguish between contractual and proprietary issues arising from assignment. They 
shall all be regarded as involving the contractual transfer of contractual rights to 
payment. Without any mandatory rule of property law being involved, assignment shall 
be treated on the basis of contract law. It subsequently creates a chance to harmonise the 
substantive laws of assignment at the international level. In terms of legal practice, the 
rights-based approach is appropriate for typical financial transactions based on 
assignment which include the assignment of future receivables and bulk assignments. 
This approach facilitates financial businesses, such as factoring and invoice discounting, 
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the operations of which benefit from the law of assignment. What the rights-based 
approach can also achieve is unifying the different legal approaches of contract and 
property, which vary across countries, into a single one. It shall subsequently serve, 
support and promote the growth of receivables financing activities and their 
development into a single broad market practice as a whole.  
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis offers a new analytical explanation for conflict of laws relating to the 
assignment of receivables. It criticises the property-contract approach that divides laws 
of assignment and conflict-of-law rules into proprietary and contractual categories. 
Instead, it proposes a rights-based approach that sees assignment as the transfer of rights 
and establishes conflict-of-law rules on this basis. Conflict-of-law rules are generally 
based on and developed from an understanding of relevant substantive laws. 1  By 
analysing substantive laws of assignment and conflict of laws relating to assignment in 
international scenarios, the principal outcome of the thesis can be concluded as follows.  
From the substantive aspect of the assignment of receivables, its true legal nature is the 
transfer of contractual rights to monetary payment against a debtor from assignor to 
assignee. Receivables which are the object of assignment are, according to their legal 
classification, intangible things. 2  Their basic features are those of contracts, not 
property.  They are created by contractual relations between debtor and creditor. Rights 
embodied in them are in personam and so must and can be asserted only against the 
debtor. They are not rights in rem in a specific property. Based on English legal 
terminology, they are choses in action which are things or rights that can be enforced by 
legal action.3 Although they contain value in themselves and are regarded as financial 
assets, they are but contractual rights claimable against the debtor. They are not 
property in a creditor’s hands. Once receivables are transferred by way of assignment, 
they are contractual rights to payment, not property, that are assigned. Assignment is a 
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method of transferring contractual rights or interests, or choses in action, that is 
recognised by law.4 It is a contract concluded between creditor or assignor and assignee. 
An assignment has contractual preliminary results in a triangular relationship between 
creditor, assignee and debtor. Legal issues arising from an assignment can be divided 
based on each relationship in that triangle. This is the result of the substantive laws of 
assignment in conjunction with the law of contract creating the receivables assigned.  
However, this is not the end of the matter. There are also other legal effects that flow 
from assignment. These effects are the effectiveness of assignment against third parties 
and priority problems. They are typically regarded by the property-contract approach as 
proprietary issues of assignment.5 According to the rights-based approach, by contrast, 
the effectiveness of assignment against third parties and priority problems are not 
proprietary issues separate from the law of assignment. They are another kind of legal 
effects resulting from the law of assignment itself. For the third-party effectiveness of 
an assignment, this is established by the law of assignment through an additional 
method being imposed, the purpose of which is to secure the assignee’s rights. Thus the 
assignee has to follow that method if he needs his rights to be effective against third 
parties. That method may be, for example, notifying the debtor.6 For priority issues, this 
is a problem between competing assignees where the same receivables have been 
assigned more than once. Under English law, for instance, priority is given to the 
assignee who is the first to notify the debtor, if at the time of the assignment he does not 
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know of the prior assignment.7 The rights-based approach regards a priority problem not 
as a question of who owns receivables but who has a better right in them. This question 
again depends on the substantive laws of assignment and the law of assigned 
receivables. No property right needs to be considered. No proprietary explanation needs 
to be given.   
From the conflict-of-laws aspect, to choose a governing law for an international 
assignment of receivables is to choose a law governing an international transfer of 
contractual rights to monetary payment. Conflict-of-law rules under the rights-based 
approach are structured based on this principle. Unlike the property-contract approach, 
legal issues arising out of assignment are not characterised into proprietary and 
contractual categories.8 They all are seen as a special set of legal issues flowing from an 
assignment of rights. Both proprietary and contractual issues are united. 
Characterisation difficulties between property and contract are, as a consequence, 
resolved. The methodology the rights-based approach adopts is to classify those legal 
issues into a class of legal relationships between relevant persons, i.e. the relationship of 
rights between assignor and assignee, rights relating to a debtor and rights against third 
parties.  
A comparative study shows that conflict-of-law rules in a jurisdiction follow the legal 
classifications used in the substantive laws of assignment. They are all based on the 
property-contract approach. Both in England and Europe, legal issues arising out of an 
assignment of receivables are divided into contractual and proprietary. Conflict-of-law 
rules are applied accordingly. While the contractual aspect is principally governed by 
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the law of the assignment contract, there have been developments that attempt to reveal 
an appropriate way of governing the proprietary aspect, e.g. the third-party effectiveness 
of assignment and priority disputes. The possibilities range from the lex situs of 
receivables, the law of the debtor’s location and the law of the assignor’s location to the 
law of the assigned receivables and the law of assignment.9 This causes characterisation 
difficulties and uncertainty in applying the law, as happened in the Raiffeisen and the 
Hansa cases.10 Though the law of the assignor’s location is preferred by international 
instruments, there seems to be no universal acceptance. The Receivables Convention 
which adopts this choice has not yet come into force, and this choice has only been 
written as an optional rule in the Guide.11 In the European context, a proposal for the 
law of the assignor’s location was not accepted by the Rome I Regulation.12 The law of 
the assignor’s location is also the rule under the UCC Article 9.13 However, it is based 
on a mandatory, multi-state filing system and it is far from clear how this or a 
compatible system could be developed on a global scale. Additionally, characterisation 
difficulties between proprietary and contractual issues still remain problematic, and no 
solution has been offered by American law.  
Considering conflict of laws under the property-contract approach, although discussions 
and studies have been conducted, there is as yet no clear nor certain answer.14 Although 
several typical choices have been recommended and their advantages and disadvantages 
have been thoroughly analysed, a recent conclusion is that no general solution is 
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perfect.15 As critically analysed by this thesis, the fundamental difficulty of the problem 
lies in the legal concept of assignment under the property-contract approach itself. It 
leads to difficulties in pointing to an appropriate choice of applicable law. 
Characterising the legal matters of assignment into contract and property cannot be done 
with certainty. Different legal classifications among legal jurisdictions result in different 
perspectives on the legal issues arising from assignment, and hence differences in 
choices-of-law rules. 16  By reestablishing the understanding of substantive laws of 
assignment as a special method of transferring rights, and not as a hybrid method with 
the legal nature of both contract and property as the property-contract approach 
generally claims, the rights-based approach advances a rule for each category of the 
legal relationship of rights arising out of assignment. Firstly, the relationship between 
assignor and assignee is governed by the law of assignment. Secondly, the relationship 
between assignor and debtor as well as between debtor and assignee are decided by 
reference to the law of the assigned receivables. Thirdly, the law of assignment also 
governs the relationship between assignee and third parties. Finally, the law of the 
assigned receivables is also applicable to priority problems.  
The thesis demonstrates that it is the rights-based approach that is consistent with the 
true legal nature of the assignment of receivables. Considering the law of assignment 
and its conflict-of-law rules in this way makes this subject clearer, more understandable 
and more organised. This is true not only in terms of legal principles, but also in terms 
of legal practice. By regarding assignment as a transfer of contractual rights, the rights-
based approach creates an opportunity to harmonise conflict-of-law rules across 
jurisdictions. This can be achieved without resorting to the diversification of property 
law across jurisdictions. The obstacle arising from proprietary terminology and 
                                                             
15
 BIICL (n 9) 402. 
16
 See ibid part 4; also Raiffeisen Zentralbank Österreich AG v Five Star General Trading LLC [2001] EWCA 
Civ 68; Brandsma qq v Hansa Chemie AG, the Dutch Supreme Court (Hoge Raad), 16 May 1997 in 
Struycken (n 5); Steffens (n 8).  
262 
 
methodology is overcome. Characterisation of the proprietary and contractual matters of 
assignment is irrelevant. Its difficulties are revealed.  
For receivables financing, the rights-based approach can cope with both the assignment 
of future receivables and bulk assignments of receivables. A future receivable is seen as 
a contractual right to monetary payment under a contract that is expected to be 
concluded in the future. It is, in other words, a future contractual right of an assignor 
against his debtor which is based on the assignor’s business activities. An assignment of 
future receivables, if sufficiently identifiable as receivables to which the assignment 
relates, is treated as an agreement to assign.17 The legal issues affecting this transaction, 
if relevant to the future receivables purported to be assigned, are governed by the law of 
the contract creating those future receivables. Other issues, such as the legal 
requirements of assignment, refer to the law of the assignment contract. In the case of 
bulk assignments, the rights-based approach can account for them thoroughly. It treats 
them as a transaction whereby a bundle of contractual rights is transferred by a single 
master contract of assignment. Subject to this, rules applicable to bulk assignments are 
compatible with those applied to an assignment of a single receivable. Those rules are, 
for the relationships between assignor and assignee as well as between assignee and 
third parties, the law of the assignment contract, and for the relationships between 
assignor or assignee and debtor as well as priority issues, the law of the receivables. The 
rights-based approach emphasises, in theory, on the examination of each receivable in 
the bulk as it is inevitable to realise its governing contract law. It stresses, in practice, 
the orientation of financial market models where a risk of non-payment of a single 
receivable is mitigated by contract and bulk-receivables pricing.18 This is where the 
                                                             
17
 See Oditah (n 4) 27–32; Guest (n 4) 6–10; Akseli (n 6) 140–146; M Bridge, L Gullifer, G McMeel and S 
Worthington, The law of personal property (Sweet & Maxwell 2013) 786; art 8 of the Receivables 
Convention; the Guide, para 105. 
18
 See R Fentiman, ‘Trading Debts Across Borders: A European Solution?’ (2010) 17 IJGLS 245, 264 and 
267; Hartley (n 14) 53; art 8 of the Receivables Convention; UNCITRAL, Explanatory note by the 
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market practice meets the legal principles with consistency. Without requiring any 
changes to the nature of business practice, the rights-based approach is therefore not an 
obstacle to the free flow of receivables. It does, on the contrary, facilitate financing 
practices against receivables on the basis of their real legal nature. 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
UNCITRAL secretariat on the United Nations Convention on the Assignment of Receivables in 
International Trade (UN Publication 2004) para 26. 
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